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abstract
This thesis examines the informal sharing of information and cooperation between
police agencies across international borders, and how it is or should be informed by
international human rights law. The author looks at how intelligence-led policing theory
has affected transnational policing. A distinction is made between police actions made
on domestic soil that have adverse consequences abroad and police actions made on
foreign soil that have adverse consequences. The first category of cases is firmly within
jurisdiction and covered by domestic and international legal obligations. The second
category of cases introduces the concept of the extraterritorial application of
international human rights instruments. The theory is illustrated by the case studies of
the Bali Nine and of Maher Arar. Finally the author suggests methods of best practice
for transnational information sharing and suggests that all government agencies should
follow these rules.
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1 Introduction
1.

Over the last few decades, a new spirit of police-to-police cooperation has
emerged at the transnational level. While this cooperation between national
police agencies has come to prominence in the last fifteen to twenty years, it
accelerated significantly after the al-Qaeda attacks on US soil in 2001. But
counter-terrorism is only one example of the increasing number of criminal
activities which are being identified as having an international dimension requiring
a transnational police-to-police response. Other such crimes include drug
trafficking, child pornography, people trafficking and identity theft.

2.

International cooperation takes many forms and is a wide area ripe for legal
research and analysis. Increasingly, national police forces post liaison officers to
each other’s forces and to international and regional police organisations. Police
also undertake joint operations across jurisdictions. Police attend international
conferences and training courses at the international level, including at training
centres set up for this purpose. This essay, however, examines only information
sharing across international borders, touching on the other forms of cooperation
only when relevant.

3.

The growth in transnational cooperation coincides with several global trends,
without which the breadth, depth and frequency of international cooperation could
not have been so rapid. Foremost among these trends is the introduction and allpervasive expansion of information technology. Computers have enabled the
storage, collation and analysis of ever-increasing amounts of information. This
proliferation of information-gathering has spawned its own theory: intelligence-led
policing.

4.

Intelligence-led policing means different things to different people. At its core the
theory is a management tool, which sees ‘raw’ information given to analysts who
‘process’ it and turn it into intelligence. This intelligence is used by police
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management to target finite resources as effectively as possible. As such, the
theory is underpinned by and promotes the collection of information. This leads
to an insatiable desire for information that seems to be based on an
undemonstrated belief that the more information fed to analysts, the better will be
the resulting intelligence.
5.

The growth of telecommunications technology is another significant global trend
informing increased transnational police-to-police cooperation. Global
telecommunications networks, such as the internet, have allowed police to
increase dramatically the pool from which information can be drawn. National
police can conveniently and quickly access databases belonging to regional and
international police organisations, such as Interpol, Europol and ASEANPOL.

6.

This growth in the willingness of police to share information across international
borders has largely been without reference to international human rights
standards. It is to this latter trend that this essay is directed.

7.

Formal transnational cooperation in criminal matters, such as mutual legal
assistance and extradition, is largely governed by treaty and domestic statute.
Informal transnational cooperation in criminal matters, such as police-to-police
information sharing and cooperation in investigations, is largely ungoverned by
treaty or statute. For example, there is no international treaty establishing
Interpol. However there are signs that this is changing. Over the last decade the
Europeans, through the establishment of Europol, have begun to establish a body
of bilateral treaties governing transnational police cooperation.

8.

This paper will look at this brave new world of informal transnational policing
through the prism of two infamous cases: the Canadian case of Maher Arar; and
the Australian case of the Bali Nine. These two case studies have brought
transnational policing into the consciousness of the public like never before,
undermining public confidence in operational policing. The need to formalise
transnational policing is important in order to restore public confidence in police
and the important work they do across international borders.
–2–

9.

The second chapter of this paper attempts to define the term informal
transnational police-to-police information sharing. It then examines the process of
how information is shared by police across international borders, including the role
of organisations such as Interpol. The chapter introduces the controversial
operational guidelines for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) when cooperating
with a police agency from a country that retains the death penalty. The guidelines
came to public attention after the AFP shared information that led to the arrest of
nine Australian drug traffickers Indonesia. In Canada, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) operate under more formalised procedures when
cooperating with countries that violate human rights. These procedures came
under judicial scrutiny in the Commission of Inquiry into case of Maher Arar, who
was tortured in Syria after Canadian agents shared information with their
American counterparts. Finally, this chapter explores the theory of intelligence-led
policing, which has influenced information gathering and sharing at domestic and
international levels.

10.

Chapter 3 looks more closely at the two case studies. Firstly, at how information
sharing between the AFP and Indonesian National Police (INP) led to the death
sentences of Australian drug smugglers in Indonesia in 2005. Attention is paid to
the AFP practice of transnational police-to-police cooperation and how the
Australian courts have viewed it. Secondly, this chapter traverses how information
sharing between the RCMP and US authorities led to the torture of Maher Arar in
Syria in 2002. In particular, the chapter looks at the Arar Commission’s findings of
RCMP practices, which were found wanting in this case.

11.

Chapter 4 looks at the domestic and international obligations of police when they
operate across borders. Two main legal scenarios are canvassed. The first is
when police travel abroad and act in a foreign jurisdiction. The second is when
police act domestically but their actions have adverse human rights consequences
abroad. Overarching these scenarios are domestic and international law. The
obligations to expose no one to the real risk of execution or torture are examined.
–3–

12.

Chapter 5 examines the question of whether and how a country’s human rights
obligations extend to the extraterritorial acts and consequences of its domestic
agents. The chapter first examines the legal concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under public international law and international human rights law. In particular,
the view of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Palestinian Wall case,
which found that a country’s human rights obligations extend to all acts done in
the exercise of that State’s jurisdiction abroad, whether in occupied territory or
not. The chapter examines the limited jurisprudence of Canadian, United States
and Australian courts on this question. For a more detailed legal analysis, the
chapter examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
which is more nuanced and developed than other jurisdictions. The purpose of
this detailed analysis is to explore some of the various complexities of jurisdiction
and state responsibility raised by transnational cooperation.

13.

In the sixth chapter I attempt to draw together some of the legal issues raised in
the Bali Nine and Arar cases by suggesting a model of best practice for informal
transnational police-to-police information sharing. Many of the suggestions
endorse the recommendations of the Arar Commission of Inquiry. Others are
specific to Australia and/or Canada. Before making these suggestions, there is a
brief examination of police culture and methods for encouraging the adoption of
best-practice among rank-and-file police officers. At the end of the chapter, I
examine the ‘ticking-bomb’ scenario and conclude that there are extreme
situations in which the public interest outweighs the human rights of individuals.

14.

Finally, I suggest that further research is required into the feasibility of
extrapolating this best-practice to all transnational agency-to-agency cooperation,
not just police-to-police cooperation. The proposed model is a legal framework
that expressly requires State agents, whether police, immigration, intelligence,
customs or otherwise, to consider the human rights implications of their actions
when dealing with countries with questionable human rights records.
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2 Informal Transnational Information Sharing
in Law Enforcement
15.

This chapter first examines what I mean by the term informal transnational police-

to-police information sharing. It then discusses why information sharing is
necessary and legitimate. Then this chapter explores the ways in which
information is shared informally between foreign police agencies. This is followed
by a brief overview of the theory of intelligence-led policing and its relationship to
the expansion of transnational police cooperation. Finally, there is an outline of
some of the limits placed on this form of international cooperation.

2.1 Preliminary definitions
16.

This paper focuses on informal transnational police-to-police information sharing.
As a matter of definition, I will briefly deconstruct this phrase and explain how I
am using each of its constituent parts in this paper.

17.

Informal: I am broadly dividing all forms of transnational police-to-police
cooperation into two categories: formal and informal. The categories describe the
degree of legal formality imposed on the cooperation. I define ‘formal’
cooperation as that which occurs pursuant to international or bilateral treaties
signed by nation states, often incorporated into domestic law and subject to
judicial oversight. An example of such structured cooperation is the mutual legal
assistance treaty (MLAT), which commonly allows foreign police to request the
provision of evidence for court and to request the exercise of coercive powers
(such as search or seizure) in a foreign jurisdiction to obtain evidence.1 Other
examples include extradition and anti-money laundering measures. While these
1

e.g Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of Canada on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters [1990] ATS 11; 1990 Canada Gazette Part I, 1582 (entry into force:
14 March 1990); implemented by Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c.30
(4th Supp.), and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth).
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treaty arrangements are largely expressed in terms of government-to-government
cooperation, police-to-police cooperation is occasionally, and increasingly,
expressly mentioned at treaty-level.2
18.

‘Informal’ cooperation is, generally, that which is governed neither by statute nor
treaty. This is not to say that such arrangements are not governed by written
guidelines or agreements between police. There is a vast spectrum of such
informal cooperation. At one end of the spectrum is cooperation provided under
such semi-formal documents as Memorandums of Understanding, negotiated and
signed by the law enforcement agencies (rather the governments) of different
nations. At the other end of the spectrum is one-to-one cooperation where
individual officers communicate and assist each other, for example over the
telephone or by email.

19.

Transnational: I use this term in a literal sense to mean simply across
international borders. This distinguishes cooperation from that which occurs
between domestic law enforcement agencies. I prefer this term to ‘global’,
because that term is best reserved to describe multinational policing operations.3

20.

Police-to-police: This form of transnational cooperation occurs between law
enforcement agencies. It can be coordinated bilaterally, for example pursuant to
Memorandums of Understanding, or multilaterally, the most obvious example of
which is Interpol. Police-to-police assistance is but one form of what is more
widely known as agency-to-agency assistance. Police can assist other types of
agencies, such as the RCMP’s cooperation with the CIA in the Arar case.

2

for example, the recent ‘Lombok Treaty’ between Australian and Indonesia is the first formal
treaty dealing with agency-to-agency assistance signed by Australia: Agreement between Australia
and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation (Mataram, Lombok, 13
November 2006) [2008] ATS 3. Article 3 of the Lombok Treaty describes several areas of agencyto-agency cooperation, including law enforcement. In law enforcement, cooperation extends to
inter alia dialogue, capacity building and joint operations.
3
e.g. under the auspices of the United Nations as UN Police (formerly UNCIVPOL),
<http://www.un.org//en/peacekeeping/sites/police/>.
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21.

Information sharing: There are many forms of transnational police-to-police
cooperation. There are joint operations,4 such as Operation Alliance between the
AFP and INP.5 Another example of cooperation is capacity building, whereby
expertise and training is provided to a foreign law enforcement agency. However,
this paper deals only with the sharing of information and intelligence, which for
brevity’s sake I shorten to ‘information sharing’. I distinguish between information
and intelligence. Intelligence is the valued-added product after pieces of
information have been analysed. This difference lies at the heart of intelligenceled policing, which is discussed later in this thesis. Information sharing also
occurs orally and in documentary form. Such cooperation might be formal or
informal.

2.2 the legitimate need to share information
22.

While it is a trite point, it nevertheless needs to be acknowledged that cooperation
and information sharing between police across international borders is important.
There is a legitimate need to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of
such transnational crimes as terrorism, child pornography, and drug and people
trafficking. This is underlined by the observation of his Honour Justice O’Connor,
the Arar Commissioner, that:6
Information sharing among agencies allows a more comprehensive picture to
emerge. Viewing different pieces of information together may allow a more
complete and accurate assessment of the threat being investigated and the steps
needed to address that threat. Sometimes, seemingly inconsequential bits of
information may take on an importance not otherwise apparent when viewed
alongside other information. Broad information sharing is therefore essential to
effective prevention.
4

the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000), UNGA res 55/25, encourages
parties to formalise joint-investigation cooperation and to ensure that ‘the sovereignty of the State
Party in whose territory such investigation is to take place is fully respected’: Article 19.
5
Operation Alliance was the joint AFP-INP investigation of the October 2002 Bali terrorist
bombings: see, AFP, ‘Bali Bombings 2002’, archived at
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/34194/20030807-0000/www.afp.gov.au/page70b2.html>.
6
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of
the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006), 102.
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23.

The consequences of agencies not sharing information were central to the final
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in the USA. As some sociologists had
already observed in their research,7 the 9/11 Commission found that police and
security agents were reluctant to share their information with other agencies.8
The Commission identifies and criticises the prevailing culture wherein a ‘need-toknow’ must be demonstrated prior to information sharing. The Commission also
notes that, while there are institutional risks associated with sharing information
‘(criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions)’, there are few rewards for
sharing information:
There are no punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a “needto-know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-toshare” culture of integration.

24.

While this is not a transnational example, given that it deals with the sharing of
information between US agencies within the same jurisdiction, there are
resonances for transnational police cooperation. If information is not shared, or
not gathered, then the threat of a serious crime might go undetected, thereby
reducing any chance of preventing it. This was certainly recognised by senior
executives of the AFP when they increased transnational cooperation in the fight
against drug trafficking in the late 1990s.9

25.

The process of transnational cooperation also needs to be reciprocal. What the
Arar Commission observed of information sharing in the context of terrorismrelated investigations holds true for all forms of information sharing:10

7

e.g. Peter Manning, ‘Policing new social spaces’ in J. Sheptycki (ed) Issues in Transnational
Policing (2000) 194: referring to the ‘conflict and competition’ between agencies (both national and

transnational) which impacts on police-to-police information sharing.
8
The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (22 July 2004), 416-7,
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>.
9
by the mid-1990s, the AFP was firmly of the view that ‘nearly all major crime issues impacting on
Australia originate elsewhere’ and that international police cooperation was vital in disrupting
transnational crimes like drug-trafficking and fraud: Alan Mills (Assistant Commissioner, AFP),
‘Organised crime goes global’ (1995) 48 Platypus 19. See also: David Schramm (Director of
International, AFP), ‘Isolation no longer a natural security buffer against trans-national crime’
(1996) 51 Platypus 5.
10
Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 6, 102.
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...information sharing must be reciprocal if it is to be effective. If an agency wishes
to receive information from other agencies, it must be prepared to provide
information in return. The networks within which terrorism-related information is
shared must function on a co-operative basis.

26.

This imperative is at the heart of the AFP Commissioner’s all-or-nothing approach
to information sharing.11 However, as this paper later argues, such cooperation
should not be left solely to the discretion of police and it should have limits.
Irrelevant, inaccurate, unreliable or out-of-date information can be dangerous to
share. The Arar Commission concluded that sharing such information is
potentially dangerous and ‘may be worse than not sharing information at all’.12

27.

There are also legal and human rights implications to be considered. Of course, it
is important to consider how police might react to limits being placed on their
ability to share information transnationally.13 All of these issues will be canvassed
shortly.

2.3 Informal Information-Sharing Mechanisms
2.3.1 requests for and the spontaneous provision of information
28.

Transnational police-to-police information sharing can be instigated in two ways:
by a request from a foreign law enforcement agency; or by its spontaneous
provision to an agency.

29.

A solicited request is more likely to be auditable, because it is more likely to be
communicated through a centralised bureau. This is certainly so of requests for
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, which are formal and controlled by
treaty and statute. Nevertheless, a request can also be made informally, on an
officer-to-officer basis or pursuant to an inter-agency agreement such a
memorandum of understanding. This is more likely to occur at the investigatory
stage.
11
12
13

see [80] below.
Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 6, 104.
see “Police culture and human rights” on p.157.
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30.

The spontaneous provision of information is also recognised in some international
treaties.14 This involves investigators providing information that they think might
be of interest to a foreign agency, such as intelligence about the arrival of a
criminal suspect in the foreign jurisdiction.

31.

This distinction is significant because formal mechanisms for sharing information
often only refer to requests. It is arguable, for example, that Australian MLATs
only govern requests for information and not situations involving the spontaneous
provision of information. This is because the relevant legislation expressly states
that:15
Section 5:
The objects of this Act are:
(a) to regulate the provision by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters when a
request is made by a foreign country for any of the following...;
(b) to facilitate the provision by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters when a
request is made by a foreign country for the making of arrangements...; and
(c) to facilitate the obtaining by Australia of international assistance in criminal matters.
Section 6:
This Act does not prevent the provision or obtaining of international assistance in criminal matters
other than assistance of a kind that may be provided or obtained under this Act.

32.

This potential loophole makes it possible for requests to be dressed-up, with a nod
and a wink, as the spontaneous provision of information. The provision of
information pursuant to an informal police-to-police request for information,
without a paper trail of the originating request, can easily be characterised
retrospectively as spontaneous and unsolicited.

14

see for example: Article 11 (“spontaneous information”) in Second Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2001),
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/182.htm>; and Article 18 in Convention
Against Transnational Organised Crime [2004] ATS 12 (entered into force for Australia 26 June
2004).

15

Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) ss.5-6.
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33.

The practice of spontaneous cooperation was explained to a Senate Committee by
the AFP Commissioner in this fashion:16
There is no requirement for us to await a request from the other agencies. If we
have information we can actually provide the information. So we fully engage
those countries with the exchange of information. That ought not come as too
much of a surprise with globalisation and the transnational nature of crime. If
criminals do not recognise borders and they conduct their operations without any
regard for borders, then it is important that the policing agencies work together to
ensure that there are no intelligence gaps or information gaps in trying to deal
with a crime.

34.

While some information sharing might look spontaneous, it might actually be the
result of a request. For example, in the Bali Nine case, the AFP spontaneously
provided the INP with intelligence that suspected drug traffickers were in
Indonesia. In court, the AFP maintained that ‘the terms of the MOU [between the
AFP and the INP] contemplated the very provision of information by the AFP in
circumstances such as in this matter and it could properly be said of the MOU that
there was a standing request by Indonesia for such assistance’.17 This is
significant, because if unsolicited information sharing can constitute a ‘standing
request’, then such activity might fall within the jurisdiction of an MLAT treaty.
This point was not tested in Rush v Commissioner. This is an area ripe for further
legal research and analysis.

2.3.2 management of information flows
35.

According to Anderson’s classic analysis, cooperation between law enforcement
agencies can be centralised or decentralised.18 For the purposes of this paper, it
is not significant whether informal information sharing flows through a centralised
or decentralised conduit. This is so because the legal structure governing the
sharing should remain the same, regardless of the conduit through which the

16

Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168.
17
Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [73].
18
Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the politics of international police cooperation (1989) 172-178.
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information flows. The same basic rules for sharing should apply, no matter how
the information is communicated.
36.

In Policing the World, Anderson identifies four models for police-to-police
cooperation.19 When applied to information sharing, all four models describe a
tension between two competing priorities: the need to oversee information
sharing and the need to provide quick and effective communication of information.
In essence, Anderson’s models reflect a belief that these two priorities exist in
inverse proportion.

37.

In Anderson’s centralised model, all cooperation is coordinated through a single
agency, maximising oversight and respect for state sovereignty. For the
requesting police, the purpose of this centralisation is to ensure that they know to
whom to address requests and can be confident that the requestee has the
requisite authority to cooperate. For the requested police, the purpose of
centralisation is to ensure that management is aware of cooperation and that
shared information is provided in an efficient and consistent manner.20

38.

In the decentralised model, police at all levels can share information and
cooperate. This decentralisation increases the efficient flow of information, but
little effective oversight is possible. It is plain to see why many investigators
prefer this decentralised model: it is quicker, more efficient and there is a lot less
paperwork.

39.

Anderson’s other two models are modified or ‘qualified’ versions of the first two.
Anderson argues that these qualified models more closely resemble police
practice. In the qualified centralised model, information usually goes through a
central agency, but individual police may cooperate directly in special
circumstances. Finally, in the qualified decentralised model, police may cooperate

19

Anderson, n 18, 172-178.
e.g. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background Volume 1 (2006), 33.
20
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directly with their foreign counterparts, but are required to keep the central body
informed of all such cooperation.
40.

Robertson suggests that Anderson’s centralised model is essentially strategic in
nature;21 what we would call today an intelligence-led approach. Whereas the
decentralised model is tactical; taking an investigative case-by-case approach.
Robertson observes that some forms of transnational crime will require the
strategic approach, others the tactical:22
This may mean that different crimes will create different forms of cooperation,
some centralised and others decentralised, rather than there being a single
national blueprint covering all forms of international police cooperation.

41.

Robertson’s analysis of Anderson’s four models might help to explain why both the
RCMP and AFP have adopted a qualified centralised model. The adoption of this
halfway approach is flexible and adaptable to suit both strategic/intelligence and
tactical/investigative ends. For example, in an investigation such as Project A-O
Canada, cooperation would ordinarily have been coordinated through the Criminal
Intelligence Directorate (CID) in Ottawa. In evidence to the Arar Commission, a
senior investigative officer noted unfavourably that information sometimes takes
weeks to reach an investigations team via CID.23 However, under certain
circumstances once an investigation is underway, it is possible for investigators to
liaise directly with their foreign counterparts, provided that CID is kept informed.24
The AFP follows a similar qualified centralised model for transnational police-topolice cooperation, centred on the AFP Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC) in
Canberra,25 which operates inter alia Australia’s National Central Bureau (NCB) of
21

Kenneth Robertson (1994), ‘Practical Police Cooperation in Europe: the intelligence dimension’ in
Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer (ed), Policing Across National Boundaries (London: Pinter
1994), 111.
22
Robertson (1994), n 21, 111-2.
23
Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 20, 24.
24
Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 131. The Arar case highlighted
the need for oversight, to ensure that such cooperation is conducted according to procedural
guidelines. In that case, operational officers shared information with the FBI without attaching
written caveats.
25
Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008),
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/89127/AFPAnrep2007-08.pdf>, 82.
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Interpol.26 All of this is not to say that completely informal pick-up-the-phone
information exchange does not occur, but it is discouraged.
42.

The qualified centralised model is also favoured by Interpol in its Model Bilateral

Police Cooperation Agreement.27 The Model Agreement provides an obligation,
subject to national legislation, to exchange information relating to ‘ordinary
crimes’.28 All information exchange, whether provided spontaneously or by
request, is to be conducted via the relevant NCBs.29 Where the request ‘cannot
be made in good time’ via a NCB, then direct police-to-police contact may be
made. In such cases, however, both NCBs should be informed of the direct
request ‘as soon as possible’. The commentary to this provision is enlightening
because it highlights Interpol’s philosophy of the free flow of information to all
members. Though when entering information, members can choose to restrict
access to that information to particular parties.30 The commentary reads in part:31
The purpose of centralizing information exchanged under the Agreement is to
make it available to services or States not directly involved in a particular
exchange. These services or States can then use this information for other
investigations which may turn out to be linked to those at the basis of the initial
exchange. Centralizing information is the only way to establish and identify such
links. To be truly effective, bilateral or regional co-operation must be part of a
worldwide co-operation system...

43.

Apart from information sharing, the Model Agreement also provides for a right of
cross-border surveillance and pursuit, though these are not considered mandatory
provisions.32 The Model Agreement also contains a confidentiality clause, a
personal data protection clause, provisions for joint investigations, forensic and
technical assistance and training.
26

Australia joined Interpol in 1948 and the first Australian NCB was established in Melbourne,
hosted by Victorian Police: AFP, ‘Interpol – sixty years in Australia’ (2008) 98 Platypus 14. In 1975
the NCB was moved to Canberra and in 1979, when the AFP was formed, it inherited the NCB from
the old Commonwealth Police.
27
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement,
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/Model.asp>.
28
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 4.
29
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 5.
30
Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 5 (Raymond Kendall).
31
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 5 (commentary).
32
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, n 27, Article 8 & 9.

– 14 –

44.

One important element of the centralised model of transnational policing is the

liaison officer. Many countries post liaison officers abroad to facilitate cooperation
and information exchange with the foreign law enforcement agency. For example,
the AFP’s International Network boasts 87 international liaison officers in 33 cities
across 27 countries.33 According to AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty, the network is
‘the backbone of our international crime fighting strategy’.34 The RCMP’s
International Operations Branch has 36 liaison officers in 26 locations around the
world.35
45.

The growth of liaison networks over the last decade has been impressive and
reflects the growth of transnational policing. For example, in 1998 there were 28
AFP liaison officers in 16 countries.36 In 2004, 62 officers were based in 26
countries.37 Now there are: 87 international liaison officers in 33 cities across 27
countries.38

46.

Anderson’s is not the only model for police-to-police cooperation. His centralised
and decentralised models (and their qualified counterparts) are similar to the
usage of the term ‘formality’ by the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference
(CCIC).39 With respect to information sharing, the CCIC distinguishes between
three tiers of transnational police-to-police communication: Formal, formal and
informal.40 These categories are determined by the level of communication
(rather than legal formality) at which cooperation occurs and the level of
33

AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5.
Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, ‘Enhancing security through law
enforcement’, speech delivered at the Security in Government 2005 Conference (10 May 2005),
<http://www.aps.gov.au/media/national_media/national_speeches/2005/security_in_government_2005_conference.html>.
35
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘International Operations Branch’ (March 2009),
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ip-pi/pdf/iob-soi-eng.pdf> (accessed 31 May 2009).
36
Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 1998-1999, 35
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3680/annualreport98_99.pdf>.
37
Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2004-2005, 3,
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3706/annualreport04_05.pdf>.
38
AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5.
39
James Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing
(2002) 28ff.
40
James Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing
(2002) 28ff.
34
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supervision involved. ‘Formal’ communication is centralised and occurs at an
agency’s national headquarters. ‘formal’ communication occurs at the regional
level and involves some amount of oversight. While ‘informal’ information sharing
occurs without supervision on a one-to-one basis.
47.

Anderson’s centralised model approximates the CCIC’s Formal level of
communication. Whereas the formal level is a modified model, and the informal is
a decentralised model. I have chosen to adopt Anderson’s terminology, because
adopting the CCIC’s terminology would led to confusion, given my usage of the
adjectives ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ to describe the degree of legal structure in which
cooperation occurs (as opposed to the level and oversight of
communication/information flows).41

2.3.3 memorandums and letters of understanding
48.

In the Bali Nine case, AFP agents operated under a memorandum of
understanding with their Indonesian counterparts.42 Written agreements
negotiated between police agencies, setting out the terms and conditions of
cooperation, often take the form of a memorandum of understanding or an
exchange of letters. The latter being more suited to ad-hoc case-by-case
cooperation.

49.

The AFP has negotiated a considerable number of bilateral Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU) covering police-to-police cooperation and the sharing of
information and intelligence.43 Some agreements relate to cooperation in
transnational crime generally. Others relate to specific crimes. For example, the

41

for definition of formal and informal cooperation, see [17] ff.
see [122] ff.
43
these MOU have been signed with many law enforcement agencies, including: Afghanistan;
Brunei; Cambodia; China; Fiji; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea;
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Timor Leste; the United Kingdom; and, Vietnam. Of which only
Cambodia, Philippines, Timor Leste and the UK have abolished capital punishment.
42
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AFP has signed several MOU relating to child-sex offences with law enforcement
agencies in Asia, the Pacific and South America.44
50.

The text of each AFP MOU is confidential and is not publicly available,45 so there is
little which can be said about them. However, according to AFP Commissioner
Mick Keelty, the AFP can and does offer intelligence spontaneously, that is without
waiting for a request, under the terms of these MOU.46 All information sharing,
whether requested or spontaneous, is communicated via the AFP’s liaison
officers.47

51.

Because these MOU are confidential, it is not possible to discern whether they
contain human rights safeguards or recognise Australia’s sovereign right to place
conditions on cooperation when it comes to death penalty cases. The need for
police secrecy is unclear. While it is necessary that the details of an ongoing
police operation should not be disclosed publicly, there is no reason why the
‘framework’ procedures and rules for all such operations should be treated as a
national secret. Their release does not jeopardise any ongoing police operation
and the public has a right to know the rules by which its police cooperate with
foreign agencies. Any argument for secrecy is undercut by the fact that the MOUs
which Australia and Canada have separately negotiated with Europol are publically
available on Europol’s website.48

52.

The Arar Commission noted that agreements to cooperate should always be
written down, even if at first only in an exchange of letters, and they should be
44

Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007), 4,
<http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/61774/AFPAnrep2007.pdf>.
45
Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 169. Though, the MOU between Australia (not the AFP) and
Europol is publically available (on Europol’s website): Agreement on Operational and Strategic
Cooperation between Australia and the European Police Office (Feb 2007),
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/Australia.pdf>. See also: AFP,
Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 5.
46
Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168-9.
47
Evidence of Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee (31 October 2005), n 165, 168-9.
48
see fn 45.
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reviewed periodically.49 Such agreements should make it clear how Canada
expects the foreign agency to use the information. This is important because,
‘[o]nce information is in foreign hands, it will be used in accordance with the laws
of the foreign jurisdiction, which may not be the same as Canadian law’.50

2.3.4 Interpol and other international bodies
53.

International policing is facilitated by several international police bodies, the most
significant of which are Interpol and Europol. There are other smaller bodies,
such as ASEANAPOL, the Association of South-East Asian Nations Chiefs of Police.
ASEANAPOL is a grouping of police chiefs who meet annually to network and
discuss common issues. ASEANAPOL has no permanent Secretariat office and it
lacks the infrastructure of its two larger counterparts, though there have been
discussions to rectify this.51 Since 2007, ASEANAPOL’s database has been
accessible via Interpol.52

54.

Interpol (International Criminal Police Organisation) is not an operational police
force.53 One of its main functions is to act as an information and intelligence
clearing house. It is forbidden by its own Constitution to deal with matters of a
‘political, military, religious or racial character’.54 According to its Constitution,
Interpol aims:55
(1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all
criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different
countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.

49

Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 320-1.
Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 320.
51
Faez Hani, ‘Creation of ASEANAPOL Secretariat Discussed’ (20 March 2009) The Brunei Times,
<http://www.bt.com.bn/en/home_news/2009/03/20/creation_of_aseanapol_secretariat_office_discussed>.
52
Interpol, ‘Interpol and ASEANAPOL sign historic information-sharing agreement’ (media release)
7 June 2007, <http://www.interpol.int/public/News/2007/Aseanapol20070607.asp>.
53
Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). See also: Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 116.
54
Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 3.
55
Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 2.
50
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55.

Interpol is funded largely by contributions from its members.56 Its members are
not nation-states, but a representative police agency of a nation-state.57
Contributions are based on criteria such as a country’s population and Gross
National Product, with a maximum contribution amount.58 Interpol has been
granted Observer Status at the United Nations General Assembly and is treated as
a quasi-intergovernmental organisation, despite the fact that it is not underpinned
by treaty or controlled by any government.59 Interpol is recognised in several
prominent multilateral treaties, including the Convention against Transnational
Organised Crime.60 It is not accountable to any external body.61 Though of
course, national governments can control what is sent to Interpol by directing
their own police how to cooperate. There is also an internal ‘independent’ fivemember Supervisory Board responsible for overseeing the keeping and use of
Interpol’s records. The membership of the Supervisory Board includes an
Executive member of Interpol, a member appointed by the French government
and another appointed by Interpol.62 The complete independence of the Board is
questionable given, as Sheptycki observes, only one member is not directly chosen
by Interpol or selected from a list of candidates prepared by Interpol.63

56.

Interpol’s role as an information repository and clearing-house is underpinned by a
network of National Central Bureaus (NCBs). Each member is obliged to maintain

56

Interpol, Constitution (1956), Article 38.
Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 119. Sheptycki observes that the identity of Interpol members is
ambiguous, though he concludes that ‘the RCMP...is a member of Interpol and not the government
of Canada’.
58
Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 5 (Raymond Kendall).
59
James Sheptycki, "The Accountability of Transnational Policing Institutions: The Strange Case of
Interpol" (2004) 19 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 107, 117-23
60
e.g. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, n 262, article 18; Convention
against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, n 276, article 7;
Convention against Corruption 2003, n 274, article 46. Note, in these particular cases Interpol is
only mentioned in the context of mutual legal assistance, not police-to-police cooperation.
However, there is a general reference to Interpol in the Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism 1999 [2002] ATS 23 (entry into force: internationally, 1 April 2002; for
Australia, 26 October 2002; for Canada, 10 April 2002), article 18.
61
generally, see: Anderson (1989), n 53; and, Sheptycki (2004), n 59.
62
Anderson (1989), n 53, 66.
63
Sheptycki (2004), n 59, 122.
57
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a NCB through which information and intelligence is exchanged. The main
function of a NCB is, in the words of Anderson, ‘to act as a link between the police
forces in a country and the outside world’.64 In deference to national sovereignty,
they operate independently of Interpol headquarters in Lyon in the sense that no
member is obliged to send information to Interpol or to answer requests coming
from other members or Lyon.65 Any such obligations arise from bilateral
agreements between the parties, not via Interpol. It is possible for a police
agency sending information to Interpol to request that certain countries not have
access to the information.66
57.

For example, in 2007/2008, the Australian NCB processed a total of 25,013
incoming and outgoing messages via Interpol,67 of which 75% involved the
exchange of operational information and intelligence.68

58.

The European Police Office (Europol) was launched in 1999.69 It was established
due to many different pressures, including increased European administrative
integration and dissatisfaction with Interpol.70 It has five principal aims: “acting
as a central point for EU Members States’ exchange of criminal information;
operational intelligence analysis with a central analytical database; conducting
strategic intelligence analysis; spreading best investigative practice;
and...supporting transnational operation as conducted by the Member States”.71
Like Interpol, Europol acts as ‘an intelligence broker’.72 In 2007, Europol

64

Anderson (1989), n 53, 81.
Anderson (1989), n 53, 83.
66
Joint Committee on the NCA (5 December 1996), n 630, 21 (Raymond Kendall).
67
AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 25, 82.
68
Evidence of Keelty to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (31 October 2005),
n 165, 167.
69
Paul Norman, ‘The Evolution of European Policing Strategies in Response to Transnational Crime’
in James Sheptycki & Ali Wardak (eds), Transnational & Comparative Criminology (Abingdon:
Glasshouse Press, 2006), 323.
70
e.g. Anderson (1989), n 53, 170.
71
Norman (2006), n 69, 323-4.
72
Tom Schalken & Maarten Pronk, 'On Joint Investigation Teams, Europol and Supervision of
Their Joint Actions' (2002) 10 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminology 70, 73.
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exchanged 260,463 messages.73 Unlike Interpol, however, Europol also actively
supports joint investigations. Observing that Europol’s budget increased by 50%
in 2002, Norman noted that the events in the US on 11 September 2001 spurred
the growth and importance of Europol.74
59.

Europol has agreements with many non-European countries and organisations,
such as Interpol.75 Europol has signed agreements with both Australia and
Canada.76 For the AFP (and RCMP) these agreements provide ‘unprecedented
access to an extensive intelligence information database’.77 Under the agreement,
the AFP and RCMP each post a liaison officer to Europol headquarters in The
Hague, where there is direct access to other liaison officers from Interpol, 27 EU
countries as well as Australia, Canada, Croatia, Columbia, Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland and the United States (FBI, DEA, USPIS, ATF and US Secret
Service).78 This direct access represents a wealth of intelligence, but also a cost
saving given that only one liaison officer need be posted to one location rather
than many officers to many different locations. The Europol-AFP arrangements
have ‘contributed significant intelligence’ to Europol’s Analysis Work Files and
initiated an investigation which led to the arrest of several suspects on charges of
child pornography.79

60.

The legal structure of Europol is much sounder than that of Interpol. While
Sheptycki’s observation that ‘[c]onstitutionally there is no framework for the
governance of transnational policing globally’ remains largely true,80 the
73

European Police Office, Annual Report 2007 (2008), 32,
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Annual_Reports/Annual%20Report%202007.pdf>.
74
Norman (2006), n 69, 323-4.
75
see <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=agreements>.
76

Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the European Police
Office (Feb 2007), <http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/Australia.pdf>;
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Police Office (2002)
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements/227746.pdf>
AFP, ‘Joining forces with Europol’ (2007) 94 Platypus 14.
78
AFP, ‘Australia and Europol join forces to combat transnational crime’ (2008) 98 Platypus 10-11.
79
Europol, Annual Report 2007 (2008), n 73, 79.
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J. Sheptycki, 'Patrolling the New European (In)security Field' (2001) 9(2) European Journal of
Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 144, 158.
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governance of Europol within the framework of the European Union affords more
oversight. Interpol, the only truly international police cooperation organisation, is
not accountable to any democratic national or international institution. As
discussed above, Interpol exerts a large influence over its independent
Supervisory Board.81 In terms of data protection, Europol’s handling of
individuals’ data is overseen by a National Supervisory Board in each member
country and a Joint Supervisory Board.82 The Board of Governors of Europol is
accountable to the Council of Ministers.83 Complaints of maladministration against
Europol can be submitted with the Office of the European Ombudsman.84
Europol’s annual reports can be scrutinised by the Justice and Home Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this
is rarely done.85 However, the accountability for the actions of operational police
working through Europol is largely left up to the institutions and parliaments of
the state to which investigating officers belong.86 However, as Dorn observes,
from 1 January 2010 the European Parliament acquired a general oversight role of
Europol, as its finances move under the umbrella of the main EU budget.87 This is
significant as the European Parliament has signalled that improvements are

81
82

[55].

Europol Convention (1995) SN 3549/95, articles 23 & 24. For details of present and future data

protection mechanisms within Europol, see: Max-Peter Ratzel (Director of Europol), ‘Europol tasks:
present and future’, speech to 10th Anniversary of the Joint Supervisory Body Conference in
Brussels (9 October 2008),
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/Docs/JSB10thAnniversaryConferenceinBrussels9October2008.pdf>.
83
Schalken & Pronk (2002), n 72, 79-80.
84

Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general conditions governing the
performance of the Ombudsman's duties (1994) Adopted by European Parliament on 9 March 1994

(OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, p. 15) and amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002 (OJ L 92, 9.4.2002, p.
13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ L 189, 17.7.2008, p. 25),
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/resources/statute.faces>.
85
Kiron Reid, ‘Home Secretary and Improved Accountability of the Police’ (2005) 69 Journal of
Criminal Law 232, 253.
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Reid (2005), n 85, 253-4.
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Nicholas Dorn, 'The end of organised crime in the European Union' (2009) 51(2) Crime, Law and
Social Change 283, 284 & 286.
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required “as regards Europol’s democratic responsibility, especially following the
extension of its operational powers”.88
61.

Another important innovation is that the memorandums of understanding on
police-to-police cooperation are negotiated between Europol and a state, not
Europol and foreign police agencies. This might account for the public availability
of these MOUs.89

2.3.5 policy and operational guidelines

Australian practice: death penalty situation guidelines
62.

Australian practice and policy in relation to transnational police-to-police
cooperation has been defined in large part by the drive to police drug trafficking
and terrorism ‘at the source’ in South East Asia. The fact that these offences
attract the death penalty in much of the region has proven a significant challenge
for Australian police and policy makers, who have preferred respect for the
sovereignty of nations over respect for human rights in these matters.

63.

The AFP operates transnationally according to statute, ministerial directive and
internal guidelines. The Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (‘the AFP Act’)
authorises the AFP to provide assistance and information in transnational policing
operations to foreign law enforcement agencies:90
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE ACT 1979 - SECT 8
Section 8: Functions
(1) The functions of the Australian Federal Police are:
...
(bf) the provision of police services and police support services for the purposes of
assisting, or cooperating with, an Australian or foreign:
(i) law enforcement agency; or

88
89
90

Dorn (2009), n 87, 284.
see [51].

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.8(1)(bf).
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(ii) intelligence or security agency; or
(iii) government regulatory agency; and
...
(c) to do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of the foregoing
functions.

64.

By ministerial direction, the AFP must inter alia “develop relationships with
overseas law enforcement organisations to support international operational and
general law and order outcomes that benefit Australia’s domestic and international
interests”.91 It is also expected to contribute “effectively to the Government's
international law enforcement interests including matters involving cooperation to
combat transnational organised crime...”.

65.

In situations where the death penalty might apply, AFP agents operate under a
document entitled the AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police

Assistance in Death Penalty Charge Situations.92 The death penalty situation
guidelines have been in existence since 1993.93 They were revised in September
2006 and again in December 2009. I will refer to the guidelines in place when the
Bali Nine were arrested as the ‘pre-September 2006’ guidelines.94
66.

The pre-September 2006 and September 2006 guidelines distinguish between
cooperation in situations when a person has not yet been charged (‘pre-charge’)
and when a person has been charged or convicted (‘post-charge’) of an offence
subject to capital punishment. In summary, the guidelines:

91

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.37(2): the Minister in charge of the AFP may direct the
AFP how to operate and the Commissioner must comply. For most recent direction, see:
Ministerial Direction (August 2008), <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/operationalpriorities/ministerial-direction.aspx>.
92

AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police Assistance in Death Penalty Charge
Situations (April 2004): “the AFP may provide such [police-to-police] assistance as requested,

provided it meets existing policy guidelines, irrespective of whether the investigation may later
result in charges being laid which may attract the death penalty”.
93
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates, 24 May 2005, (Justice
Minister, Senator Ellison) 59.
94
it should be noted that the pre-September 2006 guidelines applied in the case of Rush v
Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12.
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a. grant police a discretion to cooperate (without reference to the
Minister) prior to the laying of charges that could lead to the death
penalty; and,
b. allow police, with the permission of the Attorney-General or Minister
for Home Affairs, to continue cooperating after capital charges are
laid.
67.

The distinction between pre-charge and post-charge situations is controversial
because not all legal systems demand that arrested suspects be charged and
brought before a magistrate as soon as possible. In a country with a civil law
tradition, like Indonesia for example, it is possible to arrest and detain someone
for months before actually charging them. That is, before the Australian
legislative framework of mutual legal assistance is enlivened to provide human
rights protections and before the broad pre-charge police-to-police discretion is
exhausted.

68.

The pre-charge guideline provides the AFP with a discretion to cooperate in death
penalty situations without reference to the Attorney-General. The discretion was
described in the following manner:95
pre-September 2006
...the AFP may provide [police-to-police] assistance as requested, provided it
meets existing policy guidelines, irrespective of whether the investigation may
later result in charges being laid which may attract the death penalty.
post-September 2006
•

Police-to-police assistance can be provided, without reference to the
Attorney-General or Minister for Home Affairs, until charges are laid for the
offence.

•

Information provided by the AFP to foreign law enforcement agencies must
be in accordance with the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, and any
other legislation, treaty, convention, Ministerial Direction, agreement,
memorandum of understanding, policy, guideline, and practical guide or
associated document relevant to the provision of information to foreign law
enforcement agencies.

95

a copy of the pre-September 2006 guidelines, released under freedom of information, is
available on the website of the NSW Council for Civil Liberties:
<http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/afp%20dp%20guidelines.pdf>.
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69.

The second paragraph of the revised guideline states that shared information
must conform to inter alia treaty and convention obligations.96 The AFP seem to
interpret this as referring solely to Australia’s treaty obligations under the UN anticrime treaties to cooperate in fighting transnational crime.97 The AFP appear to
ignore the fact that Australia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Second Optional Protocol attached thereto, both
of which carry with them an implied obligation not to expose anyone to the real
risk of execution.98 Furthermore, this is contrary to the resolutions of the UN
General Assembly that human rights are to be respected in the ‘wars’ against
drugs and terrorism.99 It is unclear why the balance struck in extradition and
mutual assistance law between these competing obligations is not also observed
in police-to-police cooperation. In Australian extradition and mutual assistance
law, assistance is only provided where it is exculpatory or after an undertaking is
made that no one will be executed.100
70.

The death penalty situation guidelines were modified in December 2009. The
reference to treaties and conventions was moved to cover all police-to-police
cooperation. The guideline referring to pre-charge situations was redrafted as
follows:101
Where no person has been arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed
an offence in respect of which the death penalty may be imposed in a foreign
country:

96

it should be noted that the pre-September 2006 guidelines applied in the case of Rush v

Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12.

97

see “international treaties” on p.70 ff.
see “To expose no one to the real risk of torture” on p.68.
99
see [485].
100
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s.22(3)(c); and, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)
ss.8(1A) & 8(1B).
101
see AFP ‘New AFP Guidelines released’ (Media Release, 18 December 2009)
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2009/december/new-afp-guidelinesreleased.aspx>. The new guidelines are available at:
<http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/~/media/afp/pdf/g/guideline-for-international-death-penaltysituation.ashx>. Prior to arrest or detention, the AFP is responsible for oversight of cooperation.
Post-arrest, -detention, -conviction or –sentence, ministerial approval is required.
98
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71.

•

Police-to-police assistance can be provided without reference to the
Attorney-General or Minister for Home Affairs.

•

Requests for assistance with potential death implications will be subject to
an approval process.

•

Requests for assistance to and from the AFP International Network must be
forwarded to the relevant AFP International Desk via an overseas liaison
communication, highlighting the issue.

•

Requests for assistance through Interpol via the AFP Operations
Coordination Centre will also be subject to the approval process.

There are two practical changes: AFP agents now require ministerial approval to
assist in death penalty cases once a suspect has been arrested or detained; and,
‘requests for assistance’ prior to arrest or detention must go through an approval
process overseen by the AFP Manager International Network or the AFP National
Manager Border and International. Redefining ‘pre-charge’ to ‘pre-arrest or
detention’ narrows the discretion of police and was made in direct response to
criticism in the Bali Nine case. Under the old guideline, AFP agents could continue
to cooperate in civil law jurisdictions (such as Indonesia) without ministerial
approval in relation to a suspect who was arrested or being detained but who had
not yet been charged – a period which could extend over several months.

72.

It is worth noting that the new ‘approval process’ remains independent of the
Minister. It also refers only to ‘requests for assistance’ and does not appear to
cover spontaneous cooperation, such as that which occurred in the Bali Nine case.
It is unclear whether spontaneous cooperation is covered by these guidelines or
not.

73.

In practical terms, the new guidelines have not made any real difference to how
the AFP operate in death penalty situations. According to media reports, senior
sources within the AFP admitted as much in September 2010:102
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If the Bali situation were repeated today, they say, the federal police could act in
the same way and achieve the same result, which would mean Australians facing
the death penalty overseas.

74.

The post-charge guidelines have also undergone some changes:
pre-September 2006
...where the assistance of the AFP is sought by the police or another law
enforcement agency of a foreign country in relation to a matter in which a charge
has been laid under the law of that foreign country, for a crime attracting the
death penalty, no action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to
the decision likely to be taken in respect of the request. All such requests are to be
notified to the Director International and Operations as soon as possible after
receipt. Following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the
General Manager National Operations will provide the Commissioner and Deputy
with such advice as considered necessary in order that advice may be provided to
the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General.
September 2006
After charges have been laid for a crime attracting the death penalty:
•

...The Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs may decide that
police-to-police assistance can continue to be provided.

•

No action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to the
decision likely to be taken in respect of the request. All such requests are to
be notified to the Manager International Network as soon as possible after
receipt.

•

Following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the National
Manager Border and International will provide the Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner (Operations) with such advice as considered necessary
to seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs.

•

AFP will seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home
Affairs on a case-by-case basis to ensure ongoing AFP actions correlate with
Australian Government policy and other international obligations.

December 2009
After arrest, or detention, or charge, or conviction of an offence for which the
death penalty may be imposed in a foreign country:
•

only the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs may approve the
exchange of information on a police-to-police basis
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75.

•

all requests for the exchange of information are to be notified to the
Manager International Network as soon as possible after receipt

•

no action is to be taken, nor should any indication be given as to the
decision likely to be taken in respect of the request

•

following consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, the National
Manager Border and International will provide the Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner (Operations) with such advice as considered necessary
to seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs

•

the AFP will seek advice from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home
Affairs on a case-by-case basis to ensure ongoing AFP actions correlate with
Australian Government policy and other international obligations.

The pre-September 2006 guideline for post-charge situations simply required that
the Minister be advised of cooperation. However, in practice the Minister’s
permission was required to continue cooperation.103 This ministerial discretion is
made explicit in the later updated guidelines. No guidance is given to the Minister
other than to ensure that AFP practice accords with government policy and
international obligations.

76.

In terms of police practice, the AFP interprets its pre-charge discretion so broadly
that the death penalty guidelines have little or no impact on police investigations.
Agents do not appear to be required to consider whether the death penalty will
apply. In evidence before the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, the Acting
National Manager responsible for international cooperation observed that:104
...generally speaking, we would not refuse a police-to-police request because
there was a potential that one of the persons subject to the investigation may be
subject to a charge that could attract the death penalty some time at a later date.

77.

Police give several reasons for this broad interpretation. A regularly expressed
reason highlights the sheer volume of information shared, which is in the order of
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13,000 pieces of information transmitted overseas every year,105 and the
impossibility of screening each request or predicting whether any individual piece
of information might lead to an arrest for an offence attracting the death
penalty.106 It seems odd that foreign police are not required to explain the nature
of the investigation they are undertaking, which should indicate whether there is a
real risk of the death penalty being imposed. If the foreign investigation is for
drug trafficking in Indonesia or Vietnam, for example, then it is not difficult to
conclude that there is a real risk that someone will be executed. It is disingenuous
to argue that police have no actual or constructive knowledge of the use to which
shared information will be put. The failure to so inquire could constitute
recklessness or, in serious cases, negligence.
78.

The AFP has also argued that their interpretation of these guidelines has been
standard operating procedure since they were introduced in the 1990s. The AFP
contends that the guidelines have remained essentially unchanged during both
Coalition (conservative) and Labor Party governments.107 However, according to
Mr Duncan Kerr MP, who was Justice Minister when the guidelines were drafted,
they were never intended to be standard operating procedure.108 They were
meant to be facilitative. They were originally intended to be used only in
exceptional circumstances where there is an imminent threat to human life: the
‘ticking bomb’ scenario.

79.

Furthermore, the AFP follows the same death penalty situation guidelines
regardless of the national origin of the agency with which they are cooperating.
Speaking of the Bali Nine investigation, the AFP Manager of Border and
International network said: “We operate exactly the same way no matter which
105
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country it is. ...Had this occurred in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, we’d
potentially do exactly the same thing given the same set of circumstances”.109
80.

It is not surprising then that these death penalty situation guidelines were glossed
over in the Bali Nine case, given the views of AFP Commissioner Keelty. In
deference to the doctrine of national sovereignty, the Commissioner expressed the
strong view that police-to-police cooperation is an all-or-nothing proposition:110
We simply cannot dictate to a foreign law enforcement agency as to how they
undertake their operations. We simply cannot restrict the areas in which we
cooperate. We either cooperate or we do not cooperate.

81.

These views have been criticised by the former Justice Minister, Mr Duncan Kerr
MP, who found it unbelievable that Australia would cooperate without
discrimination:111
...surely it cannot be the case, as is being proposed, that in all circumstances
common sense flies out the window and we do not exercise judgement regarding
circumstances in which assistance will be provided. Take, for example, the
circumstances in Iran where a 16-year-old girl has been hanged for the offence of
having sex with a person when she was not married. There are many countries
which have the death penalty for offences that even the most draconian of
lawmakers here would not recognise as appropriate, and for our police to say
repeatedly and for our ministers to repeat that they are obliged in all instances to
pass on information without any regard to the consequences to those who might
be affected by it is simply shutting their eyes to the real consequences of that
conduct.

82.

The flexibility with which these guidelines have been interpreted by police is also
reflected in Australian policy. What was once a strong principled opposition to the
death penalty, has been slowly whittled away. According to documents obtained
under freedom of information legislation, federal Attorney-General Daryl Williams
and Justice Minister Senator Amanda Vanstone began watering down Australia’s
long-standing principled opposition to the death penalty in 1998. In response to a
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foreign serial murder case,112 Williams and Vanstone decided that a guarantee
that no one would be executed would no longer be required in every case of
police-to-police assistance. Instead, the Minister would retain a discretion
whereby he or she may refuse assistance in the absence of such an assurance.113
Prior to this, Australia had always sought such an assurance.114
83.

In the last few years, the federal Attorney-General has authorised the AFP to
assist in post-charge death penalty cases on at least three occasions without

requiring any guarantees that no one will be executed : in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Tonga.115 The case in Indonesia involved the prosecution of the Bali
bombers. The three main terrorist bombers were executed on 9 November
2008.116 It is unclear whether anyone has been executed as a result of AFP
cooperation in Malaysia or Tonga. The new December 2009 guidelines require the
AFP Commissioner to report to the Minister for Home Affairs biannually ‘on the
nature and number of cases where information is provided to foreign law
enforcement agencies in death penalty cases’.
84.

There has been much criticism of the policy and practice surrounding police-topolice cooperation in death penalty situations. Calls for reform have been made
by several prominent individuals and organisations, including the Senate Legal &
Constitutional Legislation Committee,117 the Joint Standing Committee on
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Treaties,118 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,119 the Law Council of
Australia120 and the NSW Council for Civil Liberties.121
85.

In mid-2009, the United Nations Human Rights Committee voiced its concern of
Australian law and practice:122
The Committee notes with concern...the lack of a comprehensive prohibition on
the providing of international police assistance for the investigation of crimes that
may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in another state, in violation of the
State party’s obligation under the Second Optional Protocol.
The State party should take the necessary legislative and other steps to ensure
that...it does not provide assistance in the investigation of crimes that may result
in the imposition of the death penalty in another State...

86.

The death penalty situation guidelines also attracted judicial criticism in the
Federal Court of Australia. In the case of Rush v Commissioner of Police,123
members of the Bali Nine sought preliminary discovery, prior to commencing
action in the Federal Court of Australia against the AFP for negligence and
misfeasance in public office, of AFP documents and the identity of decisionmakers. The judge dismissed the application on the grounds that any substantive
claims brought would be ‘purely speculative in character or else would have no
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prospects of success’.124 Ultimately, Finn J observed that the actions of the AFP
had not been unlawful, ultra vires or exercised with reckless indifference. The AFP
and the Australian government saw this finding as vindication that the AFP had
done nothing wrong in the Bali Nine case. They ignored the fact that domestic
lawfulness is no defence to a violation of international human rights law.125
87.

What is significant about the Rush case is that Finn J prefaced his judgment with a
call for the death penalty situation guidelines to be reformed. His Honour’s
preface reads in part:126
The circumstances revealed in this application for preliminary discovery suggest
there is a need for the Minister administering the [AFP Act] and the Commissioner
of Police to address the procedures and protocols followed by members of the
[AFP] when providing information to the police forces of another country in
circumstances which predictably could result in the charging of a person with an
offence that would expose that person to the risk of the death penalty in that
country. Especially is this so where the person concerned is an Australian citizen
and the information is provided in the course of a request being made by the AFP
for assistance from that other country’s police force.

88.

This judicial call for review seemed to confuse the AFP Commissioner and Justice
Minister, both of whom could see no substantive criticism in the existing
procedures.127 However four years later, in 2010, the now retired AFP
Commissioner Mick Keelty appeared in an Indonesian court, dressed in a
traditional Balinese shirt, to give evidence for one of the Bali Nine in his final
death sentence appeal.128 Mr Keelty was followed by his former Manager for
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Border Operations, Mick Phelan, who was dressed in full AFP uniform. According
to journalists, this level of assistance to a criminal offender is ‘unprecedented’.129

Canadian practice
89.

Canadian police-to-police practice stands in stark contrast to Australian practice.
The Arar Commission revealed the specific guidelines for: (i) sharing information
with foreign agencies: and, (ii) cooperating with agencies from countries which
violate human rights.

90.

It is RCMP policy that all information to be shared with other agencies is screened
for relevance, reliability and personal information.130 Caveats should also be
placed on shared information, ensuring that it will only be used for the agreed
purpose and that it will not be passed on to other agencies. The Arar
Commissioner endorsed these procedures but was critical of the RCMP’s failure to
implement them during Project AOC.

91.

The Commissioner was more critical of the RCMP’s written policy restricting
cooperation with agencies from countries with a questionable human rights
record. The RCMP can also share information with the agencies of countries that
violate human rights, but not if the information sharing could have a ‘negative
human rights connotation’.131 Such connotations include torture and capital
punishment. Unlike Australia, no distinction is made between pre- and postcharge situations: the same rule applies in all circumstances. The full guidelines
appear in the RCMP Operational Manual under the title “Enquiries from Foreign
Governments that Violate Human Rights”:
M. 3. Enquiries from Foreign Governments that Violate Human Rights
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M. 3. a. The RCMP will not become involved or appear to be involved in any
activity that might be considered a violation of the rights of an individual, unless
there is a need to comply with the following international conventions:
1. United Nations Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
article 4(b) or through membership in such bodies as Interpol;
2. the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages;
3. the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal);
4. the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(The Hague); or
5. the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (Tokyo).
M. 3. b. The disclosure of information to an agency of a foreign government that
does not share Canada's respect for democratic or human rights may be
considered if it:
1. is justified because of Canadian security or law- enforcement interests,
2. can be controlled by specific terms and conditions, and
3. does not have a negative human rights connotation.

92.

The Arar Commissioner was critical of the exemptions for UN terrorism-related
treaties:132
The need to investigate terrorism and the need to comply with international
conventions relating to terrorism do not in themselves justify the violation of
human rights. The international conventions cited in the RCMP policy…do not
authorize departures from human rights standards protected under various other
international instruments Canada has agreed to abide by, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the…Convention against Torture…

93.

Having concluded that the existing policy is inadequate, the Arar Commissioner
made the following recommendation with respect to this written policy:
Recommendation 14
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The RCMP and CSIS should review their policies governing the circumstances in which they supply
information to foreign governments with questionable human rights records. Information should
never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute
to the use of torture. Policies should include specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible
Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring
accountability.

94.

The recommendation is essentially one of risk assessment, requiring the
assessment of ‘credible risk’ of whether cooperation will ‘cause or contribute to’
torture or ‘other human rights abuses’.

Recent changes to Canadian anti-death penalty policy
95.

In late 2007 the Harper government publicly announced it had changed its policy
and would no longer intervene in clemency applications by Canadians facing the
death penalty ‘in a democratic country that honours the rule of law’.133 Assistance
would now be provided on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the facts of each
case.

96.

Though never explicitly confirmed, the change in government policy appears to
have been a direct response to the case of Canadian citizen, Mr Ronald Smith.
After being convicted of a double murder in the US state of Montana, Mr Smith
has been on death row for 25 years. The Canadian government has been
assisting him in his legal appeals all that time. After decades of providing Mr
Smith with assistance, the government announced that, pursuant to this new
policy, it would no longer assist him.

97.

Mr Smith brought an application in the Federal Court of Canada for an order that
the relevant Minister petition the Governor of Montana to commute the death
sentence.134 During his judgment, Barnes J noted that Mr Smith, being held in the
US by US authorities, was beyond the jurisdiction of Canada. All that Mr Smith
could hope for was for Canada to use its influence on the Montana Governor.

98.

Mr Smith argued that the refusal to seek clemency was a violation of his Charter
rights and a denial of the Canadian government’s duty of fairness. The
133
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respondent government argued that the case before the court was not justiciable
because the act of petitioning for clemency was an Executive decision based on
government foreign policy and therefore was a political, not a legal, matter and
therefore could not be reviewed by a court.
99.

Barnes J rejected the respondent’s arguments on the grounds that the court can
examine the decision of a government decision-maker which is based on
government policy. His Honour also dismissed the government’s argument that
foreign policy is a matter for governments and not for courts. His Honour
distinguished between decisions to make a policy and decisions made under a
policy. Essentially, a court can examine decisions made by a government
decision-maker which is based on clearly-articulated government policy:135
Decisions involving pure policy or political choices in the nature of Crown
prerogatives are generally not amenable to judicial review because their subject
matter is not suitable to judicial assessment. But where the subject matter of a
decision directly affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual, a
Court is both competent and qualified to review it.

100. Barnes J expressed concern that the government was unable to demonstrate that
Mr Smith’s case had been carefully considered according to the rules of procedural
fairness. Given that the government had assisted Mr Smith for over 20 years, Mr
Smith had a reasonable expectation that he would be consulted on the application
to his case of this new clemency ‘policy’. There was no evidence that the
government had consulted him at all. The court found this to be a breach of the
duty of fairness and set aside the decision to withdraw support for Mr Smith’s
clemency petition.136
101. Barnes J also expressed concern that the government was unable to produce in
court a clearly articulated version of its new policy on clemency. Given the serious
nature of the subject matter of the policy, which related to the fundamental right
to life, his Honour concluded that there was no ‘new’ policy. Therefore, the ‘old’
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policy, which was to seek clemency unconditionally, was still in place. Having
come to this conclusion, his Honour declined to examine the alleged breaches of
the Charter and international obligations, because there was no ‘new’ policy to
measure against these standards.
102. His Honour set aside the decision to withdraw support for Mr Smith’s clemency
petition on the grounds that the decision was unlawful as it did not apply the
correct government policy.137 The court ordered the Canadian government ‘to
take all reasonable steps’ to support Mr Smith’s application for clemency.
103. The government chose not to appeal this decision, but has since published a
detailed policy on when it will and will not assist in clemency appeals.138 Mr
Smith’s case was decided as a matter of administrative law and the constitutional
issue was left undecided. So, it is reasonable to expect that the next Canadian to
be refused assistance will launch a constitutional challenge to this new policy
based on their constitutional right to life and Canada’s international human rights
obligations.

2.4 intelligence-led policing
104. To understand the increase in transnational police-to-police cooperation, it is in
my view necessary to acknowledge and appreciate the theory of intelligence-led
policing. Of course it is not the only force driving transnational cooperation
between police, but it is a useful tool in making sense of the imperatives which
drive this form of transnational cooperation. In summary: information is the raw
input material in the production of intelligence, and there is a perception that the
more information one has, the better the end-product (intelligence) will be. This
imperative for more information justifies cooperation and information exchange
with foreign agencies – even those which violate human rights.
137
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105. Intelligence-led policing is the pre-eminent contemporary model for domestic
policing throughout much of the western world. It is embraced by both the RCMP
and AFP.139 While intelligence-led policing, according to Ratcliffe, has its origins in
the twentieth century, by the beginning of the twenty-first century it had been
adopted by many of the police forces of the English-speaking world.140 Ratcliffe
attributes the rise of its popularity to many factors, including the increasing
complexity of policing, the increased need to cooperate transnationally to address
organised and transnational crime, limitations of the traditional model of policing
(which focuses on preventative patrols and on criminal investigation and
prosecution), changes in technology, increased public-sector managerialism and
resource constraints.141
106. Defining the intelligence-led model is difficult,142 but most attempts begin with the
assumption that intelligence-led policing is information-driven. Information is
gathered from as many sources as possible, stored electronically and accessed by
trained intelligence officers who process the information and turn it into what is
generally referred to as ‘intelligence’. This value-added product helps senior
police to identify trends in criminal activity and to plan the most effective
distribution of limited police resources based on that intelligence. Ratcliffe
recognises that there is no one all-encompassing definition of intelligence-led
policing, because the model is practised in many different ways across the
globe.143 But after comparing intelligence-led policing with other policing models,
he gives his best approximation:144
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Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where
data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making
framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention
through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that
target prolific and serious offenders.

107. Intelligence is a term usually associated with national security agencies, however
it is now increasingly utilised by police. According to Robertson, 'intelligence' is
not just information or information-gathering. It is a process whereby people's
secrets are collected and analysed for the purpose of informing policy-making.145
So the collection of information in the public domain is not knowledge, but when
combined with other secret information it might become intelligence. Gathering
and keeping secrets is a key component of intelligence.
108. Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘information’ as shorthand for ‘information
and intelligence’. Strictly-speaking, I see the two as separate. ‘Information’ is a
‘valueless’ allegation of fact: it is a piece in a puzzle. Granted, some information is
so probative that it might form evidence in its own right, for example surveillance
video footage of a clearly-identifiable accused committing a crime. But most
information, such as a date of birth, will amount to little in and of itself.
‘Intelligence’ is value-added knowledge; the product of the analysis of an
aggregation of information.
109. One of the assumptions that underpins the intelligence-led policing model is that
the more information that can be collected, the better the end-product intelligence
will be. No piece of information is too trivial, because its significance might only
emerge upon further analysis. The significance, for our purposes, is that a police
force with a finite budget can only gather so much information. However, the
volume of information can be increased by cooperating and exchanging
information with other agencies, both domestic and foreign. This is especially true
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when dealing with transnational crime, where the criminal targets and their
activities are spread across more than one sovereign jurisdiction.

2.5 limiting cooperation
110. Police-to-police information sharing is not unlimited. Restrictions have long been
placed on the free-flow of information. Some restrictions are institutionalised,
while others are more ad hoc and have evolved over time. So calls to restrict
transnational police-to-police cooperation are not unprecedented and are targeted
at practices which are familiar with restrictions.
111. Flowing naturally from the theory of intelligence-led policing is the view that police
can more quickly and effectively confront transnational criminal activity if they
exchange information in an unimpeded fashion, regardless of consequences. For
example, for the AFP Commissioner, transnational cooperation is an all-or-nothing
proposition. Defending the AFP’s sharing of information with the INP in the Bali
Nine heroin smuggling case, Commissioner Keelty told a Senate Committee:146
We simply cannot restrict the areas in which we cooperate. We either cooperate or
we do not cooperate.
...Most of the countries that we deal with in terms of the cooperation, particularly
on narcotics matters, do have the death penalty. Indeed, the United States, in
some states, has the death penalty. I do not think anybody would be
recommending that we stop our cooperation on police-to-police exchange of
information intelligence with the FBI.

112. Therefore, it is understandable that any requirements to limit the free flow of
information are generally resisted by police.147 Nevertheless, most police-to-police
sharing agreements, including the Constitution of Interpol, reserve to national
police a discretion to refuse cooperation. This reflects an institutionalisation of
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deference to national sovereignty.148 This discretion recognises that police must
operate within the laws of their own jurisdiction:149
In order to further its aims, [Interpol] needs the constant and active co-operation
of its Members, who should do all within their power which is compatible with the
legislations of their countries to participate diligently in its activities.

113. It should also be noted that, to facilitate the limitation of information sharing,
Interpol databases have the ability for the information provider to restrict who can
(or cannot) see the information they are sharing with Interpol.150 Even before
sharing information with Interpol, however, national police have a discretion to
share the information with Interpol or not.
114. Other restrictions have been recognised over time. For example, after pressure
from the European community, many transnational information-sharing
arrangements also place privacy restrictions on the exchange of individuals’
information.151
115. Police are also limited by international law. This is made explicit in the calls of the
UN General Assembly that human rights law must be respected in the so-called
‘wars’ on drugs and terror.152 Similarly, the 9/11 Commission, which
recommended increased information sharing between US agencies, recognised the
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Mick Keelty (AFP Commissioner), Interview, Four Corners (ABC TV), 27 March 2006,
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need to couple increased information sharing with measures to protect civil
liberties such as individual privacy.153

153

9/11 Commission Report (2004), n 8, 394-5.
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3 Informal Transnational Policing: case studies
116. In this chapter I have chosen two well-known case studies to illustrate how
informal transnational policing works and how it can go wrong. The first case
study involves information sharing between Australian and Indonesian police
during the course of an investigation into drug smuggling. The ‘Bali Nine’ case, as
it became known, resulted in several Australian citizens being sentenced to death
in Indonesia. The second case study involves information sharing between
Canadian and US police in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks
on US soil. The case of Maher Arar resulted in Mr Arar being extraordinarily
rendered to, and tortured in, Syria.
117. Both case studies involve the sharing of information across national borders
between police which result in adverse human rights consequences. The purpose
of these examples is to highlight the kinds of issues which arise in transnational
police-to-police information sharing, as well as the lack of external oversight of
this increasingly important activity. Unfortunately there are other examples, such
as the cases of Dr Mohammad Haneef154 and Mr Trinh Huu.155 There are also
other examples that involve agency-to-agency cooperation between security
agencies, like the cases of Mr Abelrazik156 and Messrs Almalki, Elmaati and
154

see: John Clarke QC, Report of the Clarke Inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: Volume
One (November 2008), <http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au/>. Dr Haneef was an Indian-born

doctor practicing in Queensland. Dr Haneef knew one of the terrorists who attacked Glasgow
airport on 30 June 2007. When Dr Haneef attempted to leave Australia a few days later, he was
arrested at the airport, then detained and charged with terrorism-related offences. When bail was
granted (for want of evidence), Dr Haneef’s visa was cancelled and he was deported. Mr Clarkes’
inquiry found that the Commonwealth had no evidence with which to charge Dr Haneef and that
the Minister for Immigration’s actions, while lawful, were ‘mystifying’: see p.xiii of the Report.
155
Mr Trinh Huu, an Australian citizen, was arrested in Vietnam in December 2004 in possession of
two kilograms of heroin, as a result of joint operation between Australian and Vietnamese police.
Mr Trinh was convicted and received a death sentence, which was later commuted: see, Tom
Hyland, ‘AFP under fire over Vietnam drug arrest’ Sun Herald (Sydney), 19 February 2006. Similar
cases were also reported prior to the arrest of the Bali Nine: see, Kimina Lyall, ‘Spare my life,
convicted Australian drug trafficker begs Vietnam’ (27 December 2004) The Australian (Sydney), 6.
156
Mr Abdelrazik is a Canadian-Sudanese citizen who was arrested in Sudan at the request of CSIS
and, unknown to Canada, was subsequently tortured: Abdelrazik v Canada [2009] FCJ 656 (Zinn
J), [91]-[92]. Abdelrazik was the subject of a UN global travel ban, as a suspected associate of al-
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Nureddin.157 There is insufficient space to cover all of these agency-to-agency
cases, which is why I have chosen only two police-to-police examples.
118. I will give the outline of these two case-studies below. I will return to them again
in more detail throughout this thesis where they illuminate a particular point.

3.1 Information sharing between AFP and INP: the
‘Bali Nine’
119. On 8 April 2005, the AFP voluntarily supplied information to the Indonesian
National Police (INP) about several Australian citizens in Bali who were suspected
of planning to smuggle heroin from Indonesia to Australia.158 The AFP liaison
officer in Bali sent two formal letters to the INP, requesting that the Indonesians
keep the Australian suspects under surveillance and that, should the INP suspect
that the organiser and/or couriers were in possession of drugs at the time of their
departure for Australia, then the INP should ‘take what action they deem
appropriate’.159 Acting on this tip-off, INP officers began a surveillance operation.
120. On 17 April 2005, the INP arrested nine Australians in Bali on charges of heroin
trafficking.160 They were tried in Indonesia and, after prosecution appeals of

Qaeda. Citing its obligation to respect the UN ban, the Canadian government refused to issue
travel documents for Mr Abdelrazik to return from Sudan to Canada. The court found this a breach
of Abelrazik’s Charter right to enter Canada, and ordered his repatriation, which the government
then facilitated.
157
See: Frank Iacobucci, Report of the Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (2008),
<http://www.iacobucciinquiry.ca/en/home.htm>. Mr Elmaati was detained and tortured in Syria
and Egypt, partially on the strength of information provided by the RCMP and CSIS. Mr Almalki
was detained and tortured in Syria, indirectly because the RCMP shared its entire investigations
database with US law enforcement. Mr Nurredin was detained and tortured in Syria, partially on
the strength of information provided to foreign law enforcement agencies by the RCMP and CSIS.
Commissioner Iacobucci endorsed the recommendations of the Arar Commission.
158
the letters were admitted into evidence in an Australian court: see, Rush v Commissioner of
Police [2006] FCA 12, [22]-[23], <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2006/12.html.
159
Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [22] (quoting letter from AFP Agent Paul
Hunniford to INP dated 8 April 2005).
160
Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [27].
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‘light’ sentences, six of the nine were sentenced to death.161 On 6 March 2008 on
appeal, three of those death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment.162 The
other three remain on death row: two organisers and one ‘mule’ (courier).
121. Despite public disquiet about the AFP’s actions, the AFP was unapologetic and the
government supported the police.

3.1.1 Memorandum of Understanding
122. At no point had a formal request been made, by either Australian or Indonesian
authorities, under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Australia and
Indonesia.163 At all times, the AFP agents involved were acting under a
Memorandum of Understanding between the AFP and INP.164 In evidence before
a senate committee, AFP Commissioner Keelty made it clear that the sharing of
such information is standard operating procedure under the Memorandum of
Understanding between the AFP and the INP.165
123. It is important to note that the MOU in operation during the Bali Nine case was
forged in the heady days after the Australian ‘heroin drought’, the MV Tampa
crisis and the September 11 attacks on US soil. This confluence of events at the
turn of the century resulted in the AFP’s budget being increased almost five-fold
(474%) over the decade from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008.166 Australia needed
161

Cindy Wockner and Madonna King, One-Way Ticket: the untold story of the Bali 9 (2006).
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2005), 170, <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S8859.pdf>.
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Indonesia’s cooperation to combat regional terrorism, drug smuggling and people
smuggling at its source. The relationship between the AFP and the INP was seen
as crucial and Australia invested a significant amount of time and money
supporting and improving that relationship, including establishing the INP
Transnational Crime Coordination Centre167 and the Jakarta Centre for Law
Enforcement Cooperation.168 As members of the Bali Nine discovered, the rights
of individuals were given a very low priority in this political climate.

3.1.2 AFP guidelines in death penalty situations
124. In addition to the MOU, AFP agents in the Bali Nine case had internal guidelines to
follow. In situations where the death penalty might apply, AFP agents operate
under a document entitled the AFP Practical Guide on International Police to Police

Assistance in Death Penalty Charge Situations.169 I have already examined these
guidelines in greater detail.170 But it is worth reiterating that the guidelines permit
AFP agents to cooperate at their own discretion prior to criminal charges being
laid, i.e. at the investigatory stage. Once charges have been laid, then
cooperation can continue only when authorised by the Attorney-General or
statute.171 The guidelines have been widely criticised for being inconsistent with
Australia’s international obligations with respect to the death penalty.

167

see: AFP, Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008), n 166, 64.
see: AFP answer to Question on Notice No.240 of Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee,
Estimates Hearings (31 October 2005),
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/sup_0506/ag/qon_240.pdf>.
For more information, see the Centre’s website: <http://www.jclec.com>. The EU has also
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Commissioner Mick Keelty (speech to Law Council of Australia, Canberra) 23 March 2007, 11,
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3.2 information sharing between RCMP and US
authorities: Maher Arar
125. On 26 September 2002, Mr Maher Arar arrived at John F Kennedy airport in New
York City from Tunisia via Zurich, in transit to Montréal.172 Mr Arar was detained
and incarcerated by US authorities. On 8 October 2002, he was formally denied
access to the United States on the grounds that he was found to be a member of
a foreign terrorist organisation, specifically al-Qaeda.173 Mr Arar is a dual
Canadian-Syrian citizen. Against his wishes and to the surprise of Canadian
officials, Mr Arar was removed from the United States to Syria, where he was
detained until his release on 5 October 2003.174 During his detention in Syria, Mr
Arar was tortured and kept in degrading and inhumane conditions.175 After his
release from Syrian detention, Mr Arar returned to Canada,176 where his case was
the subject of a Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Canadian officials in
relation to Mr Arar’s ordeal.177

3.2.1 The Arar Inquiry
126. The Commission of Inquiry, conducted by his Honour Mr Justice Dennis O’Connor,
concluded inter alia that ‘it is very likely that [American authorities] relied on
information received from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in making
the decision to remove Mr Arar to Syria’.178 The Commissioner could not be more
172
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emphatic, because American authorities declined to testify or provide evidence to
the inquiry and therefore the inquiry did not have access to classified information
upon which the US removal order was based.179
127. After the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC of 11 September
2001 (‘the 9/11 attacks’), Canadian security and law enforcement officials moved
swiftly to prevent further incidents. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS), which suspected Ottawa-resident Mr Abdullah Almalki of terrorist-related
activity, transferred its investigation of Mr Almalki to the RCMP. In turn, the RCMP
established Project A-O Canada (‘Project AOC’) to investigate Mr Almalki. Mr Arar
came to the attention of Project AOC when, on 12 October 2001, he met Mr
Almalki in an Ottawa cafe and they spent the next three hours together.180
Between this time and his detention at JFK airport in September 2002, Mr Arar
was never suspected of committing any offence; he was only ever a person of
interest to Project AOC’s investigation because of his association with Mr
Almalki.181
128. Project AOC was different from most traditional criminal investigations for several
reasons. First, it was a criminal investigation related to national security matters,
rather than being related to the domestic criminal activity with which Project AOC
officers were familiar. Second, its primary mandate was to detect and prevent
terrorist threats before they occurred, rather than to investigate and prosecute a
criminal act after it had been committed. Third, the sense of urgency following
the 9/11 attacks had led to a verbal directive from RCMP headquarters to share
information expeditiously with other agencies, including US partner agencies such
as the FBI. The Arar Commissioner was critical of the lack of supervision provided
to Project AOC officers by senior RCMP officers, given that most Project AOC
officers were inexperienced, and had received little or no training, in national
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Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 53.
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security-related or preventative-type investigations.182 However, his Honour was
most critical of the manner in which Project AOC shared information with its
American counterparts.
129. It should be noted that Justice O’Connor found no bad faith on the part of Project
AOC officers.183 The Commissioner accepted the RCMP’s evidence that no one
understood that the Americans would remove Mr Arar to Syria.184 The inquiry
report concludes that Project AOC’s errors were sloppy work attributable to a lack
of training, experience and supervision.185
130. The Arar inquiry identified three main problems with the way Project AOC shared
information with American authorities. First, that Project AOC failed to follow the
standard RCMP procedures for information sharing. Second, some of the
information it shared was inaccurate and misleading. Third, Project AOC failed to
respect the caveats of other Canadian agencies by passing information provided
by those agencies on to other agencies (domestic and foreign) without obtaining
permission.

3.2.2 Failure to follow standard procedures
131. Within a few days of the 9/11 attacks, the RCMP had reached a verbal ‘free-flowof-information agreement’ with their American counterparts to assist in preventing
further attacks.186 As a result of that agreement, an Assistant Commissioner of
the RCMP told his officers to ‘share as much information as possible in real
time’.187 This was interpreted by Project AOC officers to mean that they were
conducting an ‘open book investigation’ and could share information without
following standard RCMP information sharing procedures.188 Senior executive
officers of the RCMP, however, testified at the inquiry that this was never their
182
183
184
185
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intention and that they had still expected operational officers to follow these
standard procedures.
132. The RCMP’s standard information sharing procedures require caveats to be placed
on shared information to limit its use, and require all information to be screened
for relevance, reliability/accuracy and personal information before sharing it. In
this context, a caveat is a written note attached to a document stating that the
attached document and its contents are the property of the sharing agency, that
the information is provided for intelligence purposes only and that neither the
document nor its contents may be used for any other purpose or shared with any
other agency without first obtaining the permission of the sharing agency. I will
discuss the role and usage of caveats in more detail later in this paper.189
133. Initially, senior command staff were present when Project AOC officers met with
FBI agents.190 However, from late October 2001, Project AOC developed a direct
relationship with the FBI, which intensified over time. Senior RCMP officials and
the managers of Project AOC were aware that information shared with the FBI
might be passed on to the CIA.191 Periodically, Project AOC officers had direct
contact with CIA agents.192 When Project AOC shared information with American
agencies, it contravened RCMP policy by failing to place written caveats on the
documents and by failing to screen the information for relevance, reliability or
personal information.193
134. In late February 2002, FBI agents were given access to all physical files and
material collected by Project AOC, including Mr Arar’s file.194 In April 2002, Project
AOC made an electronic copy of all investigation documents on their computer
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database, including exhibits, statements, internal memos and reports.195 The
information was given to the FBI on three CDs.196 This disclosure, of an entire
investigation’s files, was unprecedented. None of the RCMP officers and
executives who testified at the Arar inquiry knew of any other instances.197 It
should be noted that Project AOC was at all times an RCMP investigation. It was
never a joint investigation with the FBI.198 The FBI, and other Canadian and US
agencies involved, were being kept informed of Project AOC’s progress to facilitate
a larger effort to prevent further terrorist attacks. The close relationship between
the RCMP and FBI continued after the US removed Mr Arar to Syria. It was only
in October 2002, after CSIS stepped in to express its concern about the close
contact, that FBI access to Project AOC offices was curtailed.199

3.2.3 Inaccurate and misleading information
135. Some of the information shared with the Americans related to Mr Arar. The Arar
Commissioner examined all this information and found that it was sometimes
inaccurate, inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to Mr Arar. Justice O’Connor
criticised Project AOC officers for overstating Mr Arar’s importance to their
investigation, having:200
...variously described Mr Arar as a suspect, a target, a principal subject of its
investigation, a person with an 'important' connection to Mr Almalki, a person
directly linked to Mr Almalki in a diagram titled “Bin Laden's Associates: Al Qaeda
Organization in Ottawa” and a business associate or a close associate of Mr
Almalki.

136. As Justice O’Connor observes, in the context of the US response to the 9/11
attacks, it was extremely dangerous to describe Mr Arar in this way. It is
important to recall that Arar was never charged with any offence and he was
never a suspect of the Project AOC investigation. Mr Arar was only ever a person
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of interest to the investigation, about whom Project AOC made inquiries and never
unearthed any evidence linking him to Al-Qaeda or any terrorist group.
137. In October 2001, Project AOC sent a request to US and Canadian Customs officials
to place Mr Arar, his wife (Dr Mazigh) and other individuals on border lookout lists.
The request’s cover letter describes the subjects of the lookout request as ‘a
group of Islamic Extremist individuals suspected to being linked to the Al Qaeda
terrorist movement’.201 The request to US authorities would have been placed on
US Custom’s TECS database. Evidence of one expert witness at the Arar inquiry
described this database as ‘the mother of all databases’, perhaps because there is
no automatic removal of information from the database unless requested when
the information is entered.202 Several US agencies have access to this database,
including the CIA and the National Central Bureau (NCB) of Interpol in Washington
DC.203 Without the benefit of the testimony of American officials, the inquiry could
not determine how or whether this inflammatory misstatement affected the
American view of Mr Arar.
138. Another example of Project AOC providing unfair information about Mr Arar to
American authorities occurred when Mr Arar was first detained in New York City.
At the invitation of the FBI, a Project AOC officer faxed to the FBI a list of
investigative questions to be asked of Mr Arar. The information sent to the FBI
included an assertion that Mr Arar was in the vicinity of Washington DC on 11
September 2001, when in fact Mr Arar had actually been in San Diego on that
day. The fax also indicated that Mr Arar had refused to be interviewed by the
RCMP and had ‘soon after...departed [Canada] rather suddenly for Tunisia’.204
This information is untrue and cast Mr Arar in a very suspicious light. Project
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AOC’s fax did not include a written caveat, but it did include an explicit
assessment that the RCMP had never been able to link Mr Arar with Al-Qaeda.

3.2.4 Failure to caveat shared information
139. Finally, the inquiry found that Project AOC ignored the RCMP policy to respect
caveats and to seek the permission of the caveators before sharing their
information.205
140. RCMP procedure mandates the use of written caveats when sharing information
with foreign agencies wherever the information ‘warrants safeguarding’
(“designated”) or is ‘sensitive to the national interest’ (“classified”).206 The Arar
Commissioner endorsed this policy. As examples of standard RCMP caveats in
national security situations, the Commissioner quotes:207
1. “This document is the property of the RCMP.
It is loaned to your
agency/department in confidence and it is not be reclassified or further
disseminated without the consent of the originator.”
2. “This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided
on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the
receiving government and that it not be declassified without the express
permission of the Government of Canada.”

141. In the Arar case, the RCMP repeatedly failed to caveat information. For example,
the three CDs handed to the FBI and containing all of the investigation’s
documents included caveated documents of CSIS and Canada Customs.208 This
allowed US agents, without reference to the RCMP, to share this information with
others, presumably including Syrian and Egyptian agencies.
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4 Legal obligations affecting information
sharing
142. The legal framework in which police operate domestically is well-defined.
However, the legal framework in which police operate beyond their borders is less
well-defined. There are two situations in which policing has international
consequences: first, when police travel abroad and act in a foreign jurisdiction;
and second, when police act domestically but their actions have consequences
abroad.
143. Police can operate as state agents abroad, for example when police physically
participate in operations in another country. Complex questions of legal
jurisdiction arise in these circumstances. State agents abroad are bound by the
law of the country in which they operate, but they also bound by their own
domestic law. These two sets of laws sometimes conflict, such as when only one
of the legal systems prohibits executions.
144. Police can also take actions within their own domestic jurisdiction that have
consequences abroad, including adverse human rights consequences such as
exposing someone to the real risk of torture or execution. Questions of conflicting
jurisdictions rarely arise in these circumstances because all actions occur
domestically. Some aspects of international cooperation in criminal law are well
structured legally, such as extradition and mutual legal assistance law – both of
which are strictly regulated by statute and treaty. On the other hand, informal
transnational police-to-police cooperation is only loosely regulated by domestic
legislation and policy.
145. This section briefly examines the domestic role of policing. It then examines the
domestic and international legal frameworks which have evolved to regulate it.
Issues of international human rights law are dealt with in the next section,
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because the role of that area of law in the regulation of policing is less well
acknowledged or accepted.

4.1 Domestic Obligations
146. Domestic law defines and limits the powers of modern police. In both Canada and
Australia, the national police forces are established in legislation which also sets
out the duties and goals of the force.209 In Canada, the RCMP Act expressly sets
out the standards required of every member of the force, including ‘to respect the
rights of all persons’.210 There are also constitutional limits, primarily arising from
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.211 I do not intend to trace these obligations
in any detail here, only to point out their existence and importance. The AFP Act
has no equivalent respect-the-rights-of-all-persons provision; nor is there a single
federal legislative or constitutional Bill of Rights.
147. Policing can be seen as an organ of state power. Max Weber once famously
wrote that the state is defined by its success at monopolising the legitimate use of
force in its territory.212 Police are one of the state institutions delegated to
exercise this monopoly on violence. Friedrichs argues that ‘there is no direct link
from the legitimacy of force to its physical use’.213 To extend this legitimacy from
theory to practice, Friedrichs traces a “chain of coercion” which connects the
legitimisation of force to particular choices (made by the state) of coercive
methods. He identifies five links or 'levels' in this chain: discursive; juridical;
legitimisation; authorisation; and operational.214 To maintain its monopoly on
209
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violence, the state must control all five levels. Applying these levels to policing,
Friedrichs identifies the following stages of the justification for legitimate police
violence:215
1. normative discursive conceptualisation of deviant behaviour: that is,
identifying the behaviours which require the intervention of state violence.
Or put another way, deciding what is and is not a crime;
2. juridical legitimisation of crime fighting: that is, deciding ‘what constitutes a
legitimate and legal case for enforcement’ by police;
3. selection of appropriate methods for the repression of crime: for example,
whether strip-searching or torture is appropriate;
4. authorisation for police intervention: that is, identifying the circumstances
under which it is appropriate to exercise these powers; and,
5. operational law enforcement: that is, exercising control over operational
policing. For example, through bodies which hold police accountable for
their actions, such as courts and ombudsmen.
148. Weberian theory, and Friedrichs’ analysis, are useful in this thesis to the extent
that they offer an insight in to why and how the state defines and limits the
powers of police. This is a top-down approach, which places the role for defining
legitimate force in the hands of the state. At each of Friedrichs’ levels, there is a
process of definition and, both implicitly and explicitly, limitation. This is a very
broad brush, which does not seek to account for the independent actions of
individual officers. It does not include, for example, an account for the discretion
of police to exercise their powers in any given situation. The Weberian theory
exists at a ‘macro’ level, where the theory seeks to explore how the state decides
when force is appropriate and how the state legitimises that decision. For our
purposes, we can draw from this analysis a conclusion that, politically, it is the
state (constituted as government, parliament and courts) that decides what
limitations will be placed on policing. There must be a political will to limit policing
215
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on any given ground, and those limitations are expressed through policy,
legislation and case law.
149. Both the RCMP and AFP must comply with ministerial directions.216 In Australia,
this is done by way of written ‘Ministerial Directions’,217 which sets out broad
statements of expectations and priorities such as “contributing effectively to the
Government's international law enforcement interests including matters involving
cooperation to combat transnational organised crime...”. The RCMP complies with
several ministerial directives, including one on entering into information sharing
and cooperation with domestic and foreign agencies.218

4.1.1 the role and legal duties of police
150. This short section examines the traditional domestic role of police and the source
of their legal authority and duties.
151. In the English-speaking world, the genesis of modern policing is generally
attributed to the reforms instituted in England by Sir Robert Peel, who synthesised
a uniquely English concept of policing in the establishment of the Metropolitan
Police in 1828.219 Reiner identifies two main schools of thought on the creation of
the Metropolitan Police by Peel. In the ‘orthodox’ view, the Industrial Revolution
led to a breakdown in law and order which required the creation of a police force
to restore order.220 The English form of policing had its roots ‘in ancient traditions
of communal self-policing’.221 The police, recruited from the general population,
as opposed to from the gentry, were the protectors of the poor and working class,
who were collectively perceived as the source of most crime. In the ‘revisionist’
view, the new middle class, having profited from the redistribution of land and the
216
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Industrial Revolution, needed a police force to protect their position and property
from the working class.222
152. Whatever the impetus, the Metropolitan Police became a model for most of the
English-speaking world. It is a model based on low-profile legalistic consensual
policing. Reiner identifies eight policies that assisted the manufacture of this
consent of the public to being policed:223
a. creation of full-time merit-based professional force;
b. respect for the Rule of Law, i.e. police are subject to the law;
c. adoption of a strategy of minimal force, whereby force was an option
of last resort;
d. non-political constabulary, independent of government and
government policy;
e. police are not ‘above’ the citizenry, but citizens themselves;
f. police perform a public service role;
g. emphasis on preventative policing by uniformed officers, who visibly
patrol the streets to deter crime; and,
h. cultivating a perception of police as being effective at their ‘core
mandate of crime control and order maintenance’.
153. Contemporary police forces, like the Metropolitan Police of 1828, are creatures of
statute. Their primary functions are laid out in legislation, as are the duties of
police officers to perform those functions. All police officers must swear an oath

222
223

Reiner (2000), n 219, 27ff.
Reiner (2000), n 219, 51ff.

– 60 –

or affirmation that they will perform these duties.224 The duties of all RCMP
officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner, include:225
...the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada
and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of
criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody.

154. The AFP’s enabling Act defines ‘police services’ as: ‘the prevention of crime and
the protection of persons from injury or death, and property from damage...’.226
The function of the Australian Federal Police includes the provision of police
services in relation to the laws and property of the Commonwealth ‘and the
safeguarding of Commonwealth interests’.227
155. These duties and functions, it could be argued, constitute statutory duties. This is
certainly what the RCMP argued before the Iacobucci Inquiry.228 This duty is
presented with unique challenges as police forces increasing recognise that much
of the crime they are fighting requires transnational cooperation. Indeed, in 2005,
the AFP Act was amended inter alia to clarify ‘the scope of the functions of the
Australian Federal Police in the current environment of increasingly globalised
criminal activity and law enforcement responses...including in criminal
investigations and major disaster situations’.229 As a consequence, the AFP’s
functions now also include the provision of police services:230
...for the purposes of assisting, or cooperating with, an Australian or foreign:
(i) law enforcement agency; or
(ii) intelligence or security agency; or

224
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(iii) government regulatory agency;

156. Police are also subject to other laws, such as the provisions of the relevant Privacy
Acts. The RCMP is also subject to the provisions of the constitutional Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As Australia has no equivalent constitutional Bill
of Rights, the AFP is not subject to a comprehensive human rights document.231
157. In the context of transnational policing, the fundamental question becomes: what
should police officers do if they are cooperating with a foreign agency and the
laws of that foreign country conflict with the laws and obligations of the officer’s
own country? Which law should they obey? Should they respect the sovereignty
of the foreign country, or obey the law they are sworn to uphold? This is another
way of stating the questions discussed in this thesis.

4.2 International Obligations
158. There are two human rights issues which have attracted much controversy
recently in the context of transnational policing. The first is torture, in the context
of counter-terrorism policing, in the context of a post-September-11 world.
Specifically, the RCMP has been criticised for the manner in which it has shared
information with US law enforcement agencies. The second issue is the death
penalty, in the context of the policing of the international drug trade and counterterrorism. Specifically, the AFP has been criticised for the manner in which it has
shared information with Indonesian and other South-East Asian police forces.

4.2.1 To expose no one to the real risk of execution
159. The obligation to expose no one to the real risk of execution does not appear
expressly in any international human rights treaty. Instead, it arises as an
implication from state practice and UN treaty law. This is analogous to the non-

refoulement implications found in extradition and mutual assistance law. In that
body of law, bilateral treaties sometimes expressly include protection against
231
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refouement. As Gilmore observes, such bilateral treaties sometimes go ‘above
and beyond’ the individual protections found expressly in the UN human rights
treaties.232 However, this level of protection is often only found in the UN human
rights treaties by implication.
160. The UN Human Rights Committee is the treaty-based committee responsible for
interpreting the ICCPR and the Second Optional Protocol attached thereto.233 It is
therefore appropriate to turn to its jurisprudence on this issue. In 1997, the UN
Human Rights Committee found that the Second Optional Protocol obliges
ratifying nations not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution for any
offence. In 2003, the Committee found that the ICCPR itself places the same
obligation on ratifying countries that have already abolished the death penalty.
161. Both the ICCPR and the Second Optional Protocol are silent on the law of
extradition. They do not expressly prohibit the extradition of a fugitive to a
retentionist nation. There is no mention of extradition in the Special Rapporteur’s
report on the Second Optional Protocol. In 1994, some members of the UN
Human Rights Committee were of the view that the Second Optional Protocol does
not affect the law of extradition.234 However, the Committee’s jurisprudence has
developed since then.
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162. In 1997, the UN Human Rights Committee heard two important refoulement
(return) cases against Australia: ARJ v Australia and GT v Australia.235
163. ARJ, an Iranian national, was convicted of drug supply in Australia. After he had
served his sentence, Australia wanted to deport him to Iran. Mr J complained to
the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that if Australia deported him to Iran
then it would violate his right to life (ICCPR Article 6). On the case before them,
the Committee accepted the evidence of Australia that Mr J was not at risk of
execution if returned to Iran and therefore found that Australia would not violate
the ICCPR by deporting Mr J.
164. On the law, the Committee observed that the ICCPR does not ‘necessarily require
Australia to refrain from deporting an individual to a State which retains capital
punishment’.236 Relevantly, the beginning of Article 6 of the ICCPR states:
Article 6 – Right to Life
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes…

165. Reading paragraphs 6(1) and 6(2) together, the Committee concluded that
Australia would only violate the ICCPR if it exposed Mr J to a real risk of being
executed for offences other than ‘the most serious crimes’.237 The Committee
defined a ‘real risk’ as a ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’.238
166. It is worth noting that this obligation applies to all state parties to the ICCPR,
including those which still practice capital punishment. Capital punishment is not
prohibited by international customary law.239 Nor is it prohibited by the ICCPR,
given that article 6(2) expressly contemplates such a penalty. However, it does
235
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not follow that all forms of capital punishment are acceptable or that retentionist
countries are permitted to expose people to all forms of capital punishment.
167. A few months after publishing its observations in ARJ v Australia, the Committee
examined the case of GT v Australia.240 GT, an Australian citizen, was married to
Mr T, a Malaysian citizen who was under threat of deportation from Australia to
Malaysia. Mr T had been convicted in Australia of importing drugs from Malaysia.
After he had served his sentence, Australia wanted to deport him to his homeland.
Mrs T complained to the UN Human Rights Committee, arguing that if Australia
deported her husband to Malaysia then it would violate his right to life (ICCPR
Article 6) because drug offences in Malaysia attract a mandatory death sentence.
On the facts before it, a majority of the Committee found no violation of the
ICCPR because it accepted Australia’s evidence that Mr T would not face execution
if returned to Malaysia.
168. On the law, the Committee modified its interpretation of Australia’s human rights
obligations. The Committee observed that Australia has ratified the Second
Optional Protocol, which imposes additional obligations. Whereas the ICCPR
imposes an obligation not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution for
offences other than ‘the most serious crimes’, the Second Optional Protocol
imposes a broader obligation not to expose anyone to the real risk of execution
for any offence.
169. In 2003, the Committee revisited and revised this jurisprudence. The case of

Judge v Canada involved a US citizen, Mr Judge, who was sentenced to death in
the US for murder. Mr Judge escaped his US prison and fled to Canada, where he
committed two robberies and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. When
Canada tried to deport Mr Judge back to the United States, he sent a complaint to
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the UN Human Rights Committee alleging a violation by Canada of his right to
life.241
170. The Committee departed from its earlier decision in ARJ and reinterpreted
paragraphs 6(1) and 6(2) of the ICCPR:242
Paragraph 1 of article 6, which states that “Every human being has the inherent
right to life…” is a general rule: its purpose is to protect life. States parties that
have abolished the death penalty have an obligation under this paragraph to so
protect in all circumstances. …For countries that have abolished the death penalty,
there is an obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its application.

171. Unlike its earlier decision in ARJ v Australia, the Committee concluded that
paragraph 6(2) only applies to those State parties that ‘have not abolished the
death penalty’. Therefore abolitionist countries are obliged by paragraph 6(1) to
protect life in all circumstances. The implied obligation on all abolitionist countries
is that they will not expose anyone to the real risk of execution. This is the same
obligation implied under the Second Optional Protocol (GT v Australia). The
obligation attaches whether an abolitionist party to the ICCPR has ratified the
Second Optional Protocol or not.243
172. The Committee went on to conclude that Canada (an abolitionist country) would
violate Mr Judge’s right to life by deporting him to the United States (a retentionist
country) without first obtaining a guarantee that Mr Judge would not be executed.
173. It should be observed that this is a negative obligation (an obligation to refrain
from an action), not a positive obligation (a duty to act). This point was made in
a recent Canadian administrative law case in which a Canadian on death row in
the US attempted to use Judge v Canada to argue that Canada was obliged to
assist him.244 The Federal Court judge, while not using these words, essentially
limited Judge v Canada to an obligation to refrain from any action that exposes a
person to the real risk of the death penalty in another state.
241
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174. I also note that in Judge v Canada the UN Human Rights Committee states that
abolitionist nations are obliged to protect life in all circumstances. This language
is very general. I would argue that this generality extends the obligation beyond
these extradition cases and encompasses all actions by a State and its agents.
This includes, for example, the actions of RCMP officers or AFP agents when
cooperating or sharing information with foreign police agencies in retentionist
countries. This means that extra care must be taken when Canadian and
Australian police cooperate with their counterparts from countries like the United
States of America, Indonesia and the Peoples Republic of China.
175. Finally, though it has not been asked to decide the issue, it is highly likely that the
Committee would conclude that all parties to the ICCPR – both abolitionist and
retentionist – must not expose any one to the real risk of a mandatory death
sentence – even for ‘the most serious offences’. This arises as an implication from
the Committee’s expressed view that the automatic and mandatory imposition of a
death sentence constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life and, as such, is a
violation of an individual’s article 6(1) right to life.245 This arbitrariness cannot be
cured or justified by article 6(2). Therefore, an implication must arise that no
state party to the ICCPR may expose anyone to the real risk of a mandatory death
sentence.
176. In summary, there are two degrees of this obligation for parties to the ICCPR. For
those parties which retain capital punishment: they must not expose anyone to
the real risk of a mandatory death sentence or of execution for any offence other
than for ‘the most serious crimes’. For those parties which have abolished the
death penalty and/or ratified the Second Optional Protocol: they must not under
any circumstances expose anyone to the real risk of execution for any offence.
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4.2.2 To expose no one to the real risk of torture
177. The position with respect to torture is more straightforward and less controversial
than it is for capital punishment.
178. Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited
by Article 7 of the ICCPR. These forms of treatment are also prohibited by the UN
Convention against Torture.246 The prohibition on torture is absolute247 and
cannot be suspended or derogated during times of public emergency, including
times of war.248 Torture is prohibited during times of war by Article 2 of the
Convention against Torture, Article 4(2) of the ICCPR and by the Geneva
Conventions which form part of international humanitarian law (the law of armed
conflict).249 The International Criminal Court lists torture as a crime against
humanity.250 So widely is torture condemned by the international community that
it has attained the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens), which means that it
‘enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even
“ordinary” customary rules’.251
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179. The Convention against Torture requires states to criminalise the commission of,
and participation or complicity in, torture.252 The Convention also expressly
prohibits refoulement.253 The Convention also expressly extends a party’s
jurisdiction extraterritorially and universally.254
180. An implication arises from the Convention that states must not expose anyone to
the real risk of torture. According to Professor Peter Burns, a state violates the
Convention if it shares information knowing that the information will be used to
torture someone.255
181. The Arar Commission was unequivocal in its recommendation that ‘[i]nformation
should never be provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it
will cause or contribute to the use of torture’.256
182. Recently, a senior CSIS lawyer who would not rule out cooperation in potential
torture cases was publicly contradicted by the head of CSIS before the same
House of Commons Committee.257 The RCMP remains less than absolute, in
evidence to the same committee:258
I would like to be clear that there is no absolute ban on the use of any information
received by the RCMP. However, we do not use information whose reliability,
accuracy, and relevance is suspect. Information knowingly extracted under torture
would by definition be unreliable. In the real world, the challenge is to make a
judgment on the known facts about whether any particular information received is
the result of torture. Our policy is based on making such assessments on a caseby-case basis.
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183. The AFP Commissioner says that the AFP, when acting abroad, attempts ‘as best
we can’ to adhere to Australia’s obligations against torture.259 This statement is
less than absolute. However, when the Australian Attorney-General Phillip
Ruddock publicly supported the Bush Administration view that sleep deprivation is
not torture, Commissioner Keelty stridently contradicted him and stated that it was
indeed a form of torture and the AFP did not practice it.260

4.2.3 international treaties
184. There are some international criminal law treaties which expressly raise
obligations for police-to-police cooperation in the investigation of crime. Many of
these are administered by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):261 the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (‘the TOC
Convention’) and the Protocols attached thereto;262 the anti-drug conventions; and
counter-terrorism treaties.
185. The TOC Convention has been ratified by both Canada and Australia.263 The TOC
Convention relates to the ‘prevention, investigation and prosecution’ of ‘serious
offences’ conducted transnationally by organised criminal groups. ‘Serious
offences’ are those attracting a term of imprisonment of 4 or more years,264 as
well as laundering the proceeds of crime,265 corruption of public officials,266 and
obstructing the course of justice with respect to these offences. The Convention
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relates to conspiracy, ‘organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or
counselling’ these proscribed offences.267
186. The TOC Convention contains provisions for inter alia extradition (Article 16),
mutual legal assistance (Article 18) and cooperation with respect to the
confiscation of the proceeds of crime (Article 13). Article 19 encourages the
establishment of joint investigation teams, under bilateral or multilateral
agreements. Article 27 of the TOC Convention requires State Parties to cooperate
closely with one another in terms of law enforcement (police-to-police)
cooperation:
States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their
respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness
of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention.
Each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures: [inter alia] ... to
facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of
the offences covered by this Convention...

187. Further, as the UNODC points out in relation to both the TOC Convention and the
Convention against Corruption:268
This general obligation to cooperate is not absolute; rather, it is to be conducted
consistent with [a State party’s] domestic legal and administrative systems. This
clause gives States parties the ability to condition or refuse cooperation in specific
instances in accordance with their respective requirements.

188. There are three protocols attached to the TOC Convention, relating to people
trafficking;269 migrant smuggling;270 and, the illegal arms trade.271 Canada and
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Australia have ratified the first two and signed the third. A signature indicates an
intention to ratify at a later date; upon ratification, a treaty is binding at
international law. These protocols supplement the TOC Convention and extend
the obligations of the parent convention, relating to law enforcement cooperation,
to their subject crimes. Each of the protocols, subject to the parent Convention as
well as domestic law and other international obligations, places additional
obligations on information sharing, related to the nature of the subject crime, and
expressly reserves the receiver’s right to restrict the use of such information. For
example, Article 10 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol places additional obligations
for information sharing, such as intelligence on the modus operandi of organised
smuggling groups, the theft of travel documents and the sharing of technology to
fight this crime.272 The Arms Trafficking Protocol also allows for the confidentiality
of legitimate commercial information, though it does not penalise the disclosure of
such information.273 These protocols also encourage other forms of transborder
cooperation.
189. Article 48 of the UN Convention against Corruption (CAC) also obliges close law
enforcement cooperation, in almost identical terms to article 27 of the TOC
Convention.274 The CAC Convention also encourages joint investigative teams, in
terms similar to the TOC Convention.275
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Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 2000 [2004] ATS 11 (entered
into force internationally and for Canada, 28 January 2004; entered into force for Australia, 26
June 2004).
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Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition 2001 [2002] ATNIF 7 (entered into force internationally, 3 July 2005;

not in force for Canada or Australia). Canada signed on 20 March 2002; Australia signed on 21
December 2001. As at 1 June 2009, neither Canada nor Australia have ratified this Protocol: UN
Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), 12.c,
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12c&chapter=18&lang-=en>.
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Migrant Smuggling Protocol, n 270, article 10. See also: Arms Trafficking Protocol, n 271,
article 12; and, People Trafficking Protocol, n 269, article 10.
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December 2005; for Australia, 6 January 2006; for Canada, 1 November 2007).
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Convention against Corruption, n 274, article 49. See also: [186].
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190. There are three main international narcotics conventions: The Single Convention

on Narcotic Drugs (1961), as amended by the Protocol of 25 March 1972;
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); and, the Convention against the
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). Australia and
Canada have ratified all of these conventions.276 Both the Single Convention and
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances oblige a party to ‘ensure that
international co-operation between the appropriate agencies be conducted in an
expeditious manner’.277 The Convention against Illicit Trafficking obliges parties to
enter into agreements to facilitate ‘the secure and rapid exchange of information’,
‘to cooperate with one another in conducting enquiries, with respect to offences
[proscribed by the Convention], having an international character’ and to facilitate
the establishment of joint investigative teams.278
191. In 2008, the Executive Director of UNODC delivered a speech in Vienna to
celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs:279
Finally, last but certainly not least, human rights. Our work is guided first and
foremost by the UN Charter that commits signatories to fundamental freedoms,
and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 60 years old this year.
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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 [1967] ATS 31 (entered into force internationally and
for Canada, 13 December 1964; entered into force for Australia, 31 December 1967); Protocol
amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 30 March 1961, 1972 [1975] ATS 33
(entered into force internationally and for Australia, 8 August 1975; entry into force for Canada, 4
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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by 1972 Protocol), n 276, article 35(d); and,
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, n 276, article 21(d).
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Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, n 276,
article 9.
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Antonio Maria Costa (Executive Director of UNODC), speech delivered to the 51st session of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna (10 March 2008),
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In Article 25 of the Universal Declaration, health is listed as a basic human right.
As we emphasize the health aspects of drug control, it stands to reason that
implementation of the drug Conventions must proceed with due regard to human
rights. Thus far, there has been little attention paid to this aspect of our work. This
definitely needs to be amended. Although drugs kill, I don't believe we need to kill
because of drugs. The UN drug Conventions have left it to individual states to
deal with health care and crime retribution, in relation with the specific cultural
and judicial contexts. Mindful of this, today I propose that Member States extend
the concept of harm reduction to include the need to give serious consideration to
whether the imposition of capital punishment for drug-related crimes is a best
practice.
The recent General Assembly moratorium suggests a way forward. More must be
done to bridge the gap between international standards and the right of individual
nations to decide in this difficult area. As the custodian of the judicial standards
and norms set by the World Crime Congresses, UNODC insists on the importance
of translating them into national laws and practice.

192. The United Nations lists thirteen major anti-terrorism instruments.280 Australia
and Canada have ratified all but one of the treaties.281 Several of these treaties
contain a general obligation to cooperate in the prevention of their subject crimes
by exchanging information generally.282 This obligation is general and does not
refer explicitly to police-to-police cooperation.
193. Canada and Australia are party to other international instruments which create
criminal offences and require the transnational cooperation of police. For
example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child

283

is parent to an optional

protocol prohibiting sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child
sex tourism.284 Article 6 of this optional protocol obliges parties to provide ‘the
280

United Nations, ‘UN Action to Counter Terrorism: international instruments to counter terrorism’,
<http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml>, accessed 1 June 2009.
281
see “Appendix 2: International Counter-Terrorism Instruments” for details. As at 1 June 2009,
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force internationally.
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e.g. Diplomatic Agents Convention, article 4; Hostages Convention, article 4; Maritime
Convention, article 13; Terrorist Bombing Convention, article 15; Terrorist Financing Convention,
article 18(3); Nuclear Terrorism Convention (not yet in force), article 7. See “Appendix 2:
International Counter-Terrorism Instruments” for full citations.
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September 1990; for Australia, 16 January 1991; for Canada, 12 January 1992).
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography 2000 [2007] ATS 6 (entry into force internationally, 18 January
2002; for Canada, 14 October 2005; for Australia, 8 February 2007).
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greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or
extradition proceedings’ relating to the offences proscribed by the protocol.
Article 10 obliges parties to ‘take all necessary steps to strengthen international
cooperation...for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and
punishment’ of the protocol’s proscribed offences.
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5 Extraterritorial human rights obligations
194. I now turn to the question of whether, and to what extent, a country’s
international human rights obligations extend to transnational policing. There are
two aspects to this question: whether human rights obligations apply to the
actions of police abroad (the offshore aspect); and whether human rights
obligations apply to the domestic actions of police which have consequences
beyond their territorial borders (the onshore aspect). This question requires an
examination of the extraterritorial application of international human rights law
and the obligations it imposes, if any, on state agents acting abroad and on
domestic actions with international consequences.
195. The question of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is unsettled
at international law. It is a question of public international law.285 The
jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee, International Court of Justice
and European Court of Human Rights cannot always be reconciled. I will examine
this shortly.
196. There can be no question that transnational policing should respect human rights.
This principle can be found in police practice as well as law. For example, it is a
founding principle of Interpol. Interpol’s Constitution states that its mission is to
promote mutual assistance ‘in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights’.286 The commitment is also reflected in more recent Interpol instruments,
such as the Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement, which includes in its
Preamble this recital: ‘Aware of the need for police co-operation to respect human
rights’.287 Indeed, many of the more recent human rights instruments require

285

Dominic McGoldrick, 'Extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights', in Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga (ed), Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Treaties (2004) 44.
286
see [54].
287
Interpol, Model Bilateral Police Cooperation Agreement,
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/Model.asp>.
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police-to-police cooperation to combat transnational human rights violations such
as people trafficking and child pornography.
197. This section deals only with specific obligations found, expressly or by implication,
in international human rights law. This is not intended to be an exhaustive
examination of all the international legal obligations under which police operate. I
focus on two human rights issues which have attracted criticism in transnational
policing practice: the death penalty and torture. While the obligations with
respect to torture arise as jus cogens in international law and expressly in UN
treaty law, the obligations with respect to the death penalty arise as implications
from state practice and UN treaty law. These obligations are important because
they set the parameters within which Australian and Canadian police ought to
cooperate transnationally.
198. A state is expected to give more than lip-service to these obligations: a state is
expected to do, or refrain from doing, certain things. At international human
rights law, a state should respect, protect and fulfil human rights.288 These
obligations derive from the UN Charter and international human rights treaties
such as the ICCPR and Convention against Torture.289 Transnational policing is a
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Manfred Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: commentary (2005, 2nd
ed), [2.18]-[2.20]. See also: Christopher McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ in Colin
Harvey (ed), Human Rights in the Community (2005, Hart Publishing) 12 (citing Henry Shue, Basic
Rights (1996)). See also: Sigrun Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights
Obligations in International Cooperation (2006) 66-72; and, Fons Coomans, ‘Some Remarks on the
Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’,
in Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties
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discussion in: Skogly, n 288, 74-5. For commentary on ICCPR Art 2, see: UN Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 31: the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States
parties (26 May 2004) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [2]. See also discussion in: Crawshaw et
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function of the state and, unlike military action, there is no reason to believe that
human rights law does not apply to transnational policing at all times.

5.1 extraterritorial jurisdiction under public
international law
199. At public international law, the principle of national sovereignty generally ensures
that police acting within their own national territory are free to do whatever they
wish, subject to domestic and international law, no matter the consequences
beyond domestic borders. There are also several sources of jurisdiction
authorising the extraterritorial actions of domestic police, which I cover below
briefly.
200. That the State is responsible for the actions of its agents, acting in their official
capacity, has long been recognised in customary international law and is codified
in Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State

Responsibility.290
201. At public international law, jurisdiction refers to the right of a state to legislate,
enforce and adjudicate its domestic law.291 A state's right to exercise jurisdiction
derives from its sovereignty as a state.292 There are three forms of jurisdiction:
legislative (also called prescriptive or substantive); executive (aka administrative);
and, judicial.293 Legislative jurisdiction is, generally, vested in parliament;
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James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility:
introduction, text and commentaries (2005) 94-5. Note: the ILA’s Articles on the Responsibility of
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executive jurisdiction in government and its agents, such as police officers; and,
judicial jurisdiction in the courts.294
202. A state's jurisdiction is primarily territorial.295 Everyone within a state's territory is
subject to its jurisdiction.296 The definition of territory includes land, domestic
waterways, territorial sea and airspace.297 This basis of jurisdiction is sometimes
referred to as the territoriality principle. This principle includes criminal offences
with a foreign aspect, such as crimes commencing or terminating abroad, or
crimes which have a 'real and substantial connection' to a state.298 This could
found a quasi extraterritorial jurisdiction upon which to justify transnational
policing activities. For example, AFP involvement in drug trafficking investigations
in Indonesia where illicit drugs are likely to be imported into Australia from
Indonesia.
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see e.g. R v Hape [2007] 2 SCR 292, [58].
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203. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited by the sovereign territorial
rights of other states.299 According to an often criticised decision of the
Permanent Court of International Justice from 1927, a state can only exercise its
jurisdiction outside its territory 'by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention'.300
204. However, international law recognises several exceptions to the territoriality
principle. By definition, any exercise of jurisdiction that is not based on the
territoriality principle is an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.301 There are
several principles upon which a claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be based.
The nationality principle is well-established in public international law. It grants a
state jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.302 According to Currie and Coughlan,
this principle also encompasses permanent residents and foreign citizens serving
in a state’s military and is commonly asserted by those countries which refuse to
extradite their own nationals.303
205. Of more recent formulation, and therefore more controversial, are claims of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens in foreign territory.304 The protective

principle grants a state ('the first state') jurisdiction over aliens who commit, on
the territory of another state, offences against the first state. These are generally
offences which threaten national security or the ‘dignity of the sovereign’, but also
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include crimes such as sedition and counterfeiting.305 The passive personality

principle founds jurisdiction over aliens who, in the territory of another state,
commit crimes against nationals of the first state.306 The universal principle
founds jurisdiction over aliens on foreign territory who commit acts which offend
the public policy of the international community.307 These acts are usually
international crimes such as 'genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity,
piracy, slavery, aggression [and] torture'.308 These offences are crimes under
international law and need not be defined in domestic law to found universal
jurisdiction.309 Universal jurisdiction is unusual because no link between the state
and the impugned foreign act or actor is required.310 The exercise of universal
jurisdiction is often justified by claims of upholding the rule of law in territories
where it has ceased to operate effectively.311
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206. Extraterritorial jurisdiction can also be conferred by treaty.312 Where jurisdiction is
granted by treaty it is uncontroversial because it is recognised by the consent of
the ratifying parties. Such is the complex law aboard civilian ships, aircraft and
spacecraft, which generally confers on the state whose flag is being flown
exclusive jurisdiction when the vessel is in international waters, airspace or space,
and concurrent jurisdiction when within the territory of another state.313 Universal
jurisdiction is increasingly being conferred by treaty, for example over the
suppression of terrorist activities,314 the protection of diplomats, UN personnel and
other ‘internationally protected persons’,315 the protection of nuclear materials316
and the protection of human rights.317
207. However, all these bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction are subordinate to
territorial jurisdiction.318 In theory, where conflict arises from the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more states, the state with territorial jurisdiction will have
precedence. Absent military occupation, a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction on
foreign territory without the foreign state’s consent, invitation or acquiescence.319
This accords with the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle of non312
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interference at international law.320 This is why the Canadian Supreme Court
found that, absent consent of the foreign territorial sovereign, Canadian law
cannot be enforced outside of Canada.321
208. Because there are several bases for jurisdiction, state jurisdiction is not always
exclusive.322 More than one state may have a legitimate basis from which to
assert jurisdiction over property, people or events. For example, a state (‘the first
state’) maintains jurisdiction over its nationals abroad, based on the nationality
principle. That jurisdiction is concurrent with the territorial jurisdiction of the
foreign state in which a national resides abroad. While the first state is free to
exercise its extraterritorial legislative and judicial jurisdiction over its nationals
living abroad, an attempt to exercise its executive jurisdiction is more
problematic.323 The exercise of legislative and judicial jurisdiction extraterritorially
is rarely controversial because it occurs on the sovereign territory of the first
state. In its own territory, a state’s parliament is free to pass laws which purport
to have extraterritorial application and its courts are free to apply those laws.
Generally, controversy only arises when a state seeks to exercise its executive
jurisdiction outside its territory, especially without the consent of the territorial
sovereign.
209. According to Brownlie, extraterritorial acts will only be lawful when a state
observes three general principles:324
a. ‘there should be a substantial and bona fide connection between the
subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction’;325
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b. the principle of non-interference must be observed; and,
c. accommodation, mutuality and proportionality should inform exercise
of this jurisdiction.
210. The principles of accommodation and mutuality derive from what is sometimes
called ‘the comity of nations’.326 Since all nations are equal at international law,
states should seek to accommodate each other’s wishes and exhibit mutual
respect. The principle of proportionality requires a state to minimise any
interference with the concurrent jurisdiction of another state, in other words to
only do what is necessary and no more.327
211. In summary, transnational policing is an exercise of extraterritorial executive
jurisdiction. For any act of transnational policing to be lawful at public
international law, then the consent of local authorities must be obtained and the
extraterritorial acts should be grounded in treaty law or one of the recognised
jurisdictional principles (territoriality, nationality, protective, passive personality or
universal).

5.2 extraterritorial jurisdiction under international
human rights law
212. Over the last half century or so, claims that human rights treaties have
extraterritorial application have increased. Over that time, a growing consensus
has evolved that the legitimacy and pervasiveness of human rights law is
underpinned by its universality.328 Tomuschat, in his essay on the universality of
human rights, notes that the concept is often criticised as a uniquely Western
connection to justify that state in regulating the matter and perhaps also to override any

competing rights of other states’ (emphasis added): Oppenheim (1992), n 292, 457-8.
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view.329 In response to such criticisms, Tomuschat quotes former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan:330
It was never the people who complained of the universality of human rights, nor
did the people consider human rights as a Western or Northern imposition. It was
often their leaders who did so.

213. There are two main bodies charged with interpreting international human rights
law: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Human Rights Committee.
There are other treaty body committees, but they have generally followed the
established jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and the ICJ on the
question of jurisdiction. Because the ICJ has, by and large, endorsed the Human
Rights Committee’s view of extraterritorial jurisdiction, I begin with a review of the
Committee’s jurisprudence.

5.2.1 UN Human Rights Committee
214. The UN Human Rights Committee is firmly of the view that a State party to the
ICCPR can “be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which
its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the
acquiescence of the government of the State or in opposition to it”.331 With
respect to article 2 of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee has
commented that:332
...a State Party must respect and ensure that rights laid down in the Covenant to
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party.
...This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the
forces or a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances
in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or
peace-enforcement operation.

215. This places transnational policing well within the jurisdiction of the ICCPR.
329
330
331
332

Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 69ff.
Tomuschat (2008, 2nd ed), n 384, 94.
Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Communication No. 52/1979, [12.3].
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 (2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [10].

– 85 –

caselaw
216. The leading cases from the UN Human Rights Committee come from the 1980s
and involve what we would today call ‘extraordinary rendition’: the abduction of
people on foreign soil and taking them elsewhere for detention and torture. The
offending state party in these cases was Uruguay.
217. While the cases deal with the issue of extraterritoriality in the substantive body of
their conclusions, the question is more one of admissibility as it deals with the
competence of the Committee to hear the application before it. The first two
cases make this mistake, but the third correctly deals with this issue as a
preliminary question.
218. In 1976, Uruguayan agents, assisted by Argentinean authorities, arrested,
detained and tortured Mr Burgos, who had been granted political asylum in
Argentina.333 Burgos was then unlawfully taken back to Uruguay, where he was
held in communicado, tortured and put on trial.
219. The Committee had to consider the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction because Mr
Burgos was first arrested and detained in Argentina. The Committee noted that
Articles 1 (“individuals subject to its jurisdiction”) and 2(1) (“individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction”) were no bar to this complaint.334 With
reference to Article 1, the Committee noted that this is not a reference to location
of an alleged breach of Covenant rights, but rather to “the relationship between
the individual and the State” in relation to such a breach.335
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220. In relation to Article 2(1), the Committee said:336
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect
and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit
upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the
Government of that State or in opposition to it.

221. The Committee relied on Article 5(1) of the Covenant to support their view.
Article 5(1) states that the Covenant should not be interpreted to imply a right to
act in a manner destructive of Covenant rights and freedoms ‘to a greater extent
than is provided for’ in the Covenant. The Committee concluded that:337
… it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of
the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its
own territory.

222. Zwart is critical of the UN Human Rights Committee’s reasoning in the Uruguay
cases.338 In these cases, the Committee invoked Article 5(1), which states that
nothing in the Covenant can be interpreted to defeat the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Covenant. This is a purposive interpretative provision, giving
precedence to the purpose of the Covenant (to protect human rights). However,
Zwart argues that Article 5(1) cannot be invoked if Article 2(1) dictates that the
Covenant does not apply because the complaint falls outside Covenant jurisdiction
of the State Party: ‘Article 5 of the Covenant can only be invoked if the Covenant
is applicable, and that was the question the Committee had to answer in the first
place’. In other words, the question of jurisdiction is a ‘gateway’ issue. If there is
jurisdiction, then the Committee is competent to hear the complaint and then, and
only then, may the Committee examine the Covenant’s other provisions (such as
Article 5). If there is no jurisdiction, then the Committee is not competent to hear
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the complaint and the text of the Covenant is not relevant. I agree with Zwart’s
assessment that the Committee’s finding is ultra vires.
223. Zwart prefers the reasoning which appears in the separate concurring opinion of
Committee Member Tomuschat.339 Mr Tomuschat agreed with the Committee’s
decision in all but its reasoning on Article 2(1). Mr Tomuschat expresses the view
that Article 5 is not relevant to the present case. Tomuschat argued that the term
‘within its territory’ was intended to recognise that a State Party could not be held
responsible for securing Covenant rights in foreign territory where the State Party
has no authority or power to act without consent, in accordance with international
law and the principles of non-interference and sovereign equality. According to
Tomuschat, this was the intent of the drafters of the Covenant. However:340
Never was it envisaged...to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to
carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity
against their citizens abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1),
the events which took place outside Uruguay came within the purview of the
Covenant.

224. The final Uruguayan case is not a rendition case,341 but rather a passport case.
Ms Montero was a Uruguayan citizen studying in West Berlin (as it was then
called). Without giving reasons, the Uruguayan government refused to renew Ms
Montero’s passport. Ms Montero complained to the UN Human Rights Committee
that this constituted a breach of her freedom of movement.
225. Two issues of jurisdiction arose. The first involved Article 2(1) of the Covenant.342
The second involved Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol, which states that the
Committee may hear complaints from people ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a State
Party.343 The issue centred on whether, because Ms Montero was in West
Germany and not physically located in Uruguay, she was within the jurisdiction of
Uruguay at the relevant times.
339
340
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226. The Committee found that Uruguayan jurisdiction was engaged by the impugned
actions and, therefore, the Committee was competent to examine the
complaint.344
227. The Committee was of the view that the right to leave any country, including
one’s own country, imposed an obligation on both the country of residence and
the country of nationality. Only Uruguay can issue a passport to a Uruguayan
citizen. The Committee concluded that Article 2 ‘could not be interpreted as
limiting the obligations of Uruguay under article 12(2) [freedom of movement] to
citizens within its own territory’. 345 This is clearly a recognition of extraterritorial
jurisdiction based on nationality.
228. One final case needs to be examined: Kindler v Canada.346 Like the European
Human Rights Court case of Soering,347 this extradition case is more accurately
classified as one of state responsibility rather than jurisdiction. This is because
the individual concerned is within the sovereign territory of the State Party and,
therefore, the question is not one of sovereign jurisdiction but of consequences of
sovereign action. Nevertheless, this issue was dealt with by the Committee as a
threshold issue of its jurisdictional competence.
229. Mr Kindler was a US citizen sentenced to death in Pennsylvania. He escaped and
fled to Canada, where he was arrested. In 1991, Canada extradited Mr Kindler
back to the US. Mr Kindler complained to the UN Human Rights Committee that
his extradition breached his Covenant rights, including the guarantee against cruel
and inhuman treatment or punishment.
230. Canada argued that it was United States law, not Canadian law, which required Mr
Kindler’s execution and, therefore, Canada could not be held responsible for the
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laws of another country.348 In an argument reminiscent of the UK’s argument in

Soering, Canada argued that it cannot be held responsible for what another
country might do on its own sovereign territory.
231. The Committee rejected this argument in quite broad terms. The Committee did
not limits its language to extradition alone, but rather framed its response in
terms of decisions ‘relating to persons within its jurisdiction’:349
If a person is lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party concerned will not
generally have responsibility under the Covenant for any violations of that person’s
rights that may later occur in the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State party
clearly is not required to guarantee the rights of persons within another
jurisdiction. However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within
its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that
person’s rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the
State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows from the fact
that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the
handing over of a person to another State (whether a State party to the Covenant
or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose
of the handing over. For example, a State party would itself be in violation of the
Covenant if it handed over a person to another State in circumstances in which it
was foreseeable that torture would take place. The foreseeability of the
consequence would mean that there was a present violation by the State party,
even though the consequence would not occur until later on.

232. In short, where a State makes a decision about an individual who is within

jurisdiction and that decision will, in a certain or purposeful way, have the
necessary and foreseeable consequence of violating an individual’s Covenant
rights in a foreign jurisdiction, then the decision-making State may itself be in
breach of the Covenant. This requires a State to ensure it does not expose an
individual to ‘a real risk of a violation of [their] rights under the Covenant’.350 A
real risk is one that has a necessary and foreseeable consequence of violating an
individual’s Covenant rights.351 Extradition is an example of a decision which
could have such adverse consequences.352
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233. In 1997, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR obliges ratifying nations not to expose anyone to the real
risk of execution for any offence.353 In 2003, the Committee found that the ICCPR
itself places the same obligation on ratifying countries that have abolished the
death penalty.354 Both these matters are extradition cases, in which the
complainant is located physically within the territory of the State Party and,
therefore strictly-speaking, no issue of extraterritoriality arises other than what
might happen to the complainant once she or he is surrendered to a foreign
power.355 They are analogous to decisions made by police in their own territory
that have human rights ramifications abroad.

General Comment 31
234. The Committee summarises its view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Covenant in its General Comment 31.356 The Committee confirms its view that
‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ means that:
…a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party. … [This principle] applies to those
within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside
its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective
control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State
Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.

235. At the end of this passage the Committee goes further than the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) by including the actions of nationals assigned to
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. In Behrami v France, the Grand
Chamber of the ECHR found that France was not responsible for the actions of the
troops it contributed to an international peace-keeping force in Kosovo because
the United Nations, and not France, was the entity exercising authority over the
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troops and the region.357 The ECHR followed this view in Blagojevic v

Netherlands.358
236. I would argue that the Committee’s extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to
include national contingents in all international peace-keeping operations is too
broad. Jurisdiction will turn on the circumstances of each case: who has effective
control of the troops; from whom do the troops take their orders; and, what
arrangements have been made to preserve or abrogate sovereignty over troops?

commentary
237. While it is not expressly acknowledged, the principles of international law have
strongly influenced the jurisprudence of the Committee. In Kindler, state
responsibility was engaged because the individual was already within jurisdiction.
That is a recognition of sovereign jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle.
In the passport case of Montero, the nationality principle explains extraterritorial
jurisdiction. In the Uruguayan rendition cases, jurisdiction arose with respect to a
national abroad from effective control over the national with the consent of local
authorities. Extraterritorial jurisdiction might also be found in these rendition
cases based on the nationality principle.
238. The Uruguayan cases were cited with approval by the ICJ in the Palestinian Wall
advice.359 This is significant because it raises the status of these decisions in
international law, given that a court has cited them as support for the
extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights. The court’s view supports the Committee’s own conclusion that Israel is
responsible for implementing the ICCPR in the Occupied Territories 'to the extent
that it [exercises] “effective control”’.360
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5.2.2 International Court of Justice
239. The International Court of Justice has largely adopted the view of the UN Human
Rights Committee with respect to Article 2 of the ICCPR:361
...while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be
exercised outside the national territory.
… the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their
obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They
only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their
State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of
that of the State of residence…
...[the ICCPR] is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
jurisdiction outside its own territory.

240. The ICJ expressly examined the issue of the extraterritorial application of human
rights treaties in its advisory opinion on the Palestinian Wall.362 In that case it
confirmed the view of the UN Human Rights Committee. The Court’s ruling is
significant because its jurisprudence constitutes what is called ‘hard’ international
law. In other words, its authority as law is of the highest order.
241. In the Palestinian Wall case, the ICJ was required to determine ‘whether the
international human rights conventions to which Israel is party apply within the
Occupied Palestinian Territory’.363 The court first rejected the suggestion by Israel
that human rights law does not apply in times of armed conflict.364 The court then
turned its attention to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.365
242. In determining the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, the ICJ first turned its
mind to the wording of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and whether the phrase ‘within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ should be read disjunctively or
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conjunctively.366 The court concluded that the disjunctive interpretation is correct.
In coming to this conclusion, the court observed that the object and purpose of
the ICCPR made it ‘seem natural’ that States would be obliged to comply with the
ICCPR when a State exercises its jurisdiction in foreign territory. The court also
observed that this interpretation was the practice of the UN Human Rights
Committee.367 The Court also found support for this view in the travaux

préparatoires, which:368
…show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters of the Covenant did not
intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise
jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons
residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall
within the competence of that State, but of that of the State of residence.

243. Adopting the view of the UN Human Rights Committee, the Court concluded that
the ICCPR ‘is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
jurisdiction outside its own territory’.369 This is a disjunctive reading of article
2(1). The Court also found that two other human rights instruments, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, applied extraterritorially.370 In the
Palestinian Wall case, this required Israel to extend its obligations under these
human rights treaties to the Occupied Territories. The Court did not find that the
construction of a wall, of itself, breached those obligations. However, the Court
did find that the course chosen by Israel for the construction of the wall did
breach the human rights of the Palestinian residents affected by its construction,
including article 12(1) rights of freedom of movement.371
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244. In summary, the Court’s expression of the extraterritorial application of human
rights instruments is very broad. It is not limited to occupied territory. It is only
limited to acts done in the exercise of a State’s jurisdiction abroad. This confirms
the universality of human rights. A State’s international human rights obligations
extend beyond its territory and apply wherever the State exercises its jurisdiction
extraterritorially. So, the bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised at public
international law carry with them a State’s international human rights obligations.
In short, police and other state agents must comply with their state’s international
human rights obligations, whether they act domestically or abroad. By corollary,
both state policy and state practice with respect to transnational policing must
comply with a state’s international human rights obligations.

5.2.3 conjunctive/disjunctive
245. There is some controversy in the literature on the correct interpretation of the
phrase ‘territory and jurisdiction’ in Article 2 of the ICCPR. Milanovic observes that
no other human rights treaty uses this formula.372 The closest is the Migrant
Workers Convention, adopted in 1990, which uses an ‘or’ not an ‘and’: “within
their territory or subject to their jurisdiction”.373
246. Dennis argues that the phrase should be read conjunctively: an individual
complainant ‘must be both within the territory of a State Party and subject to the
jurisdiction of that State Party’.374 This has been the view of State Parties,
according to Dennis, and he cites the comments of a US State Department Legal
Advisor before the Human Rights Committee.375 Dennis is critical of the
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Committee’s disjunctive interpretation of ‘and’ in the limitation clause. He also
suggests that both Nowak and Tomuschat express views similar to his.376
247. However, the swiftness with which Dennis brushes aside the ICJ’s endorsement of
the UN Human Rights Committee’s earlier decisions on the disjunctive
interpretation of Article 2 jurisdiction suggests Dennis has chosen to ignore the
hard-law precedential value of the Palestinian Wall advice.
248. Dennis’ reference to the travaux préparatoires is more convincing. He quotes the
US representative to the Commission on Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt, whose
view prevailed over that of others seeking to have the limitation clause to reflect
the European formulation of simply ‘within jurisdiction’. The dissenting States,
including France and Lebanon, were concerned that the effect of this narrow
interpretation was that a State is not obliged to protect the Covenant rights and
freedoms to its nationals abroad. The US view prevailed throughout the drafting
and adoption process. Roosevelt explained the view of the United States by
stating that it did not want to be responsible for extending Covenant rights to
people within its occupied territories:377
An illustration would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan:
persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the occupying
States in certain respects, but were outside the scope of legislation of those
States. Another illustration would be leased territories.

249. In a response opposing Dennis’ views, and in support of the disjunctive
interpretation, Ben-Naftali argues that human rights law has evolved over the
decades since the drafting of the ICCPR and there is now a wide consensus of the
universality of this body of law.378 Ben-Naftali argues that the disjunctive
interpretation ‘gives expression to the object and purpose of the [human rights]
Conventions which is to protect individuals from the improper exercise of power,
376
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whereas a narrower, territorially-based meaning, would exclude certain individuals
from protection, but not from power’.379 She then lists five reasons in support of
the disjunctive interpretation:380
a. it avoids redundancy of terms;
b. it coheres with the jurisdictional clauses of the [Convention Against
Torture] and the [Convention for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination], many of the obligations of which overlap with the
ICCPR, thus generating the sensible subjection of all major [human
rights] treaties to the same jurisdictional regime;
c. it coheres with Article 1 of the first Optional Protocol which
authorizes the HRC to review communications from individuals
subject to the jurisdiction of state parties, dispensing with the term
"territory" altogether;
d. it advances the object and purpose of the treaty - a method of
interpretation that, under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention, carries
more weight than the drafters' intent; and,
e. it is highly supported by practice.
250. In reality, Dennis’ piece is disingenuous. His citation of Nowak and Tomuschat in
support of his ‘conjunctive’ theory is simply false. Nowak actually criticises the
literal (conjunctive) interpretation of Article 2(1) as leading ‘to often absurd
results’ such as Article 12(4) right of a person to re-enter their national territory: a
literal interpretation of Article 2(1) would mean that a person outside their country
could never allege a breach of Article 12(4) when they are refused re-entry.
Nowak instead prefers an interpretation wherein a State might be held
accountable for ‘persons who are located on their territory and subject to their
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sovereign authority’.381 This allows for exceptional circumstances where a State
has jurisdiction, but not the means to secure the rights of those within its
jurisdiction. Such exceptional circumstances include where the sovereign territory
of a State is occupied by a foreign force and where a State has jurisdiction over its
nationals abroad but cannot be held responsible for human rights violations
committed by a foreign sovereign. Nowak argues that a State Party will be
responsible for actions abroad which breach the Covenant rights of individuals
‘subject to their sovereign authority’.382 Though Nowak does not express it in this
manner, it would appear that the travaux debates led to Article 2(1) confusing and
eliding jurisdiction with state responsibility, in a manner with which the European
Court of Human Rights has had to grapple over the last two decades.
251. With respect to Dennis’ claims that Tomuschat supports his literal interpretation of
ICCPR jurisdiction: nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Tomuschat
cites Guantanamo Bay as a good example of why disregarding the literal
interpretation of Article 2(1) is warranted.383 Noting the ICJ’s advice that the
ICCPR applies in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, Tomuschat finds the
US view on ICCPR jurisdiction ‘far from being persuasive’ in its attempts to rebut
the Human Rights Committee’s purposive interpretation.384 He concludes that
Article 2(1) ‘should not be misconstrued as a device designed to open up
loopholes permitting manipulative curtailment of rights and freedom under the
[ICCPR]’.385
252. Dennis reads the Palestinian Wall decision narrowly. He argues that the ICJ
viewed the occupied Palestinian territory as Israeli territory, but only for the
purposes of its examination of freedom of movement under Article 12(1) of the
ICCPR. This argument makes no sense and is disingenuous. The ICJ referred to
the Palestinian territory as occupied territory over which Israel had jurisdiction
381
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owing to its military occupation. Having found Article 2(1) jurisdiction, the only
valid reason to say that particular rights do not apply is if a valid derogation exists.
The ICJ acknowledged a valid derogation to article 9, but stated clearly that all
‘other Articles of the Covenant…remain applicable not only on Israeli territory, but
also on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.386 To say that the ICJ advice can only
be read as confirmation that jurisdiction exists with respect to article 12 makes no
sense. State responsibility might be limited by a valid derogation, but either there
is jurisdiction or there is not. Jurisdiction cannot apply to some articles and not
others. Dennis is simply wrong.

5.3 European Court of Human Rights
253. At the turn of the 21st Century, European jurisprudence was the most nuanced
and developed of all jurisdictions. European human rights law does not,
obviously, apply to non-European nations such as Canada and Australia, but it
does exert an influence on both international and domestic courts and tribunals
beyond its borders. So a detailed analysis is warranted to use as a measure
against other judicial bodies.

5.3.1 European Convention on Human Rights
254. The European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’) is a multi-lateral
document and applies only to those countries which have ratified it (‘the
Contracting States’).387 Contracting States are required to secure all Convention
rights to everybody ‘within their jurisdiction’.388 The phrase ‘within jurisdiction’ is
interpreted in conformity with the concept of jurisdiction at public international
law.389 This means that jurisdiction is primarily territorial.390 The Convention has
386
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no application beyond the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting
States.391 The extent of that legal space is the sum of the jurisdictions of the
Contracting States.
255. Therefore the Convention does not usually provide protection for people in the
territory of non-Contracting States: for example, prior to their respective
ratifications of the Convention, in the European principality of Andorra392 or in the
Serbian capital of Belgrade during the 1999 NATO bombings.393 In the words of
the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’): ‘The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of
Contracting States’.394
256. The Court has noted that, in exceptional circumstances, a Contracting State’s

territorial jurisdiction might be limited where the State does not control a part of
its territory due to war or rebellion.395 Despite noting this, the Court has generally
found that a Contracting State maintains jurisdiction over any national territory it
no longer controls, but that its obligations to secure the Convention rights of
people within that territory are limited accordingly.396
257. In other exceptional circumstances a Contracting State’s jurisdiction, and therefore
the legal space to which the Convention applies, will extend extraterritorially. This
extraterritorial jurisdiction of States is the subject of this section.
258. Any understanding of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial application of the Convention, requires an appreciation of the
difference between ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘state responsibility’. The Court’s

390
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jurisprudence has evolved a clear differentiation between jurisdiction and state
responsibility. Unfortunately, the two are often confused by commentators.397
Early in the development of this jurisprudence, even the Court often confused the
two concepts.398
259. The issue of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction is a preliminary threshold issue.399
It is closely linked to a Contracting State having a decisive level of control over
land, people and/or property in a foreign territory. On the other hand, state
responsibility requires an examination of the merits of a specific allegation.400 The
issue with respect to state responsibility is whether the Contracting State has
discharged its negative duties (to refrain from infringing rights) and positive duties
(to secure human rights), which is measured by a proportionality test. Because
the Convention only requires a State to discharge these duties within its

jurisdiction, determining the extent of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction must,
logically, be determined before examining whether a duty has been breached. If
the court finds that the alleged violation occurred outside of a Contracting State’s
jurisdiction, then the Court has no competence to adjudicate an alleged breach
because it falls outside the Convention’s legal space (espace juridique). In short:
there can be no state responsibility without jurisdiction, but there can be
jurisdiction without state responsibility.

397

see the discussion between Lawson and O’Boyle, in which the latter accuses the former of
conflating the two concepts: Michael O’Boyle, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: a comment on ‘Life After Bankovic’ in Fons Coomans and Menno
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5.3.2 jurisdiction
260. Certain categories of circumstances attracting extraterritorial jurisdiction have
been identified by the Court, but the list of categories is not closed. Jurists and
commentators have attempted to summarise the recognised categories. I will
briefly examine some of these attempts and then propose my own summary. But
first, I will review some significant cases in the Court’s jurisprudence on
extraterritorial jurisdiction.

caselaw
261. In the foundational case of Cyprus v Turkey (1975), the government of Cyprus
took Turkey to the European Human Rights Commission alleging Turkish human
rights breaches in occupied northern Cyprus.401 This preliminary decision was
concerned only with the issue of admissibility, not with the merits of the matter.
Turkey challenged the admissibility of Cyprus’ application inter alia on the ground
that the Commission did not have the power to hear the complaint, because of

where the acts occurred (ratione loci). Turkey observed that, because of the
wording of Article 1 of the Convention,402 the Commission was only competent to
hear complaints of acts committed within the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party.
Turkey argued that, because the acts of which Cyprus complained did not occur
inside the national territory of Turkey and that Turkey had never annexed
northern Cyprus, the alleged acts occurred outside of Turkish jurisdiction.
Therefore, Turkey was not obliged to secure Convention rights to people in
northern Cyprus.
262. The Commission rejected Turkey’s argument, finding that ‘jurisdiction’ is not
limited to a Contracting Party’s national territory. Article 1 requires a Contracting
Party to secure Convention rights and freedoms to everyone ‘under their actual
authority and responsibility’.403 The Commission further explained that:404
401
402
403

Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75.
see n 388.

Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136.
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...nationals of a State, including registered ships and aircrafts, are partly within its
jurisdiction wherever they may be, and that authorised agents of a State, including
diplomatic or consular agents and armed forces, not only remain under its
jurisdiction when abroad but bring any other persons or property "within the
jurisdiction" of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over such
persons or property . Insofar as, by their acts or omissions, they affect such
persons or property, the responsibility of the State is engaged.

263. The Commission then noted that Turkish troops, under the sole direction of
Turkey and following Turkish military law and practice, had entered Cyprus.
Therefore, Turkish troops, acting as agents of Turkey, brought any people or
property on Cyprus within the jurisdiction of Turkey ‘to the extent that they
exercise control over such persons or property’.405 If the actions or omissions of
Turkish troops affected the Convention rights of those people in Cyprus within
Turkey’s jurisdiction, then Turkey would be responsible for those breaches.
Having established that the acts complained of fell within Turkey’s jurisdiction, the
Commission concluded that it had the power (competence ratione loci) to hear the
merits of Cyprus’ complaint.406
264. The test of ‘authority and responsibility’ is a strange test for jurisdiction, because it
invokes both jurisdiction (‘authority’) and state responsibility (‘responsibility’).
This is, of course, relatively early in the Commission’s jurisprudence and the
confused legal formula would be reworked over the next few decades. It would
have been preferable for the Commission to have used wording like: authority and

capable of attracting responsibility. The Commission’s decision also conflates two
types of control, which emerge in later jurisprudence as two distinct categories:
(1) control over foreign territory; and (2) control over people and property within
a foreign territory.
404
405
406

Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 136.
Cyprus v Turkey (26 May 1975) ECommHR 6780/74 & 6950/75, 137.

in a determination of the merits dated 10 July 1976, the Commission found that Turkey had
breached several Convention rights and freedoms. Usually, the matter would then have been
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265. Another curious ruling of the Commission in Cyprus v Turkey (1975) relates to
Article 56 of the Convention.407 Under Article 56, a Contracting State may elect
(opt-in) to extend its Convention obligations to some or all of its territories abroad
and, further, to recognise the competence of the Court to accept complaints from
those territories.408 The accepted interpretation today is that, without such an
express declaration under Article 56, the Convention ‘jurisdiction’ cannot extend to
these territories.409 However, in Cyprus v Turkey the Commission read the Article
more broadly, effectively finding that the Article’s actual purpose is to ensure that
the Convention is read in concert with local culture and customs in non-European
territories:410
The Commission does not find that [Article 56] of the Convention, providing for
the extension of the Convention to other than metropolitan territories of High
Contracting Parties, can be interpreted as limiting the scope of the term
'jurisdiction'...to such metropolitan territories. The purpose of [Article 56] is not
only the territorial extension of the Convention but its adaptation to the measure
of self-government attained in particular non-metropolitan territories and to the
cultural and social differences in such territories; [Article 56(3)] confirms this
interpretation. This does not mean that the territories to which [Article 56] applies
are not within the 'jurisdiction' within the meaning of Article 1...

266. The matter of Hess v UK related to the continuing detention of Adolf Hitler’s
private-secretary, Herman Hess, at Spandau Prison.411 The application was
brought by Hess’ wife, who complained inter alia that her husband was being held
in solitary confinement: he was the only prisoner in a facility capable of holding
600 people. The prison was located in the British sector of Berlin, where Soviet,

407

Article 56 was formerly known as Article 63, and is referred to as such in this case and the later
decisions of Tyrer & Thanh: see, [271] below.
408
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409
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American, French and British troops took turns guarding Hess. Mrs Hess also
alleged UK responsibility because the agreement between the Four Powers had
been signed in London in August 1945. The Commission found that the UK’s
Convention jurisdiction was not engaged and dismissed the application. Of
relevance was the fact that the Four Powers treaty required unanimous agreement
of the four parties on all decisions affecting the running of the prison. The
Commission found that this quadripartite administration over the prison could not
be divided into four separate jurisdictions and, therefore, is not a matter ‘within
the jurisdiction’ of the UK. The Commission also noted in passing that the Four
Powers treaty could not attract Convention jurisdiction in any case, because the
treaty was ratified before the Convention came into force.
267. The case of Soering v UK is not really a case of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but
rather of state responsibility in refoulement cases.412 However, it is mentioned
here because the Contracting State unsuccessfully raised jurisdictional objections.
Soering, residing in the United Kingdom, was the subject of an extradition request
on capital charges by the United States, which refused to provide a guarantee that
the death penalty would not be sought or applied. Soering alleged that his
extradition to the US would breach his Convention rights by exposing him to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, due to the conditions on death
row in the relevant US state (the ‘death row phenomenon’).413 The Court agreed
and found that it would be a violation of Mr Soering’s Convention rights if the UK
extradited him to the US.
268. The UK argued that it was not a Contracting State that would be committing the
alleged rights violation, nor would the violation occur within its jurisdiction.
Therefore, argued the UK, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter
because any potential breach of Convention rights would occur in, and be
412
413

Soering v UK (7 July 1989) ECtHR 14038/88.

for death row phenomenon, see: Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: a worldwide
perspective (2008, 4th ed) 180-3; and, William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in
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performed by, the United States and the Court is not competent to adjudicate the
actions of a non-Contracting State.
269. The Court found in Soering that, because of the ‘foreseeable consequences...[and]
serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering risked’, a decision to
extradite might engage state responsibility ‘where substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in
the requesting country’.414 The Court reached this conclusion by observing that
the purpose and spirit of the Convention is to secure and protect individual rights,
and it would be contrary to that purpose and spirit for a Contracting State
'knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial
grounds for believing that [an individual] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed'.415
270. The issue of jurisdiction is not dealt with in Soering. The Court moves quickly to
the question of state responsibility for the adverse consequences ‘suffered outside
the jurisdiction of the extraditing State’ due to the actions of the receiving
State.416 As the Court observes in Bankovic, the applicant in Soering was within
the territory of the UK and therefore clearly within the UK’s jurisdiction.417
271. The two separate cases of Tyrer v UK (1978) and Thanh v UK (1990) are
important to a legal understanding of a Contracting State’s jurisdiction with
respect to its self-governing territories under Article 56 of the Convention.418
Tyrer was a juvenile UK citizen residing in the Isle of Man, who complained about
his judicial sentence of corporal punishment (by lashing) in 1972. The Isle of Man
was a self-governing dependency of the British Crown. In 1953, the UK had made
an Article 56 declaration with respect to the territory. On the other hand, Thanh
414
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and his co-applicants were Vietnamese nationals detained in Hong Kong pending
deportation back to Vietnam because their refugee status applications were
unsuccessful. At the time, Hong Kong was a self-governing British territory, about
which the UK had made no Article 56 declaration.
272. On the question of jurisdiction, the Court found that the Isle of Mann fell within
the UK’s jurisdiction, while the Commission found that Hong Kong did not.419 The
Hong Kong decision was ruled inadmissible because of the absence of an Article
56 declaration. Bound by the express words and purpose of Article 56, the
Commission noted that even if it had found that the UK controlled Hong Kong
immigration policy, the absence of an Article 56 declaration rendered the
Commission incompetent to adjudicate the matter. Because of the Article 56
declaration with respect to the Isle of Man, there were no impediments to UK
jurisdiction in the Tyrer case.420 While it is tempting to distinguish these cases on
the fact that Tyrer was a subject of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, whereas
Thanh was not, these cases were not decided on that point.
273. The decision in Thanh seems to contradict the Commission’s earlier broad
interpretation of Article 56 in Cyprus v Turkey (1975),421 however the reasoning in

Thanh is later confirmed by the Court in the Quark Fishing case.422
274. Thanh’s case illuminates another important aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence.
This was a refoulement case (Soering type case), in which Thanh and his fellow
applicants faced deportation to Vietnam, where they alleged there was a real risk
of torture or mistreatment. Because the applicants did not fall within the
Convention jurisdiction of the UK, the UK was not obliged under the Convention to
secure the applicants’ rights. This demonstrates starkly the two-step process of
419

the applicants in Thanh did not appeal the Commission’s decision to the Court. This is why I
am dealing with a Commission decision here.
420
there was a minor jurisdictional objection unsuccessfully raised before the Court by the UK,
which relied on the fact that the Article 56 declaration with respect to the Isle of Man expired in
1976, before the Commission put the matter before the Court. At hearing, the UK withdrew the
objection and consented to the Court’s jurisdiction in the matter.
421
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determining jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, which can render a complaint
inadmissible without any assessment of state responsibility.
275. In Chrysostomos et al v Turkey, Turkey argued inter alia that it had not elected to
extend its Convention jurisdiction to northern Cyprus by way of an Article 56
declaration.423 The Commission found that Article 56 was not applicable because,
in the express terms of that Article, it only applies to territories ‘for whose
international relations [the Contracting State] is responsible’ and Turkey had no
such internationally-recognised responsibility over northern Cyprus.424
276. In Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, the two applicants were convicted of a
crime in Andorra.425 As is often the case in Andorra, the panel of trial judges
included a French and a Spanish national sitting as judges of the Andorran court.
The applicants argued before the European Court of Human Rights that their trial
had been unfair and that, due to the nationality of the trial judges, France and
Spain were responsible for these violation of their Convention rights. On this
point, the Court did not deal with the substantive complaint, only examining the
question of jurisdiction. The Court found against the complainants because
Andorra was not a party to the Convention (ratione loci), and because the criminal
justice system of Andorra was separate from that of Spain or France and the
judges were not sitting in their capacity as French or Spanish judges (ratione

personae). Since the offenders did not fall within the jurisdiction of a Contracting
Party to the Convention, the Court was not competent to hear the case.
277. The case of WM v Denmark was a consular case in which the applicant
complained that the Danish ambassador in communist East Germany had acted
contrary to the Convention by declining his application for asylum and by calling
East German police to remove him from the Danish Embassy.426 While the

423

Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou & Loizidou v Turkey (4 March 1991) ECommHR 15299/89,
15300/89 & 15318/89.
424
European Human Rights Convention, article 56(1).
425
Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (26 June 1992) ECtHR 12747/87.
426
WM v Denmark (14 October 1992) ECtHR 17392/90.

– 108 –

complaint was ultimately unsuccessful, the Commission did confirm that the acts
of authorised state agents abroad can attract Convention jurisdiction under the
authority and control test:427
The Commission notes that these complaints are directed mainly against Danish
diplomatic authorities in the former DDR. It is clear, in this respect, from the
constant jurisprudence of the Commission that authorised agents of a State,
including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or property within the
jurisdiction of that State to the extent that they exercise authority over such
persons or property. In so far as they affect such persons or property by their acts
or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged.
Therefore, in the present case the Commission is satisfied that the acts of the
Danish ambassador complained of affected persons within the jurisdiction of the
Danish authorities within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.

278. The case of Loizidou clearly demonstrates the separate nature of jurisdiction and
state responsibility. Mrs Loizidou , a Greek Cypriot, complained that she was
denied access to and enjoyment of her property in northern Cyprus, an area
occupied by Turkey. The Court was called upon to determine whether Turkey was
responsible for this violation of the applicant’s Convention rights. In its first
judgment, the Court looked only at the question of jurisdiction.428 This was a
preliminary matter of determining the Court’s competence to proceed to the
substantive issue of Turkey’s responsibility for the violations.429
279. In determining the jurisdictional issue, the Court applied an ‘effective control’ test
because of Turkey’s military presence in the region. Since Turkey acknowledged
that Mrs Loizidou’s complaint stemmed from the fact of its occupation of the area
and the actions of Turkish troops in preventing her access to her property, the
Court concluded these acts fell within Turkish jurisdiction. However the Court
stressed again that the question ‘[w]hether the matters complained of are

427
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imputable to Turkey and give rise to State responsibility are thus questions which
fall to be determined by the Court at the merits phase’.430
280. The next northern Cyprus case is highly significant because it is an appeal to the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, consisting of seventeen
judges of the Court including its President.431 In Cyprus v Turkey (2001), Cyprus
alleged that Turkey continued to deny Convention rights to Greek, Turkish and
gypsy Cypriots resident in, or displaced from, northern Cyprus.432 Applying the
effective control test, the Grand Chamber again rejected Turkey’s submission that
it was not responsible for the acts of the local administration, which Turkey
claimed was independent of the Turkish state. Then the Grand Chamber went
further, to explain that ‘effective control’ meant that Turkey’s Convention
jurisdiction could attach not only to the acts and omissions of Turkish nationals,
but also to the acts and omissions of local administrators:433
Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility
cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus
but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which
survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support. It follows that, in terms of
Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey's “jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to
securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention... and
that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.

281. The Grand Chamber observed that, since the government of Cyprus was unable to
secure these rights in northern Cyprus, a decision that the region was not within
Turkey’s jurisdiction would leave the residents of northern Cyprus unprotected by
the Convention. This would ‘result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of
human-rights protection in the territory’.434 The Grand Chamber then went on to
impute Turkish responsibility in several substantive violations.
430
431
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282. The case of Bankovic was also an appeal to the Grand Chamber and the Grand
Chamber’s decision was delivered per curiam.435 In Bankovic, the six applicants
brought an application on behalf of deceased Serbian relatives complaining of
breaches of the right to life and freedom of expression. The victims had been
killed during the bombing of Belgrade by NATO aircraft in 1999. The Grand
Chamber dismissed the case, finding that the victims were not within the
Convention jurisdiction of any Contracting State. The Grand Chamber stressed
that the concept of jurisdiction is essentially territorial and that extraterritorial
jurisdiction ‘is exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular
circumstances of each case’.436 The applicants had argued inter alia for another
exceptional category of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be recognised. The Grand
Chamber characterised the proposed category as bringing within jurisdiction
‘anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever
in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt’.437 The
Grand Chamber refused to recognise this category, rejecting the applicants’
submission that jurisdiction is proportionate ‘to the level of control exercised in
any given extra-territorial situation’. Though the Grand Chamber did not use
these words, it effectively rejected this argument because the applicants were
proposing that the test for state responsibility should be used for jurisdiction. As
the Grand Chamber majority pointed out, this renders the issue of jurisdiction
‘superfluous and devoid of any purpose’.438 The Grand Chamber rejected the
applicants’ further submission that the ‘effective control’ of airspace was a limited
form of ‘effective control’ of a territory, which therefore attracted a limited form of
jurisdiction and limited form of state responsibility. The Grand Chamber observed
that this was just a variation of the first proportionality argument.439 The Grand
Chamber also observed that the applicants were not within the legal space
435
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(espace juridique) of the Convention, because at the relevant time they were not
within the territory of a Contracting State or foreign territory occupied by a
Contracting State.440
283. The case of Ilascu v Moldova & Russia was an appeal to the Grand Chamber.441
The applicants complained of their treatment and lengthy imprisonment in the
Moldovan province of Transdniestria. In the early 1990s, Moldova gained its
independence from the former Soviet Union. During this time, the province of
Transdniestria declared independence from Moldova, supported to varying extents
by the USSR and later the Russian Federation. Neither Moldova nor the
international community recognise the province’s independence. Mr Ilascu and
several other applicants were arrested in 1992, charged with crimes against the
Transdniestrian state and convicted. Mr Ilascu was released from prison in May
2001, the other three applicants remained in prison. The Grand Chamber was
called upon to decide whether Moldova or Russia is responsible for these actions
of provincial officials. The Grand Chamber’s final decision was technical and
complex. The issues of jurisdiction and state responsibility were very closely
related and the Grand Chamber dealt with them in the same judgment.
284. In relation to Moldova, the Grand Chamber explained that, where a Contracting
State does not exercise authority over some of its territory due to the specific
circumstance of a ‘separatist regime’ (whether backed by foreign troops or not),
then the scope of its jurisdiction in that territory is reduced but not eliminated.
This reduced jurisdiction accordingly reduces the state’s responsibility. The State
will still have certain positive obligations to take ‘appropriate and sufficient’
measures, such as ‘all legal and diplomatic means available’ to the Contracting
State, to ensure that the people in the separatist territory continue to enjoy their
Convention rights and freedoms.442 The Grand Chamber found that Moldova still
had jurisdiction over the province, despite the presence of Russian and rebel
440
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troops, and could still be held responsible for some breaches of the applicants’
Covenant rights. Moldova was responsible for any breaches attributable to it and
which were made after it became bound by the Covenant (ratione temporis). The
Grand Chamber found against Moldova in the limited circumstances where it failed
to sufficiently exercise its positive obligations to the applicants. Specifically
Moldova had failed to raise the applicant’s cases in negotiations brokered by
Russia.
285. With respect to the Russian Federation, the Grand Chamber found that Russian
troops in the rebel Moldovan province had arrested and handed over the
applicants to the separatist regime in full knowledge of the consequences for the
applicants’ human rights. This satisfied the ‘authority and control’ test and
attracted Russian jurisdiction, however Russia could not be held responsible under
the Convention because it was not bound by the Convention at the relevant time
(ratione temporis).443 The Grand Chamber also found that the separatist
administration only survives because of the significant political, military, financial
and economic assistance provided by Russia. According to the Grand Chamber,
this attracted Russian jurisdiction by satisfying the ‘effective control’ test, and
even if it did not, the circumstances satisfied a new standard of ‘decisive influence’
over a foreign separatist administration.444 This could make Russia responsible
under the Convention for the actions taken after 5 May 1998 (the date on which
Russia ratified the Convention) by its own agents in the region and by the
separatist administration, but also for actions taken before 5 May 1998 by the
same actors, where the consequences of those prior actions have a continuing
affect on the applicant’s human rights.445 For example, Russia was held
responsible for conditions of Mr Ilascu’s ongoing detention and the treatment he
received from 1992 through to 2001, but not for what happened at Mr Ilascu’s
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trial which ended in 1993 and was not therefore ‘continuing’ at the time of
Russia’s ratification of the Covenant in 1998.
286. In the case of Issa, six women from northern Iraq brought applications on behalf
of deceased family members, all of whom were shepherds.446 In 1995 Turkish
troops invaded northern Iraq, during which time the non-combatant shepherds
were killed and mutilated. The Court dismissed the applications on the grounds
that Turkey did not have jurisdiction over the disputed area at the relevant time.
The Court first applied the ‘effective control’ test, distinguishing this case from the
Northern Cyprus cases. While Turkey had approximately the same number of
troops in Cyprus and Iraq, it did not occupy the entire region of Iraq, it did so only
for a short time and it did not establish a local administrative authority or border
checkpoints. The Court next looked at the ‘authority and control’ test and found
that it was not satisfied to the requisite standard (‘beyond reasonable doubt’) that
Turkish troops had killed the victims, because there was doubt about whether
Turkish troops were active in the relevant area at the relevant time. Accordingly,
there was no jurisdiction, the killings fell outside the espace juridique of the
Convention and the case was dismissed.
287. In the case of Öcalan v Turkey, the Grand Chamber effectively affirmed the
“authority over people” test expounded in WM v Denmark:447
The Court notes that the applicant was arrested by members of the Turkish
security forces inside an aircraft registered in Turkey in the international zone of
Nairobi Airport.
It is common ground that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials
by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and
therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the
Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its
territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by
Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and
return to Turkey.

446
447

Issa et al v Turkey (3 March 2005) ECtHR 31821/96.
Öcalan v Turkey (12 May 2005) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 46221/99, [91].
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288. In Quark Fishing v UK, the applicant complained about the actions of UK officials
which resulted in the applicant company failing to obtain a fishing licence for the
water of the Atlantic island of South Georgia.448 South Georgia is a British
overseas territory. The applicants submitted that the ‘effective control’ test
applied to engage the UK’s Convention jurisdiction. The Court rejected this,
noting that there was no relevant Article 56 declaration with respect to the
territory. The Court made it clear that the absence of an Article 56 will be fatal to
an application. In essence, such an absence will take precedence over the
‘effective control’ test of Bankovic because it relates to the purpose and operation
of an express provision of the Convention:449
This "effective control" principle...does not...replace the system of declarations
which the Contracting States decided, when drafting the Convention, to apply to
territories overseas for whose international relations they were responsible. ...
Bankovic, a decision of the Grand Chamber, emphasises the regional basis of the
Convention and the exceptional nature of extensions beyond that legal space (§
80). The situations which it covers are clearly separate and distinct from
circumstances where a Contracting State has not, through a declaration under
Article 56 (former Article 63), extended the Convention or any of its Protocols to
an overseas territory for whose international relations it is responsible.

289. In Behrami v France, Mr Behrami complained that France, which commanded the
local military contingent of the UN military force in Kosovo, was responsible for
not clearly marking the minefield into which his son fatally strayed.450 This was an
appeal to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber found the complaint
inadmissible because the acts of French troops were attributable to the authority
exercising overall control of the region at the time, which was the UN and not
France. Therefore, pursuant to the Monetary Gold principle,451 the Grand

448

Quark Fishing Ltd v UK (19 September 2006) ECtHR 15305/06.
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450
Behrami v France (2 May 2007) ECtHR 71412/01 & Saramati v France et al (2 May 2007) ECtHR
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Chamber was not competent to adjudicate on the matter because the UN is not a
Contracting Party to the Convention.
290. More recently, in the case of Blagojevic v Netherlands, the applicant complained of
his treatment before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), sitting in the Hague.452 Mr Blagojevic argued that the ICTY was located
within the national territory of Netherlands and, therefore, that Contracting State
was responsible for securing his Convention rights. Applying the Grand Chamber’s
decision in Behrami, the Court found that overall control of the process was
exercised by the United Nations, which is ‘a legal personality separate from that of
its member states and is not itself a Contracting Party’ and therefore the Court
lacks jurisdiction ratione personae.453 This represents another limitation on
jurisdiction within the national territory of a Contracting State.
291. Finally, in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, the applicants were Iraqi nationals
arrested separately by UK military forces in UK-occupied southern Iraq in 2003.454
From December 2003 to December 2008, the applicants remained in a UK-run
detention facilities in Iraq. The detention facilities were initially established by
military force, but later the sovereign Iraqi authorities recognised the exclusive
control and authority of the UK over these facilities. In December 2007, Iraqi
authorities requested that the applicants be transferred to them for trial. The
applicants took action in the UK courts, arguing that their surrender would amount
to refoulement on the ground that they would face charges attracting the death
penalty. On 31 December 2008 Iraqi recognition of exclusive UK control of the
Iraqi detention facilities expired. In 30 December 2008, the applicants were
transferred to Iraqi authorities.

452
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292. The UK Court of Appeal had found that the applicants did not fall within the
Convention jurisdiction of the UK.455 Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was
refused. The European Court of Human Rights ruled separately on the
jurisdictional and substantive issues.456
293. The applicants in Al-Saadoon argued that, for the entire period from their arrest
through to their transfer to Iraqi authorities, they fell within the Convention
jurisdiction of the UK. The UK argued inter alia that it had no choice other than to
hand over the applicants to the sovereign power of the territory on which the
detainees were held, as the sovereign power had requested. This was because,
once the Iraqi government no longer recognised exclusive British authority over
the detention facilities, it would have been unlawful to deny the request of the
sovereign power. On the facts, the Court found that the UK had ‘total and
exclusive control’ over the facilities at the relevant time and, therefore, the
applicants fell within the UK’s Convention jurisdiction. For the Court, this was a
straight-forward application of the ‘authority and control’ test. The legality
defence, raised by the UK, was not a matter for the preliminary determination of
jurisdiction, but for the later merits determination of state responsibility.457

analysis
294. The case of Bankovic seemed to stir much controversy among European legal
commentators. Many authors were critical of the Grand Chamber’s ‘restrictive
view’ of jurisdiction.458 They also seemed concerned by the doctrine of the legal
space (espace juridique) of the Contracting Parties.459 This latter concern is
something I do not understand, because I read the concept of legal space as little
455
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more than a synonym for the sum of the jurisdictions of the Contracting Parties.
Given that extraterritorial jurisdiction is elastic, in the sense that it will expand and
contract according to the circumstances of a case, the espace juridique is not a
fixed legal space but also correspondingly elastic.
295. In his 2008 paper, Milanovic argues that the term ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights
treaties is not the same concept as jurisdiction in general international law. He
argues that it refers ‘solely [to] a sort of factual power that a state exercises over
persons or territory’.460 This is Milanovic’s sole test for jurisdiction. This leads him
to conclude that the European Court of Human Rights was wrong to find Moldovan
jurisdiction in Ilascu. While this is an interesting theoretical approach, it does not
assist in a complete understanding of the Court’s jurisprudence.
296. In a 2004 collection of papers on the extraterritorial application of human rights
treaties, several authors attempted to summarise the Court’s jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial Convention jurisdiction of Contracting Parties. I will examine two
of those authors’ attempts. Cerna summarises the categories of circumstances
which would result in a violation of the Convention extraterritorially.461 The
chapter is written after the case of Bankovic (2001),462 but before an equally
important case of Ilascu (2004) involving Moldova and Russia.463 While her first
category is accurate, the second is loose and requires modification after Ilascu,
and the third is superficial and contributes nothing to the understanding of
jurisdiction:464
(1) ... [‘the Soering cases’]...if lawful acts committed within the territory of a state
(such as extradition or deportation determinations) were likely to give rise to
actual violations outside the state's territory;

460
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(2) ...in territories that are under [a state’s] 'effective control', even if the
territories are outside the state; and
(3) ... as in the Issa v Turkey case, where neither the Court nor Turkey questioned
that the Convention applied to Turkish forces operating in Iraq, a state not party
to the Convention...

297. In the same 2004 collection of papers, Lawson summaries the caselaw into four
categories.465 This is a version of his earlier three-category summary of 2002,466
modified to accommodate the Bankovic decision. Unfortunately, these categories
are confused because they do not clearly differentiate between jurisdiction and
state responsibility. This failure is the focus of O’Boyle’s justified criticism of
Lawson’s paper.467 Respectfully, I must say that Lawson has misread Bankovic.
Though of course, that is easier to say with the advantage of several subsequent
cases which have clarified Bankovic considerably. The four categories identified
by Lawson are:468
(a)
The ‘northern Cyprus situation’, where one state party to the
Convention...exercises effective overall control over part of the territory of another
state party to the Convention...
(b) The ‘Kosovo situation’: same as (a), but [occupied territory belongs to a state
which] is not a part to the Convention...
(c) The ‘intra-European temporary operation’, where agents of one state party to
the Convention exercise de facto control over persons and property abroad in a
more or less limited, incidental, ad hoc fashion in the territory of another state
party to the Convention...
(d) The ‘external temporary operation’: same as (c), but [occupied territory
belongs to state which] is not a party to the Convention...

298. In relation to Lawson’s first two categories, there is nothing in the Court’s caselaw
to support the bifurcation of these categories. Whether the foreign territory
belongs to a Contracting or non-Contracting State is irrelevant. If a Contracting
State exercises effective control over foreign territory, then that territory will fall
465
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within the Contracting State’s jurisdiction and will become part of the legal space
in which the Convention operates. In the Kosovan case of Behrami, in which
judgment was handed down after Lawson published, the Court found that
effective overall control was exercised by the United Nations, which is not a party
to the Convention, and not by individual contributing states such as France.469 In
relation to Lawson’s third and fourth categories, again there is no caselaw to
support this bifurcation. Whether authority is exercised over people and property
on the territory of a Contracting or non-Contracting State is irrelevant. Jurisdiction
attaches to the fact of authority and control, independent of geography. This is
certainly the view taken by the UK House of Lords, which found that the UK’s
Convention jurisdiction could attach under certain circumstances in occupied
Iraq.470 Interestingly, Lawson has not included the so-called ‘Soering cases’ in his
summary, though he did include them in his 2002 summary.
299. In the House of Lords case mentioned above, Lord Brown identifies four
categories of exceptions to the rule that jurisdiction is primarily territorial. Based
on his Lordship’s reading of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision of

Bankovic, those four categories are:471
(i) Where the state "through the effective control of the relevant territory and its
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by [the government of
that territory]" ... (i.e. when otherwise there would be a vacuum within a Council
of Europe country, the government of that country itself being unable "to fulfil the
obligations it had undertaken under the Convention" ...(as in Northern Cyprus).

469
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(ii) "Cases involving the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and
on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that state [where]
customary international law and treaty provisions have recognised the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction" ...
(iii) Certain other cases where a state's responsibility "could, in principle, be
engaged because of acts … which produced effects or were performed outside
their own territory" .... Drozd v France...is the only authority specifically referred to
in Bankovic as exemplifying this class of exception to the general rule...
(iv) The Soering...line of cases, ...[which] involves action by the state whilst the
person concerned is "on its territory, clearly within its jurisdiction" ...

300. With respect, his Lordship’s first point appears to be a misreading of the Court’s
concept of legal space in Bankovic. The applicants in Bankovic had sought to rely
on the Court’s reasoning in Cyprus v Turkey (2001), in which the court found
Turkish jurisdiction and noted that to find otherwise would leave ‘a regrettable
vacuum in the system of human rights protection’ in northern Cyprus.472 The
applicants in Bankovic argued that the Convention had an ‘ordre public mission’
and that to find they fell outside its protection would “leave a regrettable vacuum
in the Convention system of human rights’ protection”.473 The Court rejected this,
explaining that the ‘regrettable vacuum’ to which it referred in Cyprus v Turkey
(2001) would have resulted because the residents of the region, who but for
Turkish occupation would have been protected by the Convention, would find
themselves unprotected. This was unacceptable to the Court. In essence,
occupation of a Contracting State’s sovereign territory does not remove the
territory from the Convention’s espace juridique. All Cypriots are still protected by
the Convention by virtue of Cyprus’ ratification. If I might be so bold, this is a
species of what the common law calls ‘legitimate expectations’. The Court
distinguished the facts of Bankovic essentially because the residents of Belgrade
had no legitimate expectation of falling within the Convention’s espace juridique:
Serbia was not and had never been a Contracting State. This is what the Court
meant when it said that the Convention is primarily regional and does not apply to
472
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the whole world. It would be an error to assume that those under the effective
control of a Contracting State on non-European territory would not also have
legitimate expectations of falling within jurisdiction.
301. In relation to Lord Brown’s second point, which is also a direct quote from

Bankovic, it is a shame that his Lordship appears unaware that the Court was
summarising its exposition of the law in Cyprus v Turkey (1975). The 1975
decision is much broader than the brief summary in Bankovic, referring to
‘authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents and armed
forces’.474 Again, in reference to the third category, while it is true that the

Bankovic Court only referred to Drozd, in the latter it referred to a long line of
authority.475 Finally, I cannot agree with his Lordship’s final category as a test for
extraterritorial jurisdiction, because it is a category of state responsibility. Lord
Brown himself acknowledges that these cases do not involve “the exercise of the
state's jurisdiction abroad” and it is disappointing that he includes it nevertheless.
302. Before I present my own attempt to summarise the Court’s caselaw on
extraterritorial jurisdiction, I note that the list of categories of circumstances which
engage extraterritorial jurisdiction is not closed. My summary only attempts to
summarise the caselaw as it stood at the time of the Arar case and the Bali Nine.
I note that the ‘Soering cases’ are not extraterritorial jurisdictional cases, because
the individual to be refouled is already within jurisdiction. These non-refoulement
cases are best dealt with below under the more appropriate heading of ‘state
responsibility’. I also note that a Contracting Party’s Convention jurisdiction will

474
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only extend to its external territories if the Contracting Party has made a
declaration under the Convention to this effect.476
303. On one final note, an individual can fall under the jurisdiction of more than one
Contracting State, such as the applicants in Ilascu who fell under both Moldovan
and Russian jurisdiction. However in these circumstances, the extent of each
State’s responsibility to an individual within jurisdiction is not necessarily identical.
Early on in its jurisprudence, the Commission also recognised the concept of ‘joint
responsibility’, in which two or more parties share equal control over a territory or
person and in which all decisions must be joint and unanimous. In these
circumstances, such as the detention of Herman Hess in Spandau prison,
jurisdiction is joint and non-severable, leading to the conclusion that one party
alone cannot be held responsible for any act or omission and therefore Convention
jurisdiction does not attach. In Ilascu, both respondent parties were Contracting
States at the time of the application. In the case of Hess, the USA and USSR,
which held joint responsibility with the UK and France, were not Contracting
States, but the Commission’s decision did not turn on this fact. It might be that, if
all respondent nations are Contracting States, then an applicant falls within some
form of ‘joint jurisdiction’. But this is pure speculation and, unfortunately, the
exact parameters of joint jurisdiction remain unclear.
304. Having reviewed the Court’s relevant caselaw, I conclude that the Court’s
jurisdiction identifies four distinct categories in which a Contracting State’s
‘jurisdiction’ will extend extraterritorially:477
a. when a Contracting State exercises effective overall control of a
foreign territory (‘effective control test’ of Loizidou);

476
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b. when a Contracting State exercises a decisive influence over a
foreign administration in another Contracting State (‘decisive
influence test’ of Ilascu);
c. when agents of a Contracting State exercise authority over a person
and/or property in a foreign territory (‘authority over people or
property test’ of WM and Öcalan); or
d. when, and to the extent that, customary international law or a treaty
recognises extraterritorial jurisdiction (‘international law exceptions’).
305. The effective control test for a Contracting State’s Convention jurisdiction is
closely linked to control over foreign territory, either by way of military action or
by agreement or acquiescence of the foreign sovereign power.478 Under such
circumstances the Contracting State is obliged to secure all the Convention rights
of everyone within the occupied territory over which it exercises effective control.
The occupation of foreign territory can be long-term, as in the case of Turkey in
northern Cyprus, or short-term, as in the case of Turkish military incursions into
northern Iraq. Furthermore, agents of a Contracting State who control foreign
territory, but who act under the command and control of an international body
(such as the UN Security Council) will not attract the Convention jurisdiction of a
Contracting State because the State is not the body exercising effective total
control.
306. Jurisdiction also attaches in situations where a Contracting State exercises
‘decisive influence’ over the administration of a separatist regime in another
Contracting State.479 Presumably jurisdiction does not attach where a decisive
influence is exercised over a separatist regime in a non-Contracting State. This is
because the people in that region have no legitimate expectation of protection
under the Convention.

478
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307. The authority and control test for jurisdiction is closely linked to the agents of a
Contracting State exercising authority and control, lawfully or unlawfully, over
people and/or property in foreign territory over which the Contracting State does
not exercise effective control. The foreign territory is not restricted to the region
of Europe. This application of jurisdiction is designed to ensure that a Contracting
State cannot ‘perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another
State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.480 In stating this reason,
the Court cites inter alia the UN Human Rights Committee’s decision in Lopez

Burgos. The case of Al-Saadoon is a clear case of UK troops exercising authority
and control over individuals in the foreign sovereign state of Iraq, by virtue of
holding the individuals in detention. Another example of agents exercising
jurisdiction is judges of a Contracting State performing a judicial function on
foreign soil in their capacity as judicial officers of that Contracting State.481
Likewise in Issa, if there had been enough evidence of Turkish authority and
control over the alleged victims, then Turkish Convention jurisdiction would have
extended to the deceased men on Iraqi soil.
308. In relation to the fourth category of cases, these involve little pockets of
extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised by international law and treaty law. This
includes embassies and consulates (under customary international law)482 and on
board ships and aircraft registered in, or flying the flag of, a Contracting State and
in international waters or airspace (under treaty law).483 These exceptions arise
because a Contracting State’s Convention jurisdiction is, according to the Court,
interpreted in conformity with the concept of jurisdiction at public international
law.484
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5.3.3 state responsibility
309. The extent of state responsibility is beyond the scope of this thesis, however I
briefly cover it for completeness’ sake and where it is relevant to the issues of
torture (Maher Arar) and the death penalty (Bali Nine).

caselaw
310. The facts of Soering are discussed above.485 It is best to view Soering as a non-

refoulement case.486 Many commentators, and even the early Court, categorise
Soering as a jurisdiction case, but it is best to recognise it as a matter of state
responsibility. Soering is authority for the proposition that state responsibility
may attach to the decision of a Contracting State to extradite an individual (who
by definition is already within jurisdiction) to a country where there is a real and
substantial risk that the individual’s fundamental Convention rights could be
violated. The concept of fundamental Convention rights is significant, because

Soering was decided as a ‘death row phenomenon’ case, turning on a violation of
the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment. The decision
was not based on capital punishment as a violation of the right to life.
311. The Court noted that not all of the extra-jurisdictional breaches of Convention
rights attracts state responsibility.487 State responsibility only attaches to those
Convention rights which enshrine ‘the fundamental values of the democratic
societies making up the Council of Europe’.488 The guarantee against torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is such a fundamental right
because no exceptions or derogations are permitted, even in times of war or
national emergency.489 The prohibition on torture is absolute and no one should
ever be extradited to face the real risk of torture. The standard is reduced when
485
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considering the guarantee against inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment. An assessment of what constitutes such conditions is required to
achieve:490
...a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As
movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger
international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that
suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the
establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the
State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the
foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included among the
factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the notions
of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases.

312. However, in exceptional circumstances, state responsibility will attach to any
decision to extradite ‘in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks
suffering a flagrant denial’ of a Convention right which ‘holds a prominent place in
a democratic society’.491 The example the Court in Soering gives is the right to a
fair trial.492 In the circumstances of Soering’s case, however, there was no such
demonstrated risk associated with Soering’s potential trial in the United States. As
already stated, the non-refoulement principle attached to the ‘death row
phenomenon’ in this case.
313. The facts of Drozd v France are covered above.493 While most of the application
was deemed inadmissible for want of jurisdiction, one ground was ruled
admissible against France. For centuries, offenders convicted in Andorra have
served their sentence in a French prison. Drozd argued that this detention in
France was unlawful because inter alia the French courts had not satisfied
themselves that the trial in Andorra complied with Convention standards. The
Court, applying Soering, found that the French courts did not have to do this.
However, the Court reiterated that ‘Contracting States are...obliged to refuse their
co-operation if it emerges that the conviction is the result of a flagrant denial of
490
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justice’.494 The Court dismissed this complaint on the grounds that there was no
evidence of a flagrant denial of justice.
314. In its second judgment in Mrs Loizidou’s case, concerning the merits of the
application, the Court clearly stated that a Contracting State could be held
responsible for the acts and omissions of its agents ‘which produce effects outside
their own territory’.495 Because Turkey exercised effective control over northern
Cyprus, the Court found that local non-Turkish administrators were subordinate
to the Turkish authorities and, therefore, Turkey could be held responsible for the
acts and omissions of these subordinate local administrators.496 Presumably a
determination of whether Turkey was responsible for the actions of a local
administration would only be made if there was little or no military presence and
after a determination of whether Turkey exercises control over the administration
and its policies. But this further examination was not necessary in this instance,
because of the overwhelming military presence.
315. In Osman v UK, Mrs Osman and her son (Ahmet) brought an application alleging
that the UK had failed to protect them and the deceased Mr Ali Osman from a
dangerous private citizen.497 The applicants and the deceased were all British
citizens living in London, so no jurisdictional issues arose. Ahmet Osman attended
a school at which Mr Paul Paget-Lewis taught. Paget-Lewis was obsessed with the
adolescent Ahmet Osman. A series of inappropriate and criminal acts committed
by Paget-Lewis were reported to police by the applicants, school authorities and
other members of the public. The police took several months to investigate these
allegations and, before police could arrest and charge Paget-Lewis, he obtained a
sawn-off shotgun and shot four people in their homes: killing Mr Ali Osman and
the son of the school’s Deputy Principal; and wounding Ahmet Osman and the
494
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Deputy Principal. The applicants alleged before the Grand Chamber that the UK
had failed to take all ‘appropriate and adequate measures’ to secure the
Convention right to life of Mr Osman and Ahmet Osman from the ‘real and known
danger which Paget-Lewis posed’.498
316. The Grand Chamber first set out the relevant principles of law in relation to a
Contracting State’s positive obligation to secure the Convention right to life to
everyone within their jurisdiction:499
...bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be
made in terms of priorities and resources, [this positive] obligation must be
interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate
burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for
the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent
that risk from materialising. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure
that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner
which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place
restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to
justice...

317. Having established the principles which must be balanced in any determination of
the breach of this Convention right, the Grand Chamber next turned to the
requirement of a Contracting State’s knowledge with respect to a particular
breach:500
...where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive
obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their [positive] duty to
prevent and suppress offences against the person..., it must be established to its
satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have
been expected to avoid that risk.

318. So before a Contracting State can be said to have breached this positive
obligation, two circumstances must be satisfied. First, there must be real or
constructive knowledge, on the part of the State, of a real and immediate risk to
498
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an individual. Second, the State must have failed to use what power it has in the
situation, to the extent that can be reasonably expected, to avoid that risk. The
Grand Chamber rejected the UK’s submission that gross negligence or wilful
disregard was the requisite standard of state responsibility.
319. The Grand Chamber summarised the applicant’s burden of proof in this fashion:501
...it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that
could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of
which they have or ought to have knowledge. This is a question which can only be
answered in the light of all the circumstances of any particular case.

320. In Cyprus v Turkey (2001), Cyprus asked the Grand Chamber to recognise Turkish
jurisdiction over the acts and omissions of private individuals in northern Cyprus.
Having already found that Turkey had jurisdiction and an obligation to secure all
Convention rights in the region,502 the Grand Chamber found that Turkish
responsibility extended beyond the actions of its own nationals to include the acts
and omissions ‘of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish
military and other support’.503 The Grand Chamber further noted, in relation to
Turkey’s state responsibility for the acts and omissions of private individuals in
northern Cyprus, that: 504
...the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the
acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals
within its jurisdiction may engage that State's responsibility under the Convention.

321. In several cases determining a State’s responsibility for an alleged violation of the
Convention, the Court has referred to and relied on the work of the International
Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for

Internationally Wrongful Acts. In Ilascu,505 the Grand Chamber cited the ILC’s
Draft Articles with approval and accepted it as authority for the principle that a
State may be held responsible for the acts and omissions of its agents even when
501
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those agents are acting outside their authority.506 Or as the Court put it: “a
State's authorities are strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates”.507 The
Grand Chamber also cited with approval the ILC’s Draft Articles, and associated
commentary, on the duration of state responsibility for a breach of an
international obligation.508 In Behrami, the Grand Chamber again turned to the
ILC’s Draft Articles, but in a more comprehensive manner and as authority for the
principles relating to the responsibility of international organisations and States.509
Specifically, the Grand Chamber adopted the ILC’s concept of ‘attribution’ in
relation to identifying the entity responsible for any given act or omission.510 This
willingness of the Grand Chamber to adopt the Draft Articles demonstrates an
approval of their status as authority as a codification of international law on state
responsibility.
322. The applicants in Bader v Sweden were Kurds who had unsuccessfully sought
asylum in Sweden on the grounds that they faced persecution if returned to
Syria.511 Bader argued that he faced a substantial risk of execution if deported to
Syria, in violation of his Convention rights to life (Article 2) and to be free of
inhuman treatment or punishment (Article 3).512 The Court then traversed its
jurisprudence and concluded that refoulement is prohibited by the Convention
where Article 3 violations are likely, following Soering.513 With reference to capital
punishment, the Court stated that the Convention does not necessarily prohibit

refoulement in all death penalty cases.514 This is because, while Europe is a
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“death penalty free zone”, the right to be free of capital punishment is only made
a non-derogable right under Protocol 13 attached to the Convention, which has
not been ratified by all European nations.515 Nevertheless, a Contracting State’s
state responsibility might be engaged where the death sentence was the result of
an unfair trial. In short, the Convention prohibits refoulement in circumstances
where ‘an alien...has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in
the receiving State, the outcome of which was or is likely to be the death
penalty’.516 In Mr Bader’s case, the Court considered his trial in Syria to be unfair
and summary in nature. Accordingly, the Court concluded that his refoulement
would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.
323. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK,517 the Court observed that Protocol 13 establishes
by implication a non-derogable right not to be subjected to the death penalty.
The Court found that ratification of Protocol 13, therefore, removes the death
penalty exception to Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention, thereby elevating
Article 2 to the status of a “fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”.518 Consequently,
for those Contracting States that have ratified Protocol 13, the principle of non-

refoulement now encompasses this implied right not to be subjected to the death
penalty. This extended the rulings in Soering and Bader (both "death row
phenomenon" cases based on Article 3) and closely follows the UN Human Rights
Committee's finding in ARJ v Australia.519
324. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, the applicants were Iraqi nationals arrested and
detained by UK military forces in UK-occupied southern Iraq in 2003 on suspicion
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of murdering UK nationals in Iraq. The general facts are set out above.520
Further and relevantly, in August 2004 Iraq reintroduced the death penalty for
murder, and in November 2004 the UK and Iraq signed an MoU on the continued
detention of prisoners by UK forces and their transfer upon request to the Iraqi
authorities.521 Justifying the transfer of the inmates to Iraqi officials in December
2008, the UK argued that international law required it to respect the sovereignty
of Iraq and to transfer the suspects for trial. The UK referred to the domestic
decision of B.522 The Court distinguished the case of B on the grounds that B had
voluntarily sought refuge in the British consulate in Melbourne, whereas the Iraqi
detainees had been involuntarily arrested and detained by the UK. Referring inter
alia to the 2004 MoU, the Court found that, from the date Protocol 13 entered into
force for the UK (1 February 2004), the UK “should not [have entered] into any
arrangement or agreement which involved it in detaining individuals with a view to
transferring them to stand trial on capital charges or in any other way subjecting
individuals within its jurisdiction to a real risk of being sentenced to the death
penalty and executed”.523 Furthermore, as the UK had originally arrested and
detained the Iraqi nationals, the UK “was under a paramount obligation to ensure
that the arrest and detention did not end in a manner which would breach the
applicants' rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention [right to life and
freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] and
Article 1 of Protocol 13 [abolition of capital punishment and the implied right not
to be subjected to the death penalty]”.524 Having found violations of the Covenant
Articles 2 and 3, the Court ordered the UK to seek a guarantee that the men
would not be executed, and awarded compensation and costs.
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analysis
325. The European Court of Human Rights has developed its own jurisprudence on
state responsibility, based on established principles of international law. Since the
adoption of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the Grand Chamber
has shown a willingness to adopt the Draft Articles as an authoritative codification
of that international law of state responsibility.
326. In essence, once the Court has determined that a complaint falls within the
Convention jurisdiction of a Contracting State, the legal focus shifts to the
Contracting State’s state responsibility for the alleged Convention violation. This
state responsibility consists inter alia of negative obligations ‘to refrain from
interfering with the enjoyment of rights and freedoms guaranteed [by the
Convention]’ and positive obligations to secure all the Convention rights to
everyone within jurisdiction.525
327. A Contracting State must discharge its positive obligations by taking all
‘appropriate and sufficient’ measures. But it is not required to go beyond what is
possible and proportionate in the circumstances. The Court has acknowledged
that it is not its role to dictate appropriate measures to Contracting States. This is
an alternative formulation of the ‘what can reasonably be expected’ standard.526
In the discharge of these positive obligations:527
...regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the
general interest and the interests of the individual, the diversity of situations
obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of
priorities and resources. Nor must these obligations be interpreted in such a way
as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden.
...Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should
take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that
the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case.

525
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328. These positive obligations must not place ‘an impossible or disproportionate
burden’ of responsibility on a Contracting State. For example, the scope of these
positive obligations might be limited in cases where part of the national territory of
a Contracting State is not under its effective control, however even with such
limitations a Contracting State is required to take ‘all appropriate measures’ within
its power to discharge these obligations in the occupied or rebellious region.528
The scope of these positive obligations will also be limited when agents of the
Contracting State operate in the territory of a foreign State, simply because the
Contracting State’s agents must respect the sovereignty of that foreign nation by
obeying local law.
329. To satisfy the Court that a Contracting State has breached its positive obligations
to protect an individual’s right to life, an applicant must ‘show that the authorities
did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and
immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge’.529
330. State responsibility also extends to the actions and omissions of subordinate local
administrators in a foreign territory over which a Contracting State has
jurisdiction. This is so, even if those administrators are not nationals of the
Contracting State. To the extent that a Contracting State, in these circumstances
of foreign occupation, colludes or acquiesces in the actions of private individuals
which violate Convention rights, the Contracting State may be held responsible for
those actions.530
331. A Contracting State's state responsibility may also extend to acts which have
‘sufficiently proximate repercussions’ on Convention rights, ‘even if those
repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction’. Of course, the individual complainant
must be within jurisdiction to begin with in such cases. This class of case deals
with acts or omissions made within jurisdiction, which have adverse consequences

outside jurisdiction. The non-refoulement, or Soering-type cases, are of this class.
528
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332. The principle of non-refoulement applies to the actions of a Contracting State
where a decision to expel, extradite or surrender an individual within its
jurisdiction to another State in circumstances where there are substantial risks of
a breach of the individual’s fundamental Convention rights. The Court has
recognised that fundamental rights are those which are inter alia considered
fundamental at international law or because they are non-derogable in the
Convention or its attached Protocols. The Court recognises the application of the
principle of non-refoulement in all cases where there are ‘substantial grounds for
believing that [an individual]...faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention.531 The Court recognises the non-refoulement principle in death
penalty cases, at least for those Contracting States that have ratified Protocol 13,
as a violation of Article 2 of the Convention (right not to be executed).532 The
Court also acknowledges the non-refoulement principle in all cases where there
has been, or is a risk of, a flagrant breach of the right to a fair trial, as a violation
of Article 6 of the Convention.533

5.4 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
333. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also recognised
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. It favours a test along these lines: “when
agents of a state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and authority over
persons outside national territory, the state's obligation to respect human rights
continues”.534 The nexus is power and authority over individuals, no matter where
that occurs.
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5.5 Other domestic courts
5.5.1 United Kingdom
334. The question of human rights jurisdiction was unsettled in the United Kingdom. In
the leading case of Al Skeini v Secretary of Defence, the House of Lords followed
the European Court of Human Rights.535 However, lower courts in the UK have
had difficulty reconciling the common law with the Human Rights Act and

European Convention on Human Rights.
335. In Al Skeini family members of six Iraqis killed by UK forces in Iraq sought relief
from British courts. The majority in the House of Lords decision relied on
Bankovic to conclude that the first five appellants, whose family members had
been killed while UK troops were patrolling urban areas, were not within
jurisdiction.536 The majority found that UK troops did not have effective control
of the areas in which they were patrolling537. However, the sixth Iraqi was killed
while he was under detention in a UK military base in Iraq and was, therefore,
within jurisdiction. In this case, the House of Lords had difficulty reconciling the
European decision of Issa with Bankovic. This appears to be because their
Lordships did not accept the ‘authority and control’ test over individuals, while
recognising the ‘effective control’ test over territory.538 In 2011, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the UK had
jurisdiction in all six cases under the ‘authority and control’ test on the grounds
that the UK had assumed the responsibility for security in this area of Iraq and
“through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in
question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of
535
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such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the
deceased and the United Kingdom”.539 The Grand Chamber went on to find that
the UK had breached its procedural duties in the investigation of the deaths in all
five cases.
336. In the case of B, the UK Court of Appeal examined the extent of extraterritorial
jurisdiction on consular premises. The applicants in this case were two juveniles
who had arrived in Australia with their mother by boat in 2001. The Australian
government had refused them asylum on the grounds that it did not believe their
claims that they were Afghan Hazaras. The boys escaped from an immigration
detention centre in the Australian desert and sought asylum in the British
Consulate in Melbourne. Asylum was refused and the boys were returned to
Australian authorities. The boys appealed this administrative decision in the
British courts.
337. In the UK Court of Appeal, two preliminary jurisdictional issues arose.540 The first
issue involved whether the European Convention on Human Rights applied to the
actions of the British consular officials in Melbourne. The second issue concerned
whether the Human Rights Act applied to the actions of British consular officials in
Melbourne.
338. Delivering the decision of the Court, Lord Phillips examined the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights from X v Federal Republic of Germany
through to Ocalan v Turkey, recognising the importance of the exceptional nature
of extraterritorial jurisdiction as identified in Bankovic. Lord Phillips then examined
the nature of jurisdiction that diplomatic and consular officials exercise. Relying
principally on WM v Denmark, Lord Phillips concluded that the protection afforded
the boys in the British Consulate brought them under the authority of British
consular officials and attracted Convention jurisdiction.541 For separate reasons
based on domestic considerations, his Lordship also concluded that the acts of
539
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British officials in Melbourne fell within the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act.542
Having found jurisdiction, the Court moved on to consider whether these
instruments had been breached.
339. It is important to understand that the consular officials were not accused of any
action which violated the boys’ Convention rights. Rather, the complaint was that
by allowing Australian officials to arrest the boys, the British consular officials had
exposed the boys to the real risk of a violation of their Convention rights,
specifically that Australian officials would return them to mandatory immigration
detention in the desert where the boys faced cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.543 In this light, the court saw this issue as one of state responsibility:
when does a country have a duty to provide refuge on foreign soil. Lord Phillips
concluded that this duty arises, and is defined, in international law. This duty
arises when a fugitive faces ‘the risk of death or injury as the result of lawless
disorder’. But, in deference to the principle of territorial sovereignty, consular
officials must hand over a fugitive as requested by the lawful sovereign, unless
the requesting state ‘intends to subject the fugitive to treatment so harsh as to
constitute a crime against humanity’.544 In obiter dicta, Lord Phillips speculated
that the threshold at international law for granting diplomatic asylum might be
lower than this.545 When applying this law to the facts, his Lordship reformulated
the legal threshold as ‘immediate likelihood of experiencing serious injury’546 and,
later, as a ‘perceived risk to the physical safety of the applicants…[which] was
immediate and severe’ that refusing asylum would violate consular duties under
international law.547 On the facts, this appeal was dismissed because the threat
faced by the boys in the hands of Australian authorities was not so severe as to
constitute an unacceptable violation of human rights.
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340. B’s case was followed by the English Court of Appeal in Al-Saadoon.548 In this
case, the court found that the UK, if bound by treaty, must return a person held
by it in foreign territory (Iraq) to the local government unless such surrender
would result in a crime against humanity. As the death penalty is not a crime
against humanity at international law, the UK must comply with its treaty
obligations and hand a suspect over to face the real risk of capital punishment.
This decision found no Convention jurisdiction. However, the European Court of
Human Rights overruled this decision and found jurisidiction based on authority
and control.549 This ends the line of English authority limiting Convention
jurisdiction where authority and control is not in question.

5.5.2 United States of America
341. Owing to the executive and legislative response in the United States to the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States Supreme Court has had
to deal with several cases involving the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US legislation
and the US Constitution. While a narrow reading might limit these cases to the
unique circumstances of Guantanamo Bay, it is possible to see a broader trend
toward adapting a control test.
342. Rasul v Bush was the first Guantanamo Bay case to come before the Supreme
Court.550 The case dealt with the issue of the extraterritorial reach of US statutory
law. The Supreme Court majority found US courts had jurisdiction in Guantanamo
Bay because, by treaty with Cuba, US authorities have “complete jurisdiction and
control” over the territory.
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343. The two Australian and 12 Kuwaiti applicants sought habeas corpus review of their
detention at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The naval base was on
the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cuba, which was leased to the United
States. The terms of the lease included a provision that ‘the United States shall
exercise complete jurisdiction and control’ over the leased territory.551
344. The jurisdictional question was summarised by the majority in this way:552
The question now before us is whether the habeas statute confers a right to
judicial review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in a territory over
which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not
‘ultimate sovereignty’.

345. The source of habeas jurisdiction upon which the applicants relied was legislation
passed by Congress.553 The government argued inter alia that ‘congressional
legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless such intent is
clearly manifested’.554 However, the government conceded in argument that the
federal courts would have jurisdiction to hear a claim for statutory relief made by
a US citizen held at Guantanamo Bay.555 The question really came down to one of
whether the legislation applied to aliens. Since there was no express exclusion of
aliens in the statute, the majority concluded that the statutory writ of habeas
corpus applies to anyone in US custody, both citizen and alien.556 The majority
drew further support for their conclusion from the long common law history of the
writ, which applies to any territory “under the sovereign’s control”.557
346. Another interesting argument relied on by the majority, but expressed in terms of
control over territory, amounts to an in-the-custody-and-control argument. The
writ of habeas lies against the gaoler not the prisoner.558 Therefore, so long as
the gaoler ‘can be reached by service of process’ (i.e. served with court papers),
551
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the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Such service of process is
possible at Guantanamo Bay because the territory is under the ‘complete
jurisdiction and control’ of the US. Here, jurisdiction is not founded on sovereign
territory, but control of the relevant territory. Given that habeas lies against those
holding the detainees in custody at Guantanamo Bay (as agents of the US
military), it follows that the court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.559
347. The federal habeas statute limits the courts jurisdiction to the ‘territorial
jurisdiction’ of the United States. This was potentially fatal to the applicant’s
claims. In the pivotal passage, the majority appears to extend the meaning of
‘territorial sovereignty’ to incorporate the concepts of both sovereign territory and
territory over which jurisdiction and control is established by other means (such as
by lease or treaty):560
Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other
contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with
respect to persons detained within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.
By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises
"complete jurisdiction and control" over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may
continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses.

348. Much in this case turned on the terms of the lease, as evidence of jurisdiction and
the extraterritorial application of US laws. The lease demonstrated that the US
controlled the territory in which the applicants were detained. This brought the
area within the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States, a somewhat larger
concept than ‘sovereign territorial jurisdiction’.
349. In Boumediene v Bush issues similar to Rasul v Bush arose, but this time relating
to the extraterritorial reach of the US Constitution with respect to Guantanamo
detainees.561 The majority found that it is sufficient for the United States to
exercise de facto sovereignty over a territory in order for extraterritorial
jurisdiction to exist.
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350. In 2005, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v Bush, Congress
had passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which amended the habeas statute and
purported to remove the right of aliens held at Guantanamo to seek a habeas writ
in any US court.562 In the place of habeas, the Act instituted habeas-like
procedures. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) was created to review
a detainee’s detention and to determine a detainee’s status as an ‘enemy
combatant’. A detainee had limited appeal rights to the US Court of Appeals.
351. The US Constitution prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus, except ‘when
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it’.563 The main
issues in this case were whether this Suspension Clause applied to the Detainee

Treatment Act and, if so, whether the ‘habeas-like’ procedures were adequate. If
the procedures of the CSRT were inadequate, then they would amount to an
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus if the Suspension Clause applied.
352. The government contended that the US Constitution did not extend to non-citizens
outside of US territory. The government argued that the applicants could not seek
constitutional relief because (1) they are non-citizens designated as enemy
combatants and (2) because they are held outside the sovereign territory of the
United States.564
353. The government also took the view that historically the writ of habeas corpus ran
only to the King’s sovereign territory.565 Since Guantanamo Bay is located outside
the sovereign territory of the United States, the writ did not run there and the
constitutional Suspension Clause cannot apply to the detainees.566
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354. In response to this argument, the Supreme Court majority clarified its rather
confused definition of ‘territorial sovereignty’ from Rasul v Bush. In Boumedine,
the majority made a clear distinction between de jure sovereign territory and de

facto sovereign territory. The majority deferred to the government’s view that
Cuba is the de jure sovereign of Guantanamo Bay.567 However, the majority
confirmed the view in Rasul v Bush that the United States ‘maintains de facto
sovereignty over this territory’, due to the US’ ‘complete jurisdiction and control
over the base’.568
355. The majority rejected the government’s assertion that habeas runs only to
territory over which the United States has de jure sovereignty.569 The majority
noted that, arising principally from a line of cases known as the Insular Cases,570
the Court’s jurisprudence states that the Constitution extends completely over
those territories which the US intends to incorporate into the Union. While in
territories which the US does not intend to govern indefinitely and which are
therefore likely to gain independence (e.g. occupied Germany and Japan after the
Second World War), the government is expected to guarantee ‘certain
fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution’.571 The majority also
observed the obvious separation of powers problems with the government’s
view:572
The necessary implication of the [government’s] argument is that by surrendering
formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the
same time entering into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to
the United States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without
legal constraint.
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Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants
Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory,
not the power to decide when and where its terms apply. Even when the United
States acts outside its borders, its powers are not "absolute and unlimited" but are
subject "to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution”. Abstaining from
questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To
hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at
will is quite another. The former position reflects this Court's recognition that
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the political branches.
The latter would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government,
leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say "what
the law is."
These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question in
the cases now before us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. The test for determining the
scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those
whose power it is designed to restrain.

356. During their reasoning the majority referred again to the Insular cases and
distinguished Guantanamo Bay from US-occupied Germany or the US colony of
the Philippines:573
Guantanamo Bay, on the other hand, is no transient possession. In every practical
sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United
States.

357. The majority saw no problems arising from the concurrent jurisdiction of the US
and Cuba over Guantanamo, since the terms of the lease grant to the US
complete and total control of the territory.574 While it must abide by the terms of
the lease treaty with Cuba, ‘the United States is, for all practical purposes,
answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base’.575
358. The majority of the court concluded that the constitutional protection of habeas
corpus extended to the non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay.576 Having
disposed of the jurisdictional question, the majority then went on to find that the
habeas-like procedures of the Detainee Treatment Act were an inadequate

573

Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261.
Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261.
575
Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2261.
576
Boumediene v Bush (2008) 128 S Ct 2229, 2262.
574

– 145 –

substitute for habeas corpus and, therefore, amounted to an unconstitutional
suspension of habeas corpus.577 The CSRT process was inadequate because
detainees did not have access to a lawyer or all the evidence against them.578
The appeal rights were also deemed inadequate for many reasons, including the
inability of a detainee to present exculpatory evidence gathered since the CSRT
hearing.579

5.6 Australian Practice
359. After the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, the Howard government
authorised police-to-police cooperation between Australian and Indonesian police.
Assistance was provided for both the investigation580 and prosecution581 of the
terrorist offences. Australian government action was premised on legal advice to
the Australian government that:582
The obligations under the ICCPR (and therefore also the OP) apply to
“…individuals within [Australia’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction”. This
Department has previously advised that, in its view, the ICCPR and OP do not
apply to individuals outside of Australia’s territory or not subject to Australia’s
jurisdiction. In the Bali attacks, the issue of Australia’s obligations under the
ICCPR and OP do not arise.
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360. Further advice from government lawyers appears to define the conditions under
which a person, outside of Australia's territory, is not "subject to Australia's
jurisdiction" :583
•

all charges are laid by foreign authorities abroad;

•

the persons charged are not Australian citizens;

•

the persons charged have not been extradited or otherwise removed from
Australia's territory or jurisdiction; and

•

the persons charged are 18 years or over.

361. The first point ensures that Australian judicial jurisdiction is not invoked. The
second point acknowledges the nationality principle at public international law.
The third point acknowledges Soering-type cases. The fourth point acknowledges
Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However,
the Australian view is that, assuming none of these four conditions are satisfied,
then assistance can be provided in death penalty cases.
362. It should be noted that, consistent with this legal advice, the Australian
government sought and obtained from the United States a guarantee that the
Guantanamo Bay detainees Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks would not be
executed.584
363. The Australian government which succeeded the Howard administration did not
significantly change this view. In response to question from the UN Human Rights
Committee, the Rudd government did not acknowledge that Australian agents
acting abroad (in territory over which they exercise no control) are required to
comply with the ICCPR. It only acknowledges that such agents must comply with
Australian domestic law with extraterritorial application. This means that
583
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584
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Australian agents acting abroad may assist in death penalty cases, given that the
only relevant domestic legislation is the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act,
which does not apply to all forms of cooperation (e.g. direct police-to-police
assistance) and which authorises assistance in death penalty cases with ministerial
approval.585 Nor does the reply acknowledge the implied obligation to ensure
Australia exposes no one to the real risk of execution for any offence.

5.7 Canadian jurisprudence
364. In Canada, the Supreme Court has rejected the ‘effective control’ test for
extraterritorial application of the Charter. While recognising the extraterritorial
application of legislative and judicial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
constrained the operation of executive extraterritorial jurisdiction with a ‘consent’
test. Canadian law, including the Charter, may only be applied on foreign territory
where the foreign sovereign power consents to its application. There is one
recognised exception to this rather narrow interpretation: where Canadian officials
abroad act contrary to Canada’s international obligations, the Charter will step in
to protect Canadian citizens by restricting the unlawful activity of Canadian
agents.
365. Mr Hape, a Canadian citizen, was the subject of an RCMP anti-money laundering
investigation. With the permission of local authorities and acting under the
supervision of local police, RCMP officers undertook covert searches of Mr Hape’s
office in the archipelago of the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British Territory in the
Caribbean. At Mr Hape’s trial in Canada on charges of money laundering, the
Crown adduced evidence that had been obtained during those searches, but did
not adduce the warrants authorising those searches. Mr Hape argued
unsuccessfully at trial, and again unsuccessfully before the Ontario Court of
Appeal, that the evidence was inadmissible on the ground that the searches were
585
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conducted without a warrant and therefore violated his Charter guarantee to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure.
366. The sole issue in the appeal before the Supreme Court was ‘whether the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to extraterritorial searches and seizures by
Canadian police officers’.586 While all the Justices of the Supreme Court dismissed
Mr Hape’s appeal, their reasons revealed a Court deeply divided on the issue of
the extraterritorial reach of the Charter. The majority declared that the Charter
can only have extraterritorial reach where a Canadian agent abroad acts where
there is ‘an exception to the principle of sovereignty’, such as when a foreign
power consents to the application of the Charter in its territory.587 Three
dissenting Justices found this test too narrow, criticised the consent test and
preferred a ‘control test’.588 This minority thought the law required Canadian
agents, no matter where they are in the world, to comply with the Charter. This
‘control test’ does not prohibit the participation of Canadian agents in foreign
investigations which offend the Charter, but the test directs that Canadian agents
must not take a ‘primary or directing role’ in such circumstances.589 Binnie J, in a
separate judgment, preferred the Court’s earlier legal test from Cook, which stated
that the Charter applied to the actions of Canadian agents abroad where those
actions did not ‘generate an objectionable extraterritorial effect’ by interfering with
the sovereignty of the state in which they act.590
367. The majority observed that the Canadian Constitution places no jurisdictional
limits on the Charter.591 However, they concluded that both international law and
the principle of the comity of nations nevertheless limit the operation of the
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Charter extraterritorially.592 Canada may not interfere in the affairs or territory of
other nations. However, in obiter the majority observed that this respect for
sovereign equality of nations and the principles of non-interference and
territoriality has its limits in criminal investigations:593
In an era characterized by transnational criminal activity and by the ease and
speed with which people and goods now cross borders, the principle of comity
encourages states to co-operate with one another in the investigation of
transborder crimes even where no treaty legally compels them to do so. At the
same time, states seeking assistance must approach such requests with comity
and respect for sovereignty. Mutuality of legal assistance stands on these two
pillars. Comity means that when one state looks to another for help in criminal
matters, it must respect the way in which the other state chooses to provide the
assistance within its borders. That deference ends where clear violations of
international law and fundamental human rights begin. If no such violations are in
issue, courts in Canada should interpret Canadian law, and approach assertions of
foreign law, in a manner respectful of the spirit of international co-operation and
the comity of nations.

368. A corollary of this observation is that the actions of Canadian agents abroad,
beyond the reach of the Charter, might be unlawful where they violate Canada’s
international obligations.594 This would cover instances where fundamental
human rights are breached, such as the prohibition on torture. In the following
year, the Supreme Court was to confirm this corollary as law in the case of Omar
Khadr.
369. In 2002 Mr Omar Khadr, a 15 year-old Canadian citizen, was captured by US
forces in Afghanistan and sent to the US military facility at Guantanamo Bay as an
‘unlawful enemy combatant’. On various occasions in 2003 and 2004, Mr Khadr
was interviewed at Guantanamo Bay by Canadian intelligence and foreign affairs
officials, who shared the information obtained from these interviews with US
officials. In 2005, Mr Khadr was indicted before a US military commission on
charges of murdering a US soldier in battle by throwing a grenade and of
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conspiring with al-Qaeda to launch terrorist attacks against US forces in
Afghanistan. Mr Khadr denied all charges.
370. In order to prepare his defence, Mr Khadr asked the Canadian government for
copies of all the information it held about these charges, including the information
gathered during his interviews at Guantanamo Bay. The government refused and
Mr Khadr sought a declaration (of mandamus) from the Canadian Federal Court
ordering the Canadian government to disclose this material to him. As a
preliminary matter, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered that all relevant
documents be delivered unredacted to the Court for judicial review. The
government appealed this preliminary decision to the Supreme Court.
371. Before the Supreme Court, Mr Khadr argued that he has a right to view these
documents, under section 7 of the Charter, which requires Canadian officials to
conduct themselves ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’ when someone’s
liberty is at stake.595 The government, relying on Hape, argued that the Charter
did not apply to the actions of Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay because the
US had not given its consent for Canadian law to apply.
372. The Supreme Court explained that, while it had been divided in Hape on the
extent of the Charter’s extraterritorial application, the Court had nevertheless been
united on the point that the principle of “comity cannot be used to justify
Canadian participation in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary
to Canada’s international obligations”.596 So if a Canadian participated in US
activities at Guantanamo Bay which were contrary to Canada’s international
obligations, then the Charter would apply to the extent of that participation.
However, if US activities at Guantanamo Bay were not contrary to Canada’s
international obligations, then Hape dictates that the Charter cannot apply to
Canadian participation because the US had never consented to the Charter
applying at Guantanamo Bay.
595
596
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373. At this point the Supreme Court was confronted with the difficult question of
whether it is appropriate for a Canadian court to adjudicate the legality of a
foreign process. However, in this instance, the Canadian Supreme Court simply
deferred to two significant decisions of the US Supreme Court concerning the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, which:597
...held that the detainees [at Guantanamo Bay] had illegally been denied access to
habeas corpus and that the procedures under which they were to be prosecuted
violated the Geneva Conventions. Those holdings are based on principles
consistent with the Charter and Canada’s international law obligations. In the
present appeal, this is sufficient to establish violations of these international law
obligations, to which Canada subscribes.

374. The Canadian Supreme Court noted that Canada was bound at international law
by the same Geneva Conventions and that the Canadian Charter and other treaty
obligations recognised the law of habeas corpus.598 As CSIS had conducted its
interviews at Guantanamo and shared the relevant information with the Americans
at the time covered by these US Supreme Court decisions, specifically during 2003
and 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court had no difficulty concluding that CSIS’
participation in that process was contrary to Canada’s international obligations.
This meant that the Charter applied in Mr Khadr’s case. It is important to note
that the Court did not decide whether the interviews, of themselves, violated the

Charter, nor whether the handing over of the information, of itself, violated the
Charter. Under different circumstances these activities may have been lawful.
However, the Court concluded that, by sharing the information from the Khadr
interviews with the Americans at Guantanamo Bay, where processes were
contrary to international law (as confirmed by the US Supreme Court), Canadian
officials became participants in processes contrary to Canada’s international
obligations. This engaged the extraterritorial operation of the Charter.599
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375. By participating in the unlawful processes at Guantanamo Bay, Canada had
breached Mr Khadr’s constitutional rights to liberty and personal security. In these
circumstances, the Charter imposes ‘a duty on Canada to provide disclosure of
materials in its possession arising from its participation in the foreign process that
is contrary to international law and jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian citizen’.600
As a consequence, the Canadian Crown was required to disclose to Mr Khadr all
records of the interviews and all material given to the Americans as a direct
consequence of the interviews, subject to national security and other public policy
considerations.601 The matter was remitted to the lower court to determine which
documents could be released to Mr Khadr.602
376. The lower court decision is significant because, after reviewing all the Khadr
interview material, the court came to an astounding conclusion: Canada was
aware of Mr Khadr’s torture at Guantanamo Bay and failed to take steps to stop
it.603 (It is no wonder that the government fought so hard to keep the material
from the court, Mr Khadr and the public.) As a matter of public interest, the court
ordered the government to release the bulk of the interview material.
Subsequently, the taped interviews were broadcast on national television,604
showing a scared young man asking for help.
377. In Slahi v Canada, two non-citizen applicants sought disclosure of their records of
interview with Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay.605 The facts were
essentially identical to Mr Khadr’s except that these applicants were not Canadian
citizens. This proved fatal to their applications. Because they failed to establish a
nexus to Canada such as citizenship or being within Canadian territory, the
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Federal Court dismissed their case.606 This case confirms that the Charter will only
protect Canadian citizens, where the foreign government consents to the
application of Canadian law or where Canadian agents act contrary to Canada’s
international obligations. The status of permanent residents was not raised in this
case, but it is likely that permanent residency might establish a sufficient nexus to
Canada to engage extraterritorial protection.
378. In summary, if Canadian police were to participate in activities contrary to
Canada’s international obligations, then the Charter’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
could conceivably be invoked. In Soering-type cases of domestic actions resulting
in human rights violations abroad, Charter rights would be engaged.

5.8 some final comments
379. The question of the extraterritorial application of domestic and international
human rights law is a complicated one. The first question arising is the question
of jurisdiction: which domestic or international obligations, laws or treaties are
being invoked; whether the impugned actions occurred domestically (with adverse
consequences on foreign soil) or extraterritorially; and whether the impugned
actions of state agents are justiciable under the invoked law. If jurisdiction is
found, then the question turns to the state’s responsibility for the particular
actions in any given case.
380. Most obviously there are decisions made within jurisdiction that have
extraterritorial consequences. For example, the letters and list of questions
composed by Canadian agents in Mr El-Maati’s case and handed to foreign agents
who used the information to torture and interrogate Mr El-Maati.607
381. It might also be argued that the actions of AFP officers in Australia assisting
Indonesian police in the Bali Nine case would, by analogy, fall into the Soering line
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of cases: domestic actions resulting in extraterritorial violations of human rights.608
In either case, a complaint could be made to the UN Human Rights Committee
under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR alleging breaches of the ICCPR
and/or Second Optional Protocol.
382. But there are also decisions taken and actions made by domestic agents who are
located overseas. Most of the caselaw deals with military situations, in which the
question of whether a country’s military forces have control over the territory in
which they are operating or which they occupy. In relation to police operations,
close attention needs to be paid to precisely where these decisions and actions
are taken, because embassies on foreign soil are recognised as sovereign
territory. It is supposed that the infamous ‘Bali Nine’ letters written by Federal
Agent Paul Hunniford, the AFP Senior Liaison Officer in Bali, to the Indonesia
National Police were probably written from his desk in the Australian Consulate.609
If this is in fact true, then the letters would have been written within Australia's
jurisdiction.610
383. It is also worth noting that the mode of sharing or cooperation – whether it is
formal or informal – is not relevant to any examination of jurisdiction or state
responsibility for the actions of state agents.
384. More generally, some authors have argued that States have an obligation not to
interfere in individuals’ human rights through their extraterritorial actions. This
implication flows, it is argued, from the “principles, purposes and specific
provisions of the UN Charter”, which calls on Member States to promote, protect
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and respect human rights.611 As a normative principle, this argument carries some
weight. However, as a legal principle, this argument fails to consider the
complexities of jurisdiction.
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6 Best Practice: informal information sharing
385. After reviewing law and practice for informal transnational police-to-police
information sharing, I now look at best practice. In this discussion, I want to
examine how to construct best practice guidelines for transnational police-topolice cooperation. Not surprisingly, the guidelines are closely modelled on the
RCMP procedures with the modifications suggested by the Arar Commissioner.
This is because the RCMP procedures are quite good – and the AFP have not
publicly released their procedures. I acknowledge the heavy debt owed to the
work of that Commission. Particular emphasis will be placed on screening
requests from countries with poor human rights records and examining the human
rights implications of cooperation. I will also discuss situations in which it might
be possible to override these guidelines, and the appropriate procedures to ensure
accountability.
386. Due to space constraints, I will not present a detailed analysis of EU attempts to
formalise cross-border police cooperation, in the form of the Schengen
Convention, the Convention establishing Europol and other instruments.612 For
example, there are provisions in the EU Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Convention for cross-border pursuits, joint investigation teams and covert
surveillance.613 However, when these are instructive, then they will be mentioned
briefly.

6.1 Police culture and human rights
612
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387. One question worthy of brief examination at this point is: how are rank-and-file
police likely to interpret and respond to any minimum human rights standards and
accountability mechanisms for transnational policing? This is important because,
as sociologists have observed, rank-and-file police sometimes deviate from blackletter law in their day-to-day tasks.614
388. As already discussed, an intelligence-led policing culture is not likely to respond
favourably to any measures that restrict information exchange.615 Such resistance
can be seen from the rank-and-file AFP Association, which expressed its
frustration at the introduction of death penalty assurances in extradition law as an
impediment to the swift and efficient operation of international police
cooperation.616
389. There is a more practical concern related to refusing to share information. For
information sharing to be effective, it must be reciprocal: ‘If an agency wishes to
receive information from other agencies, it must be prepared to provide
information in return’.617 Or as a senior AFP officer put it: transnational
cooperation ‘is very much a two-way street’.618 The general concern is that
anything that stops or slows the flow of information across borders infringes on
the sovereignty of other nations and risks reducing the amount of information
flowing back.
390. Bayley observes that police reform succeeds best when it has police on-side.619
He urges reformers to take this into account and to attempt to eliminate any
impact on the effectiveness of operational policing:620
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...because reducing crime and disorder is what police have been taught to believe
is their institutional mission, they reflexively discount reform proposals that they
think impinge negatively on enforcement effectiveness...
Reformers need,
therefore, to confront head-on the likely effect of reform on law-enforcement...
Reform has a much better chance of succeeding if it can be shown to be
effectiveness-neutral or, preferably, effectiveness-enhancing.

391. Reiner has a similar view. He believes that new police rules should not elicit a
defensive response in police, because this will mean that such rules will not be
‘co-opted’ into police culture.621 Reiner notes that ‘black-letter law’ is transformed
by the filter of police culture before emerging as ‘blue-letter law’, the rules by
which police carry out their day-to-day tasks. He notes two schools of sociological
thought on this process. The ‘presentationalists’ believe that black-letter law is
used to justify police action, but that it does not inform actual police practice. In
this model, police subculture is key to understanding police action, not black-letter
law. For example, in any attempt to address police racism, education of police will
achieve better results than a top-down reform of law enforcement procedures.
The other school of thought belongs to the ‘structuralists’, who believe that police
deviance from black-letter law does not come from rank-and-file officers, but is
rather encouraged by senior officers, judges and politicians who do not correct
deviance. Presumably, in the structuralist model, reform of institutional racism
must be addressed by figures of authority.
392. Reiner notes that the ‘relationship between legal rules and police practice is
complex’.622 He identifies four indirect and subtle functions of formal rules and
accountability mechanisms in the regulation of police work. First are constitutional
functions, whereby police work is subordinated to democracy and the rule of law.
Second are co-optive functions, wherein rules which are tailored to avoid a
defensive response in police are more likely to be adopted into police culture.
Third are communicative functions, which seek to keep open channels for routine
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communication and complaint by police. Fourth are control functions, which
provide visible penalties for demonstrated deviance.
393. Crawshaw et al argue that policing and human rights are not incompatible:623
At a theoretical level there is no tension between human rights and policing.
...Policing should not be a negative factor in the protection of human rights, and
one of the great tasks of police leaders is to develop and sustain a human rights
culture within police organisations'.

394. Crawshaw argues that police should protect and respect human rights, investigate
(serious) human rights violations, and are entitled to respect of their own human
rights.624 Much of what police already do relates to the protection, respect and
investigation of human rights. However, the authors stress that by securing
respect for the human rights of police officers, this could assist in instilling a
human rights culture in the rank-and-file.625 Crawshaw is not just talking about
guarantees of security of person, but also rights such as procedural fairness in
disciplinary hearings, and also employment rights such as fair pay.
395. In summary, if a black-letter law response to human rights and transnational
policing is too far-removed from operational police culture and practice, then it is
unlikely to become part of the ‘blue-letter law’ of operational policing and it might
have little effect at all, irrespective of accountability mechanisms. In the same
vein, any reform which reduces the effectiveness of information sharing is likely to
meet stiff resistance from senior and rank-and-file officers. However, a human
rights message might be better received by police if it is expressed in universal
terms, owed to police as individuals as well as owed to others.

6.1.1 Police attitudes to human rights safeguards
396. There is considerable resistance from within the AFP to statutory changes
requiring a death penalty guarantee in extradition cases. In 1997, the president

623
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of the AFP Association626 expressed concern to the Daily Telegraph that Australia
would become a ‘safe haven’ for murderers and terrorists. He also expressed
concern about the time it takes to obtain a death penalty guarantee:627
If the Government wants to take a moral position on capital punishment that is up
to them. However, our members are not happy with the delays now experienced
in taking out provisional arrest warrants on people wanted overseas.

397. These comments from 1997 came about the same time as leaks to the Daily

Telegraph about the extradition of a Philippines-born US citizen living in Australia
and wanted in the US for murder-related charges.628
398. According to media reports, there is also considerable pressure on Australia from
US law enforcement officials to do away with death penalty guarantees in
extradition cases.629
399. In 1996, the Interpol Secretary-General Raymond Kendall addressed an Australian
parliamentary committee about the work of Interpol.630 During that session, he
was asked about Australia’s recent legislative amendments to mutual assistance
law requiring death penalty guarantees. He was not well briefed on the topic and
only responding to what he was being told, but Kendall described the requirement
to obtain such undertakings as ‘counter-productive’.631 He argued such
transnational police-to-police cooperation was analogous to international trade
and human rights should not be linked to it.632 He also offered this opinion:633
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I can well understand a refusal to extradite in a case where the country that is
requesting extradition does apply the death penalty to a person who is convicted
of a certain offence in that country. But I fail to see why the exchange of
information should be affected by that because there are two levels of decision
here. I think the decision to extradite is a legal decision which will be taken after
due study of the issue, but I do not see why that should affect the exchange of
information on a subject when you know full well that you do not have to extradite
the person at the end of the day.

400. What can be drawn from this superficial review of media and parliamentary
reports is that police, understandably, are concerned about any measure that
impedes the efficient flow of cooperation and information with foreign agencies.

6.2 request assessment
401. A request for information can be received at a centralised location, or by a liaison
officer posted abroad, or in a more direct police-to-police fashion. Once received,
an assessment should be made of whether the request will be granted. In the
interests of efficient police-to-police cooperation, this initial filter should be kept as
stream-lined as possible. Initially it should be screened to determine if it is really
a request for police-to-police assistance, or whether it is in fact a request for
mutual legal assistance. If it is a request for information in admissible form or for
the exercise of coercive powers (such as the execution of a search warrant), then
the appropriate mutual legal assistance legislation should be complied with.634
402. If, however, the request is for police-to-police assistance, then an important
question needs to asked: if the information is provided, is it likely that the
information will be used to violate an individual’s human rights? This involves a
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general assessment of the requestor’s human rights record and a specific
assessment of the use to which the requested information will be put.
403. The Arar Commissioner places this test under the general heading of examining
content relevance.635 However, I think it is important to separate explicitly an
assessment of content from an assessment of the requestor. This will better allow
the decision maker to focus on the individual country’s human rights record and
the likely uses to which the information, if provided, would be put. It is, of
course, likely that, during an assessment of content relevance, these same
questions will be asked for each piece of information that could potentially be
shared.
404. To assist them to assess both the requestor generally and the request on a caseby-case basis, liaison officers and other officers cooperating with foreign agencies
require human rights training.

6.2.1 abandoning the ‘need-to-know’ principle?
405. RCMP information sharing policies require an assessment of whether the requestor
needs to know the requested information. In essence, an assessment whether
the information ‘is expected to further an ongoing investigation’ on a case-by-case
basis.636 The Arar Commissioner did not find this requirement ‘particularly
helpful’.637 His Honour thought that an assessment of content for its relevance to
the requestor’s investigation was more meaningful. Justice O’Connor also noted
the 9/11 Commission’s criticisms of the ‘need to know’ culture.638
406. The 9/11 Commission associated the need-to-know approach with the outdated
Cold War assumption that ‘the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the
benefits of wider sharing’.639 The Commission was critical of a culture where one
domestic agency kept information from another. The Commission recommended
635
636
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increasing incentives for agencies to share information with each other. Caution
must be exercised when extrapolating this criticism to transnational policing. The
Commission was criticising the stonewalling of information sharing between
domestic agencies, not between American and foreign agencies. It is unlikely,
had it addressed the issue of transnational cooperation, that the Commission
would have been as enthusiastic and permissive about sharing information with
foreign agencies.
407. Nevertheless, the criticism that a culture of open information sharing is preferable
to a ‘need-to-know’ culture has some merit. A need-to-share approach is more
consistent with international obligations to cooperate in matters of transnational
crime.640 Of course, that does not mean that need-to-share equates to a sharewithout-discrimination policy. The AFP appears to favour a share-withoutdiscrimination policy.641 When discussing police-to-police information sharing, the
senior AFP officer in charge of transnational policing told journalists: 642
We operate exactly the same way no matter which country it is. ...We do not have
the ability, nor the desire, to pick and choose which countries we will deal with,
depending on the laws of those countries and how they will deal with offenders for
offences that occurred in their own country.

408. However, as the Arar Commissioner observed, caution needs to be exercised
when sharing information to ensure that other considerations, such as a country’s
international human rights obligations, are observed and discharged.643 This
requires an assessment of the requestor’s human rights record and the use to
which the shared information is likely to be put.
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6.2.2 assessment of human rights and usage
409. The RCMP’s current policy, which applies to ‘governments that violate human
rights’, was criticised by the Arar Commissioner on several grounds. The
Commission recommended that the review be redrafted to ensure that information
is ‘never...provided to a foreign country where there is a credible risk that it will
cause or contribute to the use of torture’.644 Similarly, information received from a
country with a questionable human rights record should be clearly marked as such
and treated with great caution.645
410. There appears to be no similar requirement for AFP agents to assess a requesting
country’s human rights record or the use to which shared information will be put.
In the case where agents must consider if the death penalty would be involved,
the death penalty guidelines must be consulted. When allegations of torture are
made, as in the case of Australian Mamdouh Habib who reported that he’d been
tortured in Egypt and Guantanamo Bay, it appears to be standard AFP procedure
to report the allegations to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT).646 This is because the welfare of detainees is seen as a consular issue,
not a police matter.
411. It is at this stage that it would be appropriate to alert the requestor that an
undertaking would be required that no one will be executed or tortured as a result
of cooperation. Of course, the provision of an undertaking would need to be
assessed for credibility. The requirement to seek an undertaking should apply to
requests from foreign agencies, as well as request to foreign agencies or the
spontaneous provision of information. For example, AFP agents would require a
644
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death penalty undertaking before spontaneously providing information in a matter
attracting the death penalty in Indonesia, such as drug trafficking or terrorism.
412. The need for police to screen for potential human rights violations is
demonstrated by cases such as the Canadian torture cases and the Australian Bali
Nine case. The Australian case is quite straight forward: AFP agents, who
spontaneously provided information to the INP under an existing MOU, knew that
the activities of the Bali Nine involved the trafficking of heroin, which attracts the
death penalty in Indonesia. Such information should not have been shared
without first securing a guarantee that no one will be executed.
413. The AFP appears to have very low standards when it comes to screening
information to be shared with foreign agencies. Speaking of the Bali Nine case,
the AFP Commissioner told a Senate Committee that:647
We cannot give over a piece of information, have [the police operation] become a
broad operation and then say, ‘Look, we are sorry about that – can we take that
information back, please?’.

414. This information was provided spontaneously to the INP, prior to the arrest of any
suspects. In fact, it appear that the Indonesians were unaware of the suspects,
until informed by the AFP.648 The intelligence was provided under the police-topolice MOU existing between the two agencies.649 The text of the MOU is not
public, but it appears that it fails to include a provision stating that any
information or cooperation provided by Australian officials under the agreement is
provided on the condition that it will not be used for the investigation of an
offence that might attract the death penalty, unless a guarantee that no one will
be executed is provided. Given that the information was provided spontaneously
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in the Bali Nine case, and that the AFP liaison officer involved would have been
well aware that the offence attracted the death penalty, this information should
not have been handed over until a guarantee had been secured that no one would
be executed. If Indonesia chose not to provide such a guarantee, then the
information should never have been handed over. Such a procedure is recognised
in European Conventions and even exists in some of the international treaties to
which Australia is a party.650 Spontaneous cooperation should first secure a
guarantee that no one will be executed. If such a guarantee is not forthcoming,
then the information should not be shared.
415. This approach is endorsed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture,
Mr Philip Alston:651
It's a matter of saying we have a strong opposition in Australia to the death
penalty, and we would condition our cooperation on your not applying the death
penalty when you are operating on the basis of information or assistance provided
by us.

416. Such a procedure does not offend the sovereignty of a foreign nation, which can
take the assistance or leave it. Nor does this solution compromise Australia’s
sovereign right to insist that Australian resources will not be used to assist another
country to execute anyone. This solution does not mean that Australia stops
cooperating with foreign law enforcement agencies. Nor does it mean that
international criminals will walk free. This solution only ensures that when
suspects are convicted they will not face the death penalty.
417. In the case of Mr Arar, it is hard to fault RCMP officers for assuming that Mr Arar
would be sent back to Canada from New York. Prior to the events of 11
September 2001 it would have been unthinkable that the US would kidnap a
Canadian citizen travelling on a Canadian passport and render him for torture to
Syria. The shift in the US’ human rights policy was swift and secretive, including
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the introduction of torture and extraordinary rendition.652 Though, of course, this
does not excuse the failure to follow established information sharing procedures
or to train staff adequately.
418. The screening of requests for human rights implications could be done in a narrow
or broad fashion. The screening tests could be directed at avoiding specific
violations, such as execution or torture. This is the current approach of the AFP’s
death penalty guidelines. More broadly, the RCMP’s current guidelines speak of
‘negative human rights connotation[s]’. The Arar Commissioner recommended
that policies be formulated that seek to eliminate ‘any possible Canadian
complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring
accountability’.653 Given the international obligation to respect, protect and fulfil
human rights,654 it is preferable to follow the broader Canadian example.
419. It is also worth recalling that Interpol’s databases are capable of restricting who
can or cannot view information shared with Interpol.655 This mechanism should
be employed to ensure that countries with questionable human rights records will
not have access to Interpol records, at least not without specifically requesting the
originating country. Such restrictions need to be placed on information at the
time it is entered into the Interpol database.
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420. It is also important to perform this screening on all incoming and outgoing
requests for police-to-police assistance. Before deciding to send a request for
assistance to a foreign country, an assessment should be made of that country’s
human rights record and the use to which it might put the details contained in the
request. For example, in the case of Mr Elmaati, Commissioner Iacobucci found
no evidence that the RCMP had considered Syria’s poor human rights record
before sending a letter to Syria linking Elmaati to al-Qaeda and requesting
assistance.656 Such a lapse, failed to follow RCMP procedures and likely exposed
Mr Elmaati to extreme abuse.

6.2.3 training in human rights and information sharing
421. If officers are to screen requests for police-to-police assistance on human rights
criteria, then staff will need to be trained and regularly updated on the human
rights records of countries with which they cooperate. The Arar Commissioner
noted that the RCMP liaison officer in Rome, who handled liaison with Syria in the
Arar case, was never trained about Syria’s human rights record.657 His Honour
recommended that RCMP training should include courses on human rights and
cooperating with countries with poor human rights records.658
422. If time is of the essence and officers have not had such training or little
experience in information screening, then it is important that they be supervised.
This was one of the major factual findings of the Arar Commission in relation to
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Operation AOC: that management failed to supervise untrained and/or
inexperienced staff.659
423. Training officers in how to screen effectively and adequately will assist in
encouraging acceptance among operation police of this impediment to the free
flow of information.660 As Crawshaw also observes, the obligation to provide
human rights training is contained in article 10 of the Convention against
Torture.661 The UN Human Rights Committee has found a similar obligation in the
ICCPR.662

6.3 content assessment
424. As the Arar Commissioner observed, there is a need for caution when sharing
information.663 Sharing outdated, inaccurate or unreliable information can have
serious consequences, as it did in the case of Maher Arar. Some police-to-police
arrangements also require that the information be current and accurate.
425. The Arar Commissioner made the following recommendation:664
Recommendation 8
The RCMP should ensure that, whenever it provides information to other departments and agencies,
whether foreign and domestic, it does so in accordance with clearly established policies respecting
screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy and with relevant laws respecting personal
information and human rights.

426. Interpol places emphasis on ‘accuracy and relevance’ of information placed on its
databases.665
427. Ideally, once a request is determined to be for police-to-police assistance and
unlikely to expose anyone to a real risk of a human rights infringement, the
659
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requested information should be collated and each item of information screened
for relevance, accuracy, reliability and data protection. Again, these steps closely
follow the recommendations of the Arar Commissioner, who examined these
issues in detail.
428. Content assessment is equally valid for the assessment of information obtained
from a foreign source. This is particularly important when the foreign country has
a questionable human rights record and the information might have been obtained
under torture or other threats. It is a simple matter of public policy that such
information should be treated with scepticism. A written assessment of the
accuracy and reliability of the information should be attached to such information,
in order to alert others who read it. Unfortunately, as was seen in the Arar case,
RCMP officers, seeking a search warrant, relied on confessions obtained by Syria
from Mr Elmaati. The application did not alert the judicial officer to the nature of
the evidence or Syria’s poor human rights record.666 Similar use of questionable
confessional material has been used by Australian authorities to support a decision
to deny Australian torture victim Mamdouh Habib his passport.667
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429. Content assessment is referred to specifically in the police-to-police agreements
between Europol and the RCMP and the AFP.668 For example, article 10 of the
Europol-AFP agreement requires an assessment of the reliability of the source and
of the information being shared to be attached to all shared information. If such
an assessment is missing, then any attempt by the recipient to make its own
assessment must involve the supplying agency.
430. The importance of screening information is self-evident. Because it is not always
possible to predict how the information will be used once it has been shared, it is
important that the information be accurate and precise. The Arar Commissioner
was critical of the lack of precision in some of the documents shared with
American authorities: the terms ‘suspect’ and ‘person of interest’ were used
interchangeably; and emotive terms like ‘Islamic Extremist’ and ‘jihadist’ were also
used.669

6.3.1 relevance
431. Each piece of information to be shared should be screened for relevance, with
respect to the original request. In essence, the test for relevance provides a
nexus between the request and the information to be shared. Each piece of
information should only be shared if: first, it falls within the scope of the request;
and second, it is connected to the investigation being undertaken by the
requesting agency. This assumes that the request articulates the parameters of
the subject investigation.
The Arar Commissioner was of the view that relevance should be measured in
terms of “a possible connection or use to the recipient’s investigation”.670 His
Honour was of the view that the threshold for relevance need not be too high,
668
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assuming that reliability, accuracy, privacy and human rights assessments are
made and caveats are used.671

6.3.2 reliability of source and accuracy of information
432. As with reliability, it is important that information be accurate.
433. As Justice O’Connor observes: “sharing unreliable or inaccurate information does
not provide a sound foundation for identifying and thwarting real and dangerous
threats to national security and can cause irreparable harm to individuals’.672 It
does the reputation of a police agency no good if the information it shares is
unreliable. So it is in the best interests of an agency to classify for reliability.673
Or, in his Honour’s words: ‘Providing unreliable or inaccurate information to other
agencies is in no one’s best interests and can create potentially serious problems
for those who rely on it and possibly those who are the subjects of the
inaccuracies’.674
434. The Arar Commissioner stressed several times the importance of information
being accurate and precise.675 As his Honour observes, police should take special
care not to overstate or misrepresent information, because ‘statements made by
police officers tend to be taken at face value’.676 The Commissioner was critical of
the inaccuracies contained in some of the information about Mr Arar that Project
AOC shared with the Americans. He was concerned that it ‘was inflammatory and
unfairly prejudicial’ to Mr Arar.677 Commissioner Iacobucci had similar concerns
about the reliability and accuracy of information shared about Mr Almalki, Mr
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin.678
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435. An assessment of the reliability of the source of shared information should be
included with any shared information. This is in addition to an assessment of the
reliability of the content of the shared information. This is important as it alerts
the recipient of the information as to how cautiously they should approach the
information. Furthermore, in many ways it is important that the source be
assessed before the content can be accurately assessed. As the Arar
Commissioner observes, ‘reliability relates primarily to the source of the
information’.679

6.3.3 privacy provisions
436. Raab observes that data protection has two distinguishing elements that are
sometimes in conflict with each other: privacy protection and data security.680
The former is about protecting the privacy of individuals by, for example,
recognising an individual right to view and correct private data kept by police.
The latter is about maintaining the confidentiality of data held by police through
protecting data and computers from ‘hacking, unauthorised access, corruption of
data, or other damage’.681 Raab argues that both forms of data protection are
important and need to be addressed.
437. While originally developed in Europe,682 this dual-purpose view now prevails in
most jurisdictions and both the RCMP and AFP are bound by domestic privacy
legislation.683 As a matter of best practice, privacy should be considered in all
police-to-police arrangements due to the importance of individual privacy. In
relation to mutual legal assistance, a European provision for personal data
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protection stipulates that such data can only be used for evidentiary purposes with
the consent of the source agency or individual involved.684
438. Another factor that affects the integrity of personal data kept on file is that it will,
over time, become out-of-date. This is best remedied by giving shared
information a ‘use-by’ date, as discussed below.

6.4 content control: caveats
6.4.1 generally
439. As well as assessing the quality of shared content, it is also important to attempt
to exercise control over that content once it is shared. It is not possible to
guarantee that, once in the hands of others, information will not be misused.685
Therefore it is important to assert ownership of information and place conditions
on the use of information before it is shared. In Canada, this is commonly done
by way of caveats. In Australia, the position has been less clear and more
worrying.
440. When sharing information internationally, Interpol practice recognises that
ownership of any information in its databases remains in the hands of the
contributor.686 The information source may alter and delete their information.
The information source may also restrict access to certain parties and/or deny
access to others.
441. The Arar Commissioner was unequivocal in his recommendation:687
Recommendation 9
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The RCMP should never share information in a national security investigation without attaching
written caveats in accordance with existing policy. The RCMP should review existing caveats to
ensure that each precisely states which institutions are entitled to have access to the information
subject to the caveat and what use the institution may make of that information. Caveats should also
generally set out an efficient procedure for recipients to seek any changes to the permitted
distribution and use of the information.

442. The standard caveat used by the RCMP ensures that the information will not be
passed on to other agencies without RCMP approval. This provides the RCMP with
some level of control over how the information is used. Caveats are not legally
enforceable, but it is in the best interests of the receiving agency to observe them.
The Commissioner recommended that, when a caveat is breached, an objection
should be lodged with the breaching agency and the Foreign Minister of the
breaching country.688
443. The AFP is more relaxed in its approach and is resigned to the loss of control of
information once it has been shared. The AFP has indicated that they sometimes
place conditions on information shared with foreign agencies, though this is not
standard practice.689 When asked about this process, the acting National Manager
of AFP International and Border told a Senate Committee:690
At the end of the day, we cannot do an audit of a foreign law enforcement
agency. We have to respect their sovereignty but we have overseas police liaison
officers... They work quite closely with the local police, so we will get an indication
if a rampant or systemic breach has occurred of any conditions we may have
placed on the use of information.

444. So what does a caveat look like? There are many conditions which can be
imposed by a caveat. However, there are some commonly recognised caveats:
for example, a condition that that the shared information may only be used for the
purpose for which it was requested. Another common example is that the shared
information must not be passed on to any other agency. Another common caveat
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is that, if the recipient agency wishes to alter these terms, they must contact the
originating agency and ask for permission.
445. A caveat is not legally binding, but any foreign agency that breaches the caveat
risks its reputation as a reliable partner in international law enforcement.691 The
mandatory use of caveats helps to ensure that an agency maintains control of the
information it shares.
446. The Arar Commission stressed the superiority of written over oral or ‘implicit’
caveats, noting that ‘those who are considering breaching a caveat, which is a
type of agreement, will be less likely to do so in the face of a clear and express
written directive’.692

6.4.2 exercising control over information retention and deletion
447. Though not raised by the Arar Commissioner, another important caveat condition
expresses the need to control when the recipient agency should delete the
information. This might be upon request or after a certain amount of time.
448. Information needs to be revisited on a regular basis. Police intelligence is affected
by its input data and it is important that such data is accurate. One dimension of
information’s accuracy is its currency. Introducing a ‘use-by date’ on shared
information ensures that it is accurate and current. If a recipient agency wishes
to retain the information, then it should be required to contact the source agency
and re-request it. This will require the source agency to provide updated
information. This process might reveal important developments of which the
recipient agency might otherwise have been ignorant, such as the arrest,
conviction or flight of a person of interest.
449. Such conditions are recognised in the bilateral Europol agreements with the RCMP
and AFP.693 Both agreements require the other agency to delete information
691
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when requested. However, the time-limits are more vague. The Europol-RCMP
agreement requires personal information to be retained only as the recipient ‘has
a relevant use’ for it, ‘if not legally required to retain it for a longer period’.694 The
Europol-AFP agreement requires personal information to be deleted after six
months if the recipient party has no use for it.695 Ultimately, the vagueness of
these provisions is unsatisfactory because it could result in ‘stale’ information
remaining on the recipient agency’s file.

6.4.3 responding to breaches of caveats
450. The Arar Commissioner recommended that the breach of caveats by recipient
agencies should be dealt with at a very high level. Specifically, his Honour
recommended:696
Where Canadian agencies become aware that foreign agencies have made
improper use of information provided by a Canadian agency, a formal objection
should be made to the foreign agency and the foreign minister of the recipient
country.

451. The Commissioner stressed the need to object to the foreign agency and
diplomatically. Such an objection is not necessarily a negative exercise. As his
Honour notes:697
Objections to breaches of caveats may prompt productive discussions about
misunderstandings concerning information-sharing agreements with foreign
agencies and the scope of caveats. They may lead to constructive remedial
measures to make caveats and information-sharing agreements clearer and more
effective.

6.4.4 Improving Australian practice
452. Given the AFP’s unwillingness to caveat information, the Minister could direct the
AFP that all information shared across borders contain a written caveat stating
that the information:
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•

should not be passed to any other agency (international or domestic)
without permission of the AFP;

•

should not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it is
provided; and,

•

should be deleted after 6 months, or earlier if requested.

6.5 written cooperation agreements
453. The Arar Commissioner made a formal recommendation that all national securityrelated cooperation agreements between the RCMP and other agencies, both
foreign and domestic, ‘should be reduced to writing’.698 The need for written
agreements was particularly acute in the Arar case. After the September 11
terrorist attacks in the United States, RCMP officers from Project AOC shared
unprecedented amounts of information with US agents. Project AOC members
were under the impression that written caveats were no longer required (‘caveats
were down’), but that a mutual legal assistance request would be required if the
shared information was needed for court.699 The RCMP officers thought of Project
AOC as an 'open-book investigation', in which all information could be shared with
their American counterparts without screening for accuracy or relevance.
Information was first shared verbally, then later in documentary form. Officers
believed that RCMP information sharing policies did not need to be followed,
including caveats and respect for third party caveats (respecting the caveats of
other agencies).700 The Arar Commissioner was critical of this misunderstanding
of official policy. While his Honour accepted that there might be circumstances in
which there is an urgent need to establish a verbal cooperation agreement,
Commissioner O’Connor was critical that the terms of the Project AOC agreement

698
699
700

Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, Recommendation 2(e), 321.
Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 45.
Arar Commission, Factual Background Vol.1 (2006), n 172, 45-6.

– 179 –

were not committed to paper and distributed, and that no expiry date was set on
the verbal agreement.701
454. Though the Commissioner never expressly makes comment, it could be said that a
short review date should be set for such informal case-by-case agreements. This
will encourage the drafting of a more formal document in the medium term. By
the time of the review date, a draft MOU or letters of understanding should be
ready for consideration or the informal cooperation agreement might be scrapped
if the urgent need has passed.
455. In 2002 the Canadian Solicitor General issued a directive requiring the RCMP to
reduce agreements with foreign agencies to writing, and to obtain legal and
foreign affairs advice.702 The directive required the RCMP to keep a register of all
such agreements and to review the agreements regularly. In evidence to the
Inquiry, the RCMP Deputy Commissioner expressed his view that the directive did
not refer to day-to-day operational police-to-police cooperation.703 Commissioner
O’Connor disagreed, arguing that the agreements contemplated by the directive
applied more generally.704 While it was not necessary for agreements to be
‘unduly formal or lengthy’ or applicable to each piece of information exchanged,
his Honour believed that “written agreements should set out a general approach
within which ‘day-to-day’ exchanges may take place”.705

6.6 dealing with exceptions
456. It is important, when drafting guidelines for police-to-police cooperation, that they
not be completely inflexible. Crisis situations do arise, such as the days and
weeks immediately following 9/11 or the Bali bombings, in which it is not in the
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public interest for police to follow standard operating procedure. The very nature
of policing can, unlike the courts, require immediate action to prevent harm.
457. However, such exceptions to standard operating procedure, should be
contemplated in internal guidelines. Exceptions should be dealt with on a caseby-case basis. There should be no blanket exception for a particular type of
offence, such as terrorism.706 Given the serious consequences which could flow
from overriding established procedure, accountability should be an important
factor involving consultation with the Minister, who should report exceptional
circumstances to Parliament as soon as possible.
458. In relation to weighing potential benefits of cooperation against any potential
human rights violations, there will be limits. For example, the prohibition on
torture is absolute and is so fundamental a value that ‘it can never be legally
justified’.707 On the other hand, there might be extreme circumstances under
which cooperation in death penalty cases is justifiable. While the right to life is
also a fundamental non-derogable human right, I conclude below that there may
be circumstances in which the public interest will trump this individual right and
cooperation in death penalty cases could be acceptable. This suggests a complex
hierarchy of human rights to be considered before a Minister makes a decision to
override existing cooperation procedures.

6.6.1 credible and imminent threat to human life: an exception?
459. In short, this section deals with the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario. It concludes that this
scenario does not justify cooperation where there is a real risk of torture, but it
might justify cooperation where there is a real risk that someone will be executed.
460. The AFP’s death penalty guidelines were never originally intended to be standard
operating procedure, but were meant only to cover exceptional circumstances in
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which there is an imminent threat to human life: the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario.708 In
all other circumstances, the AFP should not put anyone at real risk of execution.
This is a matter of both practicality and principle.
461. However, there are instances where Australian agents could be in possession of
credible information suggesting that explosive devices have been planted in a
crowded public place in a foreign country which retains the death penalty. It
would be criminally negligent not to pass that information on immediately if to do
so would save lives. In these circumstances, the Minister should have the power
to authorise cooperation with foreign agencies without a guarantee that the death
penalty will not be sought or carried out. As an extra safeguard, the Minister
should be required to inform Parliament that she or he has exercised this
discretion.
462. The requirement of imminence to this exception should be stressed. If there is
time to seek a request that no one will be executed as a result of information
sharing or cooperation, then that request should be made. However, if time is of
the essence to save human lives, then the Minister should have the power to
authorise police to share the information without a guarantee that the death
penalty will not be sought or carried out. I note the need for ministerial approval
and the need for the Minister to inform Parliament that she or he has done so.
463. Another requirement to be stressed is an assessment of the credibility of the
intelligence suggesting an imminent threat. If it is not highly credible, serious
consideration should be given to requesting a no-capital-punishment guarantee
before the cooperating with foreign agencies.
464. Accordingly, the AFP death penalty guidelines should be reviewed to ensure that
they are not misinterpreted as standard operating procedure, but exceptional
operating procedure. It should also be clear that information may only be
provided in non-exceptional death penalty situations (both pre- and post-charge)
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when either: there is a guarantee from a competent foreign body that no one will
be executed; or, when such cooperation is exculpatory.
465. Torture, on the other hand, should not be the subject of this exception. The
prohibition on torture is absolute. The Arar Commission was unequivocal in its
recommended that ‘[i]nformation should never be provided to a foreign country
where there is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use of
torture’.709 CSIS Director Jim Judd endorsed this view, when he publicly
repudiated the following statement from a senior CSIS lawyer:710
The simple truth is that if we get information that can prevent something like the
Air India bombing, the twin towers, or whatever, frankly, that is the time we will
use [information obtained under torture], despite the provenance of that
information.

466. So the obvious question arises: why should torture and death penalty cases be
treated differently? At first glance, they are both the subject of non-derogable
human rights guarantees and both singled out for their own specific human rights
treaties. It seems to me that the answer lies in the way in which the information
was gathered.
467. Information obtained under torture is the product of a human rights violation and
is highly unreliable. The Canadian torture cases are just another example of the
unreliable nature of information extracted this way. Given this lack of credibility,
such information could not satisfy the test for a ‘credible and imminent threat to
human life’. Police could never be certain that acting on such information would
actually save lives, or simply divert resources away from other important
problems. Nor can such information ever be obtained (under torture) without
violating human rights.
468. With respect to capital punishment, circumstances are different. Assuming the
intelligence is credible and obtained in a lawful fashion, it would be negligent not
to act on that intelligence; not to save human lives. An abolitionist country like
709
710
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Canada and Australia would still not cooperate in the subsequent investigation and
prosecution, unless a guarantee is forthcoming.
469. Both the right to life and the right to be free from torture are jus cogens at
international law.711 However, while the prohibition on torture is absolute at
international law, the right to life is qualified by a codified exception recognising
the death penalty for the ‘most serious crimes’.712
470. A further distinction is that information extracted under torture can only be
obtained extra-judicially. Whereas, lawful execution will only occur after a judicial
determination of guilt and sentencing procedures.
471. To summarise, it is the way the intelligence is gathered that distinguishes the two
scenarios. In the torture scenario, a human rights violation is committed to obtain
(questionable) intelligence. In the death penalty scenario, credible intelligence is
available of an imminent human rights violation and to do nothing is worse than
sharing the information.
472. This leads to the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of human rights.713 The only
other human right with jus cogens status is the prohibition on slavery.714 Police
should also refuse to cooperate in cases where it would assist the slave trade.
Police should also exercise caution in relation to other non-derogable rights, such
as the guarantees against imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation
and against retrospective criminal laws, and the freedoms of thought, conscience
711
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and religion.715 Ultimately, implications for any other human rights obligations
should be weighed in the balance against the public interest.

6.7 implementation
473. One of the great challenges for transnational policing today is living up to its
commitment to human rights. The international legal framework of transnational
policing has largely developed in a culture of respect for national sovereignty, at
the expense of individual rights. As this model is likely to continue into the
foreseeable future, ethical standards and police accountability will continue to be
the responsibility of domestic law. However, there are some improvements that
could be made to transnational policing at the international level.
474. The likelihood of a treaty-based codification of standards for transnational policing
is unlikely in the short term, especially given the example of Interpol’s inability to
draft a treaty. However, a UN Rapporteur on transnational policing could be
established under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), perhaps attached to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) or the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Such a
Rapporteur could be asked to research, draft and encourage the adoption of ‘best
practice’ guidelines for transnational policing, similar to the guidelines established
for best practice in inter alia policing and treatment of prisoners.716 Another
helpful initiative could be sponsored by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights: namely, an international forum for domestic arms-length police
oversight bodies to meet and exchange experiences and expertise.
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475. The UN has adopted model treaties for international assistance in criminal
matters: namely, extradition and mutual legal assistance.717 It makes sense for a
third model treaty to deal with transnational policing, another increasingly
important form of international assistance in criminal matters. Alternatively, a
model police-to-police agreement, perhaps based on Interpol’s model bilateral
agreement718 or the recent Europol agreements, could be drafted to incorporate
important human rights protections such as an understanding that all cooperation
is provided on the understanding that any assistance will not be used to breach an
individual’s rights, such as through torture or execution. By placing this caveat at
the MOU or even treaty-level, the need to evaluate human rights factors on a
case-by-case basis would be greatly alleviated.

6.8 centralisation of decision making: internal
oversight
476. Another important recommendation of the Arar Commission is that the existing
centralisation of information sharing decisions be maintained and improved.719 His
Honour notes that centralisation provides many useful purposes, including: as a
check that information sharing procedures are being applied consistently; as a
level of review and accountability; as a management tool ‘allowing coordination of
investigations’. Commissioner O’Connor also noted that the RCMP needs to be
adequately resourced to implement this recommendation.720
477. The centralised unit also acts as one contact point for international agencies,
making the exchange of information more efficient, by reducing the time to
identify the correct agency and office to approach for information.
717
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478. The new AFP death penalty guidelines provide for internal oversight prior to
someone being arrested or detained.721 All requests must be sent through the
International Desk/AFP Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC) in Canberra. A
decision to cooperate must be authorised by the AFP’s Manager International
Network or the National Manager Border and International.

6.9 the need for external oversight
479. While internal oversight is important, there is a need for external oversight to
ensure public confidence in transnational policing. Such external oversight could
be provided by either a parliamentary or statutory body, regularly auditing police
practice. The Arar Commissioner also recommended that all information sharing
practices and arrangements be subject to review by an independent, arms-length
body.722
480. According to the Paul Kennedy, Chairman of the independent Commission for
Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC), the CPC was unable to say in 2009
whether ‘the RCMP has implemented the recommendations of Justice O'Connor, or
if such recommendations, if implemented, are either being adhered to or are
adequate to achieve their stated purpose’.723 This is due to legislative restraints on
the CPC, which allow the RCMP to withhold information from the oversight body.
Despite the recommendations of the Arar Commission and a separate report on
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the governance of the RCMP,724 there was still no independent body which can
come in and audit RCMP operations and policy in the mid-2000s.725
481. This is why ministerial oversight is also a useful form of external oversight. The
new AFP death penalty guidelines provide for external oversight once a person is
charged, convicted or sentenced.726 All cooperation must be approved by the
Attorney-General or Home Affairs Minister. A bi-annual report of all cooperation
(both pre- and post-charge) must be sent to the Minister.

6.10Australia-specific requirements
6.10.1

Amending the AFP Act

482. I recommend that the AFP Act and death penalty guidelines should be amended to
ensure the protection of human rights and Australia’s compliance with its
international obligations. Unlike Canada, or any other common law jurisdiction,
Australia does not have a comprehensive national legislative or constitutional Bill
or Charter of Rights. This is the Federal Court could find that the AFP had acted
lawfully in the Bali Nine case.727
483. Surprisingly, in 2006 the federal Attorney-General’s Department expressed the
view that police are not bound by Australia’s human rights obligations under the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.728 The
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Department argued that those treaties have not been adopted into domestic law
and are, therefore, not legally binding.
484. The AFP took the view that, irrespective of Australia’s international human rights
obligations, it is obliged by Australia’s international obligations to cooperate and
share information with foreign law enforcement agencies. The AFP points to
Australia’s treaty obligations under various UN anti-drug and anti-terrorist
treaties.729
485. However, the UN has made it abundantly clear that human rights must be
respected in the “wars” against drugs and terror. In 2002, the UN General
Assembly stressed that “respect for all human rights is and must be an essential
component of measures taken to address the drug problem”.730 In 2001, the UN
General Assembly reaffirmed that “all measures to counter terrorism must be in
strict conformity with the relevant provisions of international law, including
international human rights standards”.731
486. To remedy this culture of ignoring human rights, section 8 of the AFP Act should
be amended to add a core operational function to ‘respect and protect human
rights’.732 Concurrently, it is important that human rights training be updated, in
order to encourage a human rights culture among rank-and-file police.733
487. This is not so revolutionary, considering that the enforcement and protection of
human rights is being increasingly recognised as one of the core functions of
policing.734 This is especially so in the realm of transnational policing, in which
729

e.g. Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Hansard (4/9/2006) 2 (evidence of FA Tim Morris,
Acting National Manager, International and Border, Australian Federal Police).
730
UN General Assembly, International cooperation against the world drug problem (24 January
2002) UN Doc. A/RES/56/124.
731
UN General Assembly, Human Rights and Terrorism (13 February 2002) UN Doc. A/RES/56/160.
732
the phrases ‘respect human rights’ and ‘protect human rights’ are taken from the UN Charter.
They also appear in Victoria’s Public Administration Act (2004) s.7(1)(g), which binds Victorian
police.
733
for more detail, see [391] & [423].
734
Crawshaw et al (2007), n 623, 26: ‘the protection of human rights is a police function’. See
also: J. Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: towards a sociology of global policing
(2002) 156.
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law enforcement agencies are increasingly policing international human rights
treaties, such as the conventions against people trafficking and child
pornography.735
488. The AFP death penalty guidelines should also be modified to ensure that they are
not misinterpreted. It should be clear that information may only be provided in all
death penalty situations (both pre- and post-charge) when either: there is a
guarantee from a competent foreign body that no one will be executed; or, when
such cooperation is exculpatory. The only exception should be when there is an
imminent threat to human life, and then only with ministerial approval and a
report to Parliament.
489. Had these changes to the AFP Act and death penalty guidelines been in place
when the AFP volunteered information to the Indonesian police about the Bali
Nine,736 the outcome would have been very different. In all potential capital
cases, the requirement for a condition that the assistance will not lead to anyone’s
execution should be mandatory.
490. Such a mandatory requirement could be legislated or it could take the form of a
ministerial direction to the AFP. Section 37(2) of the AFP Act grants the Justice
Minister the power to direct AFP general policy. The AFP Commissioner must
comply with the Minister’s directions.737
491. It is, of course, important not to be absolutist about this. There will be
exceptional circumstances in which lives can imminently be saved by the exchange
of information or other cooperation. In those cases, ministerial approval should
be required.
735

e.g. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography [2007] ATS 6 (entered into force 8 February 2007); and,
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime [2005] ATS

27 (entered into force 14 October 2005).
Paul Toohey, ‘Death Dealing: a secret AFP memo may have doomed the Bali Nine’, The Bulletin
(Sydney), 16 November 2005,
<http://bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/site/articleIDs/4D99AA1EC72B3763CA2570B8007F2B0B> .
737
Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s.37(4).
736

– 190 –

7 Some Final Remarks for Further Research
7.1.1 Agency-to-Agency legislation
492. While this paper is about transnational police-to-police cooperation, many of the
lessons could be extrapolated and applied to other agency-to-agency cooperation.
Other agencies which cooperate transnationally include immigration, customs,
intelligence and financial tracking agencies. The potential exists for human rights
violations to occur when such cooperation arises. Such transnational inter-agency
cooperation is increasing, as confirmed by Mr Jack Hooper, Assistant Director of
Operations for CSIS:738
“compromising al-Qaeda operations requires an unprecedented level…of
cooperation between police, law enforcement, immigration officials and the like,
not just domestically, but internationally as well.”

493. Extradition and mutual legal assistance are governed by statute,739 have built-in
human rights safeguards and provide for judicial oversight and review of
decisions.740 They are sometimes referred to as ‘formal assistance’.
494. Transnational agency-to-agency assistance, sometimes referred to as ‘informal
assistance’, is not governed by statute. There is often no recourse to the courts
for a person aggrieved by such assistance, as was demonstrated when members
of the Bali Nine took the AFP to court.741
495. To correct this anomaly, a framework Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act could be
drafted, providing human rights safeguards and legal remedies and formalising
this form of international assistance.
496. An Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act only needs to set out the legal framework for
international cooperation, it does not need to micro-manage such assistance. It
738
739
740

Arar Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) n 175, 102.
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth).

the extradition process includes a hearing before a Magistrate. Decisions made under the
mutual assistance Act can be reviewed by a court under the ADJR Act.
741
Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12 (Finn J).
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sets the boundaries for assistance, in which agencies may operate according to
their own discretion.
497. The legislation should bind all Australian agencies, including the military.
Australia’s human rights obligations under the Convention Against Torture and the
Second Optional Protocol are non-derogable – even in times of war.742
498. An Agency-to-Agency Assistance Act should provide that assistance which has a
negative human rights connotation should never be provided to countries that
violate human rights.743 The Act should state that assistance should not be
provided if it exposes anyone to the real risk of execution or torture.
499. The Act should include an exception for death penalty situations in which there is
an imminent threat to human life. Under such exceptional circumstances, there
should be a ministerial discretion to assist. However, Parliament should be
informed. This exception should not apply to torture.
500. The Act should stipulate that all information shared with foreign agencies must
contain a written caveat restricting its use. Information collected by Australia
belongs to Australia and we should maintain control of it.
501. The Act should provide that all agency-to-agency treaties and MOU are subject to
the Act. The Act should require that all such treaties and MOU contain an express
clause that all cooperation takes place, and all information is shared, on the
understanding that no one will be executed or tortured. This also eliminates the
need to obtain guarantees on a case-by-case basis.744

742

Convention Against Torture Article 2(2): ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war…or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
for torture’. Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Article 6(2) (Australia did not enter a war-time
reservation under Article 2 when acceding to the Protocol).
743
this is the test used in Canada for police-to-police assistance: see [91].
744
police complain that the need to obtain death penalty guarantees adds frustrating delays to the
work of obtaining extradition and providing assistance: e.g. Les Kennedy, ‘Loophole left three to
rot in jail’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 April 1997, 19. By including these guarantees at the
treaty-level, there is no need to obtain individual guarantees on a case-by-case basis, thus saving
valuable police time and resources.
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Appendix 1: International Counter-Terrorism Instruments
entered into force
treaty
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents

date

aka
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internationally

Australia

Canada

1963
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[1970] ATS 14

4 December 1969

20 September 1970

5 February 1970

[1972] ATS 16

14 October 1971

9 December 1972

24 July 1972

[1973] ATS 24

26 January 1973

11 August 1973

26 January 1973

1970
1971

(Unlawful Seizure Convention, aka
Hijacking Convention)
(Civil Aviation Convention, aka
Montréal Convention)

1973

(Diplomatic agents Convention)

[1977] ATS 18

20 February 1977

20 July 1977

20 February 1977

1979

(Hostages Convention)

[1990] ATS 17

3 June 1983

20 June 1990

3 January 1986

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and
supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety)
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
746
Navigation
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
747
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

1980

(Nuclear Materials Convention)

[1987] ATS 16

8 February 1987

22 October 1987

8 February 1987

1988

(Airport Protocol)

[1990] ATS 39

6 August 1989

22 November 1990

1 September 1993

1988

(Maritime Convention)

[1993] ATS 10

1 March 1992

20 May 1993

16 September 1993

1998

(Fixed Platform Protocol)

[1993] ATS 11

1 March 1992

20 May 1993

16 September 1993

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection

1991

(Plastic Explosives Convention)

[2007] ATS 25

21 June 1998

25 August 2007

21 June 1998

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings

1997

(Terrorist Bombing Convention)

[2002] ATS 17

23 May 2002

8 September 2002

3 May 2002

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

1999

(Terrorist Financing Convention)

[2002] ATS 23

1 April 2001

26 October 2002

10 April 2002

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

2005

(Nuclear Terrorism Convention)

[2005] ATNIF 20

7 July 2007

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
745

745
746
747
748
749

as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force; ratified by Australia 17 July 2008; not signed by Canada.
as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force.
as at 1 June 2009: amendments not in force.
Australia signed 14 September 2005. As at 1 June 2009, Australia has not ratified.
Canada signed 14 September 2005. As at 1 June 2009, Canada has not ratified.
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